REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

The defendants in this jail conditions case move for summary judgment against pro se inmate plaintiff Dwayne Stovall.

I. Sixth Amendment

Previously the Court screened this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case and ruled that Stovall stated a Sixth Amendment claim against Liberty County, Georgia police detective Charles Woodall. Doc. 6, reported at 2013 WL 1339712 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2013), adopted, doc. 39 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2014) (Stovall II). That claim is now subject to this Court's recent ruling in an earlier Stovall lawsuit against different defendants. Stovall v. State Dist. Atty, CV412-204 (S.D. Ga. Jul. 30, 2012) (Stovall I). There he claimed that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated when jail officials refused to grant him private meetings with his public defender regarding criminal charges against him. Id., doc. 8, reported at 2012 WL 5722604 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2012). Stovall, this Court ruled, stated a claim that defendants had violated his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. doc. 8 at 5.1

The Court, however, has since abrogated that ruling, concluding that Stovall's case must be dismissed because he failed to plead prejudice even if guards overheard those conversations. Doc. 48 at 6-7. Also, no

Id. at 7-8 (cite omitted).

Finally, Stovall's "surviving § 1983 claim rests upon the assertion that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated merely because his conversations with counsel may have been overheard by a jail guard. Such an assertion falls short of making out a claim for relief under § 1983." Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Speculation, after all, can advance no legal claim. See Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 1363544 at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2014).

In this case against a new batch of Liberty County defendants, Stovall alleges that on January 11, 2013, he was deprived of his right to meet with his lawyer in confidence to discuss his then-upcoming criminal trial.2 CV413-025, doc. 1 at 5. A jail official refused to depart earshot range when he tried to confer with counsel. Id. He also suspects that, despite a jail official's assurance, an intercom system was left on to capture his conversations with counsel. Id. He insists that (in raw, unedited form except for bracketed additions):

Id. Stovall thus sues Woodall for listening in on his attorney-client conferences.3 Id. As it did in Stovall I, the Court ruled that he stated a Sixth Amendment claim against Woodall. CV413-225, doc. 6 at 3. But also as in Stovall I, the Court is now abrogating that ruling and concluding this claim must be dismissed as Heck-barred.

Nor has Stovall pled anything beyond sheer speculation on the prejudice component of this Sixth Amendment claim, so it fails on those grounds, too. Under the earlier-cited screening authority, doc. 6 at 2 n. 1, then, Stovall's Sixth Amendment claim must be dismissed, which means Woodall must be dropped as a defendant outright. That, in turn, moots his summary judgment motion. Doc. 28.

II. First Amendment, Due Process

In contrast to Stovall I, plaintiff also raises separate First Amendment and Due Process claims here. See Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 583-84 (5th Cir. 2014) (First Amendment, prison censorship case); Daker v. Chatman, 2007 WL 4061961 at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2007) (due process, prison censorship case). He says that in January 2012, he purchased a Georgia law enforcement handbook that arrived in paper and CD-ROM form. Brigitte Pittman, the jail's mail clerk, "placed the disc in my inmate property"4 and never told him that it had arrived. CV413-025, doc. 1 at 6. Another jail official did the same when an updating disk arrived months later. Id.

Also, in May 2012, Stovall subscribed to a magazine called "Smooth." He says it is "approved by [the] Georgia Dept. of Corrections publications list," but Pittman routed it to his property locker because she considered it "inappropriate" despite its lack of nudity or "sexual exploitation." doc. 1 at 6-7. She did this, he complains, despite the fact that another "inmate receives `Maxim' which is banned from some Georgia jails." Id. at 7. Plaintiff says he administratively grieved the matter to no avail,5 and the jail refused to forward his magazines to his home. Id. at 7. When Stovall later inquired about his CD-ROMs, "Lt. Markham and Sgt. Donaldson stated there [were] no CD-discs in my property [locker]." Id. at 7-8. His later inquiries to Pittman yielded no response. And his "stored" magazines are now also missing. Id. at 8. He raised property-deprivation, First Amendment, and Due Process claims. Id.

The Court dismissed Stovall's property-loss claims in light of available state remedies, doc. 6 at 6-7, then concluded that he stated First Amendment (censorship) and Due Process violations against defendants Pittman and Duncan. Doc. 6 at 7-8. Those defendants now move for summary judgment6 on those claims. Doc. 28. They raise a variety of defenses, including qualified immunity. Doc. 28-1. In their summary judgment filings they insist they were merely applying jail policy against the circulation of smut and weaponizable CD-ROM disks. Doc. 26-7 at 2 (Duncan attests that neither he nor his staff recall "Smooth" magazine even arriving at the jail, but even if it did, consultation of its 2012-2013 online version — for the period when Stovall was in their jail — reveals that they would have censored same "on the ground that it contains sexually explicit material."); doc. 26-3 at 2 (Pittman attests that she recalls no receipt of "Smooth" but, pursuant to jail policy, deferred to her supervisors' judgment on whether to place it in Stovall's property locker rather than deliver it to Stovall).

Under Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1987), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), Stovall's First Amendment rights7 yield to a prison regulation reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95. "The restrictions must be warranted by state interests related both reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment 16A C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 679 (Mar. 2014). But there is no clearly established law on what sexual content materials cannot be banned without violating the First Amendment.8

Here Stovall, who has since admitted to ultimately receiving (after he was transferred from the jail) one CD-ROM and some of his Smooth magazines, doc. 35 at 2,9 does not otherwise challenge the stated jail policy censoring sexual content — except to speculate that there simply must have been some non-smutty, print versions that could have been delivered to him. Doc. 32 at 8-9 (insisting, with no affidavit or record support, that the "Smooth" magazine samples submitted by the defense are more explicit than what the publisher, if instructed about content limitations, would have sent to the jail); doc. 35 at 3. The Court agrees with the defendants that self-serving declarations like that create no fact issue. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (11th Cir. 1991).

Defendants have also shown that CD-ROMs can be weaponized and thus a valid jail policy bans them. doc. 26-3 at 2 ¶ 10 ("Inmates are not permitted to have cd-roms due to the risk that they may be broken and the sharp edges may be used as a weapon. If an inmate is sent a cd-rom, it is the practice of jail staff to place it in the inmate's property locker."). Stovall does not challenge that justification, and admits that he ultimately received one of his CD-ROMs when he was transferred out of the jail. doc. 32; doc. 26-2 at 50, 64. His CD-ROM-based claims thus fail.

Finally, qualified immunity shields government officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). Conduct violates clearly established law when "the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 2083 (quotes, cite, and alterations omitted); Keith, 2014 WL 1614291 at *6-7. Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff must rebut its applicability. Keith, 2014 WL 1614291 at *7

Since there is no clearly established law on the limits of sexual-content censorship,'10 the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Stauffer, 741 F.3d at 584-87 (state prison employees were immune from damages in their individual capacity to prisoner's claim that they violated his First Amendment free speech rights by confiscating his magazines under Sex Offender Treatment Program rule, where prisoner did not prove that those rights were clearly established at time of alleged violations). And Stovall has since been transferred out of the jail and into a state prison, doc. 26-1 at 8; doc. 26-2 at 63, so no injunctive relief could be sought without colliding with the mootness doctrine. Hence, defendants Duncan and Pittman are entitled to summary judgment.11

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court should GRANT defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 28) and DISMISS Dwayne Stovall's case WITH PREJUDICE.

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED