MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RONALD E. BUSH, Chief Magistrate Judge.

Pending before this Court is Petitioner Lance Jonathan Bruhnke's Petition for Review (Docket No. 1), seeking review of the Social Security Administration's final decision to deny his claim for Supplemental Security Income. See generally Pet. for Review (Docket No. 1). This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Having carefully considered the record and otherwise being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order:

I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

On February 7, 2012, Lance Jonathan Bruhnke ("Petitioner") filed an application for Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2012. Petitioner's claim was initially denied on April 12, 2012 and, again, on reconsideration on June 22, 2012. On July 8, 2012, Petitioner timely filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). On October 31, 2013, ALJ R.J. Payne held a hearing in Spokane, Washington, at which time Petitioner, represented by attorney Erica L. Wood, appeared and testified, along with impartial medial expert, Margaret Moore, Ph.D. A supplemental hearing was held on February 19, 2014 in Spokane, Washington, at which time impartial vocational expert, Deborah Lapoint appeared and testified.

On May 29, 2014, the ALJ issued a Decision denying Petitioner's claim, finding that Petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Petitioner timely requested review from the Appeals Council on July 23, 2014 and, on July 24, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Petitioner's Request for Review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Petitioner timely filed the instant action, arguing that the ALJ improperly concluded that Petitioner was not performing at his full capacity. See Pet.'s Brief, p. 2 (Docket No. 15). Specifically, Petitioner contends that (1) the ALJ erred by failing to properly explain the weight given (or give appropriate weight) to opinion evidence from lay witnesses; and (2) the ALJ erred by failing to properly weigh the examining psychologist's opinion. See id. at pp. 11-15. Petitioner therefore requests that the Court either reverse the ALJ's decision denying Petitioner's claim for disability benefits, or, alternatively, remand the case for further proceedings and award attorneys' fees. See Pet. for Review, p. 3 (Docket No. 1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To be upheld, the Commissioner's decision must be supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Matney ex. rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). Findings as to any question of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In other words, if there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's factual decisions, they must be upheld, even when there is conflicting evidence. See Hall v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979).

"Substantial evidence" is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993); Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). The standard requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance (see Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)), and "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

With respect to questions of fact, the role of the Court is to review the record as a whole to determine whether it contains evidence that would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions of the ALJ. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; see also Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony (see Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984)), resolving ambiguities (see Vincent ex. rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984)), and drawing inferences logically flowing from the evidence (see Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment or interpretation of the record for that of the ALJ. See Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457; Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985).

With respect to questions of law, the ALJ's decision must be based on proper legal standards and will be reversed for legal error. See Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019. The ALJ's construction of the Social Security Act is entitled to deference if it has a reasonable basis in law. See id. However, reviewing federal courts "will not rubber-stamp an administrative decision that is inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrates the congressional purpose underlying the statute." See Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sequential Process

In evaluating the evidence presented at an administrative hearing, the ALJ must follow a sequential process in determining whether a person is disabled in general (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920) — or continues to be disabled (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594, 416.994) — within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful. "Substantial work activity" is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). "Gainful work activity" is work that is usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b). If the claimant has engaged in SGA, disability benefits are denied, regardless of how severe her physical/mental impairments are and regardless of her age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the analysis proceeds to the second step. Here, the ALJ found that Petitioner has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 7, 2012, Petitioner's application date. See (AR 35).

The second step requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe and meets the duration requirement. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if it significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is "not severe" when medical and other evidence establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, disability benefits are denied. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Here, the ALJ found that Petitioner had the following severe impairments: "borderline intellectual functioning and learning disorder." (AR 35-38).

The third step requires the ALJ to determine the medical severity of any impairments; that is, whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the answer is yes, the claimant is considered disabled under the Social Security Act and benefits are awarded. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant's impairments neither meet nor equal one of the listed impairments, the claimant's case cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See id. Here, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner's above-listed impairments, while severe, do not meet or medically equal, either singly or in combination, the criteria established for any of the qualifying impairments. See (AR 38-39).

The fourth step of the evaluation process requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is sufficient for the claimant to perform past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). An individual's RFC is his ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. Likewise, an individual's past relevant work is work performed within the last 15 years or 15 years prior to the date that disability must be established; also, the work must have lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do the job and be engaged in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 404.1565, 416.960(b), 416.965. Here, the ALJ determined that Petitioner has the RFC "to perform a full range or work at all exertional levels." (AR 23). Specifically:

(AR 39-42).

In the fifth and final step, if it has been established that a claimant can no longer perform past relevant work because of his impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant retains the ability to do alternate work and to demonstrate that such alternate work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); see also Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993). If the claimant is able to do other work, he is not disabled; if the claimant is not able to do other work and meets the duration requirement, he is disabled. Here, the ALJ found that Petitioner has no past relevant work. See (AR 42). However, the ALJ further found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Petitioner can perform, including housekeeper/cleaner, hand packager, and automobile detailer. See (AR 43). Therefore, based on Petitioner's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner "has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 21, 2012, through the date of this decision." (AR 44).

B. Analysis

1. Lay Witness Testimony

Petitioner contends that the ALJ did not properly consider evidence from two lay witnesses: (1) Petitioner's brother, Kurt Bruhnke; and (2) TESH commercial services manager, Howard Hogan. See Pet.'s Brief, pp. 11-12 (Docket No. 15). The evidence referred to from Mr. Bruhnke is a November 6, 2013 letter, which Petitioner characterizes as stating the following:

See id. at p. 10 (citing (AR 389-90)). As to Mr. Hogan, the evidence referred to is a February 14, 2014 letter with attachments, which Petitioner characterizes as stating the following:

See id. at pp. 9-10 (citing/quoting (AR 394)).

Within the May 29, 2014 Decision, the ALJ discussed certain third-party statements, including those from Petitioner's sister-in-law, Melissa Bruhnke, and Mr. Hogan. See AR (41). With regard to these opinions, the ALJ concluded:

(AR 41); see also (AR 40-41) (AJL discussing statements from TESH representatives, concluding: "In this case, [Petitioner] has been able to be successful in his first real job assignment, and he is to be applauded for taking the opportunity he has been given to do his very best. Indeed, he himself believes he can work, which is borne out by the positive work experience he currently has.") (citing (AR 346-78)). Relevant here however, the ALJ made no mention of either Mr. Bruhnke or the statements made within his November 6, 2013 letter. Petitioner now argues that the ALJ committed error in not addressing Mr. Bruhnke's statements, and in failing to give proper weight to certain of Mr. Hogan's opinions. The undersigned disagrees.

Lay witness testimony as to a claimant's symptoms or how an impairment affects the claimant's ability to work is competent evidence that the ALJ must consider. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). Competent lay witness testimony "cannot be disregarded without comment," and to discount competent lay witness testimony, the ALJ "must give reasons that are germane to each witness." Id.; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). But the ALJ is not required to discuss every witness's testimony on an individualized, witness-by-witness basis. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather, if the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different witness. See id. (citing Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that, because "the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [the claimant's] own subjective complaints, and because [the lay witness's] testimony was similar to such complaints, it follows that the ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting [the lay witness's] testimony")). The applicable regulations are in accord; they require the ALJ to consider testimony from family and friends submitted on behalf of the claimant, but do not require the ALJ to provide express reasons for rejecting testimony from each lay witness. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 404.1545(a)(3); see also SSR 06-03p (recognizing that "there is a distinction between what an adjudicator must consider and what the adjudicator must explain in the disability determination or decision").

As to Mr. Bruhnke, Respondent appropriately points out that his testimony (reflected in Petitioner's above-characterization of the same) aligns with that of Ms. Bruhnke's (Mr. Bruhnke's wife and Petitioner's sister-in-law). See Resp.'s Brief, p. 7 (Docket No. 16) ("Here, [Mr.] Bruhnke's lay witness statement about his observations of Petitioner's difficulties retaining information, problems doing tasks that he ([Mr.] Bruhnke) and his wife gave Petitioner to do without their supervision, comprehending things, completing forms, and poor judgment in managing money was very similar to the statement of [Ms.] Bruhnke ([Mr.] Bruhnke's wife and Petitioner's sister-in-law) of her observations of Petitioner which the ALJ noted and provided germane reasons to reject.") (internal citations omitted). To be sure, Petitioner characterizes Ms. Bruhnke's observations as stating the following:

See Pet.'s Brief, p. 10 (Docket No. 15) (citing (AR 301-06)). These observations from Ms. Bruhnke logically track those from Mr. Bruhnke, such that the ALJ's consideration of Ms. Bruhnke's testimony — constituting germane reasons for "rejecting"1 Ms. Bruhnke's testimony — applies equally to Mr. Bruhnke's testimony (even though the ALJ did not specifically address Mr. Bruhnke's testimony). That is to say the ALJ's oversight in not considering Mr. Bruhnke's testimony represents harmless error. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 ("[A]n ALJ's failure to comment upon lay witness testimony is harmless where `the same evidence that the ALJ referred to in discrediting [the claimant's] claims also discredits [the lay witness's] claims.'") (quoting Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 560 (8th Cir. 2011)).

Turning to Mr. Hogan, Petitioner argues that the ALJ "failed to incorporate or reject Mr. Hogan's description of the Petitioner struggling with change." Pet.'s Brief, p. 12 (Docket No. 15) (citing (AR 394)). But Mr. Hogan wasn't so precise on this nuanced aspect, stating only that, "[w]hen [Petitioner] was originally assigned to two different crews, it was difficult for him to keep on track" and that "[i]t was confusing for him trying to find his way around two large buildings and take direction from two supervisors with different communication styles." (AR 394)). In the Court's mind, such statements do not equate to Petitioner absolutely struggling with changes in a routine work setting that must be accounted for under SSR 85-15. See (AR 40-41) (ALJ nonetheless discussing SSR 85-15 in context of Petitioner's medically determinable impairments and /'learning difficulties"); see also (AR 411) (Gerald Gardner, Ph.D., opining that Petitioner "appears capable of simple and concrete adjustments to change."). Additionally, Petitioner's January 28, 2014 Work Evaluation (preceding Mr. Hogan's letter by approximately two weeks) indicates — like the ALJ concluded — that, within his limitations, Petitioner can be successful in a work environment, and beyond the structured environment provided by TESH. Therein, Petitioner's supervisor, Al Clayton, testified that:

(AR 395-97). With all this in mind, like Mr. Bruhnke's statements (see supra), the ALJ's handling of Mr. Hogan's statements were appropriate and germane when considering the balance of evidence contained in the record.

2. Petitioner's Examining Psychologist's Opinion

Petitioner claims the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Rehnberg's opinion. See Pet.'s Brief, pp. 12-15 (Docket No. 15). The ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical testimony. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. The ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted medical opinion of a treating or examining physician, or specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting contradicted opinions, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). However, "[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings." Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012). Additionally, the ALJ may discount physicians' opinions based on internal inconsistencies, inconsistencies between their opinions and other evidence in the record, or other factors the ALJ deems material to resolving ambiguities. See Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1999).

Dr. Rehnberg examined Petitioner on September 25, 2013, completing a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (the "Assessment") on October 2, 2013. See (AR 439-50). Within the Assessment, Dr. Rehnberg concluded that Petitioner had marked2 limitations in Petitioner's:

See (AR 447-50). Dr. Rehnberg went on to conclude that Petitioner had moderate3 limitations in Petitioner's:

See (AR 448-49). Finally, Dr. Rehnberg concluded that Petitioner had mild4 limitations in Petitioner's:

(AR 447-50).

Petitioner claims that the ALJ did not give these opinions (presumably those representing either marked or moderate limitations) the appropriate level of deference, and/or articulate specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the same. See Pet.'s Brief, p. 13 (Docket No. 15). The ALJ noted that Dr. Rehnberg (and others) opined that Petitioner was capable of performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. See (AR 37, 41-42). However, the ALJ took issue with any notion that such tasks were all that Petitioner could accomplish and, in this respect, rejected Dr. Rehnberg's opinions to the extent they suggest the opposite. In doing so, the ALJ referenced (1) Dr. Moore's testimony at the October 31, 2013 hearing, (2) Gerald Gardner, Ph.D.'s opinions, (3) Petitioner's employment with TESH, and (4) Petitioner's own testimony at the October 31, 2013 hearing. In particular, the ALJ pointed out:

With all this in mind, there is no question that Petitioner suffers from several impairments (acknowledged as "severe" by the ALJ) that impact his ability to work; however, it cannot be said that the ALJ failed to provide specific legitimate reasons for rejecting/questioning certain of Dr. Rehnberg's opinions. The opinions of this provider were not given the weight Petitioner would have preferred; however, such opinions clearly were considered in the context of the surrounding medical record.

The Court's duty here is not to resolve the conflicting opinions and ultimately decide whether Petitioner is once-and-for-all disabled as that term is used within the Social Security regulations. Rather, this Court must decide whether the ALJ's decision that Petitioner is not disabled is supported by the record. In this record, there are conflicting medical opinions, testimony, and accounts that inform the ALJ's decisions on how to consider Dr. Rehnberg's opinions. His decision to discount such opinions is supported by clear and convincing, specific, and legitimate reasons for doing so. Hence, because the evidence can reasonably support the ALJ's conclusions in these respects, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ's even if this Court were to have a different view. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019.

IV. CONCLUSION

The ALJ is the fact-finder and is solely responsible for weighing and drawing inferences from facts and determining credibility. Allen, 749 F.2d at 579; Vincent ex. rel. Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1394; Sample, 694 F.2d at 642. If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which is the ALJ's, a reviewing court may not substitute its interpretation for that of the ALJ. Key, 754 f.2d at 1549.

The evidence relied upon by the ALJ can reasonably and rationally support the ALJ's well-formed conclusions, despite the fact that such evidence may be susceptible to a different interpretation. Accordingly, the ALJ's decisions as to Petitioner's disability claim were based on proper legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner's determination that Petitioner is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is based upon an application of proper legal standards.

The Commissioner's decision is affirmed.

V. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and this action is DISMISSED in its entirety with prejudice.