GLASSER, Senior United States District Judge.
In this civil action by the United States (the
The following facts are alleged in the amended complaint (Am. Compl., ECF No. 106) and are viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. Familiarity with the extensive factual allegations contained in the amended complaint is presumed, and they are recited here only insofar as necessary to dispose of the pending motion.
Chaim Lax (
In this action, the Government seeks various forms of relief related to these unpaid tax liabilities. As relevant to the pending motion, the Government asserts that Moshe and Zlaty orchestrated a series of sham transactions to hide the Estate's assets from the IRS by conveying them to assorted business entities held in Shaindy's name. The Government describes three such schemes in the amended complaint, denoted as
Scheme 1 consisted of the alleged conveyance, for less than adequate consideration, of more than $41.2 million in real property holding company interests by Chaim to the Trust. This Scheme consisted of essentially two steps. First, on or about February 1, 2007, Chaim conveyed these assets to an entity called LX Holdings LLC (
Scheme 2, as alleged and described in the amended complaint, was essentially a continuation of the efforts alleged in Scheme 1 to shield Chaim's real property interests from the IRS. Pursuant to Scheme 2, more than $4.6 million of the real property interests described in Scheme 1 above were allegedly conveyed by LX Holdings, for less than adequate consideration, to five companies: SL Holdings I, LLC; SL Holdings II, LLC; SL Holdings III, LLC; SL Holdings IV, LLC; and SL Holdings V, LLC. (collectively, the
Scheme 2 proceeded as follows. On or about October 9, 2009, one of the SL Companies, SL Holdings I, LLC (
The Government alleges that "Shaindy nominally operates the SL Companies under the direction of Moshe" (id. ¶ 80), who "instructed or directed Shaindy to act as sole member and owner of the SL Companies with the expectation that he would retain control over the assets held by the SL Companies." (id. ¶ 81). The Government alleges that "Moshe directed [Shaindy] to use a former name, Chana Weisz, in conducting business on behalf of the SL Companies" in order "[t]o obscure [Moshe's] relationship to the SL Companies." (Id. ¶ 82). Indeed, "[i]n 2014, Shaindy testified under oath that, notwithstanding that she is the sole owner of all five SL Companies, she was only aware of SL Holdings I." (Id. ¶ 83). The Government further alleges that the SL Companies never filed tax returns (see id. ¶ 86) and that they operated from an address associated
Before his death, Chaim was the sole owner of Dynamic Diamond Corp. (
Specifically, on February 26, 2010, Moshe and Zlaty caused DDC to change its name to "White Coat, Inc." (
It is unclear from the pleadings when, precisely, Diamond Dynamics was formed. However, the amended complaint describes it as being "newly-formed" as of March 4, 2010, when the ABC Deed was executed. (Id. ¶ 105).
The Government alleges that the consideration paid by Diamond Dynamics "was inadequate and based on artificially low valuations and appraisals that Moshe obtained to defraud the creditors of [DDC] and the Estate, including the IRS." (Id. ¶ 114). As with the SL Companies, the Government alleges that "Shaindy nominally operates [Diamond Dynamics] under the direction of Moshe" (id. ¶ 119), who "placed titular ownership in Shaindy's name, with the expectation that he would retain control over the assets held by [Diamond Dynamics]." (id. ¶ 117). The Government alleges that "Shaindy has no experience operating a diamond business, unlike Moshe, who has operated several such businesses." (Id. ¶ 114). As with the SL Companies, the Government alleges that "Moshe directed [Shaindy]" to conduct business on behalf of Diamond Dynamics under the name "Chana Weisz" "[t]o obscure his relationship to [Diamond Dynamics.]" (Id. ¶ 118). As with the SL Companies, the Government alleges that Diamond Dynamics operates from an address associated with Moshe's other businesses (see id. ¶ 121) and was capitalized with funds from the Trust or other sources under Moshe's control (see id. ¶ 122).
At the time of his death, Chaim owned a 50% interest in Madison Avenue Diamonds LLC (
The Government seeks to set aside Schemes 2, Scheme 3, and Scheme 4 (collectively, the
Shaindy moves to dismiss on decidedly narrow grounds. She does not dispute, for purposes of the present motion, that the Schemes were fraudulent under DCL §§ 273 and/or 276. Nor does she contest the liability of any of the other Defendants, including the SL Companies or Diamond Dynamics (collectively, the
Section 278 of the DCL describes the rights available to a creditor as to whom a conveyance is fraudulent. Section 278 provides, in relevant part, that:
Id. § 278(1). The DCL makes no express provision for the recovery of money damages. Courts have recognized, however, that an implied right of action for damages exists where "the traditional fraudulent conveyance remedy of rescission is no longer practicable"—where, for example, the transferred assets have been sold or commingled with other assets. In re Adelphia Recovery Trust, 634 F.3d 678, 692-693 (2d Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); see 30 N.Y. Jur. 2d Creditors' Rights and Remedies § 449 ("Where the assets fraudulently transferred no longer exist or are no longer in the possession of the transferee,
In Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico, the Second Circuit held that money damages may be awarded under the DCL against persons who "participate in the fraudulent transfer of a debtor's property and are transferees of the assets and beneficiaries of the conveyance." 995 F.2d 1158, 1172 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 945, 114 S.Ct. 385, 126 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). Since Stochastic Decisions, the overwhelming majority of courts have framed this transferee/beneficiary test in the disjunctive, holding that a defendant may be held liable for damages if they are either a "transferee" or a "beneficiary" of the conveyance. Cadle Co. v. Newhouse, 74 Fed. Appx. 152, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) ("Under New York law, a creditor may recover money damages against parties who participate in the fraudulent transfer and are either transferees of the assets or beneficiaries of the conveyance"); RTC Mortgage Trust 1995 S/N1 v. Sopher, 31 Fed. Appx. 37, 38 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2002) (summary order); DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd., 323 F.Supp.3d 393, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Tae H. Kim v. Ji Sung Yoo, 311 F.Supp.3d 598, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Perrone v. Amato, No. 09-CV-316 (AKT), 2017 WL 2881136, at *38 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 5, 2017); Integrity Electronics, Inc. v. Garden State Distributors, Inc., No. 14-CV-3197 (BMC), 2016 WL 3637004, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 30, 2016); Lyman Commerce Solutions, Inc. v. Lung, No. 12-CV-4398 (TPG), 2015 WL 4545089, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16, 2015); Amusement Industry, Inc. v. Midland Avenue Associates, LLC, 820 F.Supp.2d 510, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); TD Bank, N.A. v. Coppolino, No. 09-CV-3721 (JG) (JO), 2010 WL 11626968, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2010); Robert Smalls Inc. v. Hamilton, No. 09-CV-7171 (DAB) (JLC), 2010 WL 3238955, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 19, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3238963 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010); Jet Star Enterprises, Ltd. v. Soros, No. 05-CV-6585 (HB), 2006 WL 2270375, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2006); Fundacion Presidente Allende v. Banco de Chile, No. 05-CV-9771 (GBD), 2006 WL 2796793, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Neshewat v. Salem, 365 F.Supp.2d 508, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); RTC Mortg. Trust 1995-S/N1 v. Sopher, 171 F.Supp.2d 192, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). That the test is disjunctive supported by language in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Porco, in which the New York Court of Appeals stated that the DCL does "not, either explicitly or implicitly, create a creditor's remedy for money damages against parties who ... were neither transferees of the assets nor beneficiaries of the conveyance." 75 N.Y.2d 840, 842, 552 N.Y.S.2d 910, 552 N.E.2d 158 (N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added). In their papers, both parties appear to endorse the disjunctive test as the correct legal standard. (See Def. Mem. at 4, ECF No. 97 (citing Fundacion President Allende, 2006 WL 2796793, at *3); Pl. Opp at 5, ECF No. 101).
This case presents a straightforward application of the law to the facts. By any meaning of the word, Shaindy was a "beneficiary" of the Schemes. It is undisputed that the assets conveyed in the
Shaindy does not appear to dispute that she was a "beneficiary" of the Schemes. Nevertheless, she argues that she cannot be held liable because the Government is not entitled to pierce the veil and disregard the corporate form of the Transferee Companies. (See Def. Mem. at 5). This argument, however, misunderstands the role of corporate veil-piercing and its relevance in fraudulent conveyance cases arising under the DCL. Veil-piercing is fundamentally "a form of `derivative liability.'" In re Tronox Incorporated, 549 B.R. 21, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 65, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998)). That is to say, a defendant against whom the veil is pierced is made to stand in the shoes of the corporation and answer for its "underlying corporate obligation[s]." Matter of Morris v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 141, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 623 N.E.2d 1157 (N.Y. 1993). Under the DCL, however, the liability of a beneficiary of a fraudulent conveyance is direct, not derivative. Thus, once it has been established that a defendant benefited from a fraudulent conveyance, it is unnecessary to consider whether the traditional prerequisites for veil-piercing are satisfied.
Even if, arguendo, it were necessary to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold Shaindy liable for the Schemes, the Court would have no difficulty finding that the requirements for veil-piercing have been met. "Broadly speaking, [New York courts] will disregard the corporate form... whenever necessary `to prevent fraud or to achieve equity.'" Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Bonderman, 31 N.Y.3d 30, 47, 96 N.E.3d 191 (N.Y. 2018) (quoting Morris, 82 N.Y.2d at 140, 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 623 N.E.2d 1157). Under New York law, "a plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must show that (1) the owners exercised complete domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked; and (2) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or a wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff's injury." Id. (quoting Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 1, 18, 6 N.Y.S.3d 206, 29 N.E.3d 215 (N.Y. 2015)).
With regard to the first veil-piercing element, Shaindy was the sole member
As for the second veil-piercing element, the pleadings are replete with badges of fraud indicating that the Transferee Companies were created and used to hide the Estate's and Trust's assets from its creditors, including the IRS. All of these companies were held by Shaindy, despite the fact that she has no apparent experience managing multi-million dollar real estate or diamond businesses; additionally, all of them were held under a prior name, "Chana Weisz," making it more difficult to associate them with her late father-in-law's Estate. All of them operated from addresses associated with Moshe's businesses; all were funded by the Trust and/or other financial sources under Moshe's control; most failed to file any tax returns; and all were formed close in time to the Schemes in which they allegedly partook. At the motion to dismiss stage, these indicia of fraud are enough to support the plausible inference that the Transferee Companies' corporate form was abused to facilitate the Schemes.
Shaindy's argument that she was "not a transferee of the conveyances" (Def. Mem. at 5) is therefore unavailing. There is no question that the Transferee Companies themselves were "transferee[s]" within the meaning of Stochastic Decisions and its progeny. Thus, if the corporate veil of the Transferee Companies is pierced as to Shaindy, she too would be deemed a "transferee." In any event, because the Court follows the overwhelming majority of other courts in applying the transferee/beneficiary test in the disjunctive, Shaindy could be held liable as a "beneficiary" even if she were not a "transferee." Cadle Co., 74 Fed. Appx. at 153; Sopher, 31 Fed. Appx. at 38 n. 2; Sopher, 171 F.Supp.2d at 201.
Shaindy argues that, even if the Government's allegations are afforded every favorable inference, it is her husband, not she, who should be regarded as the true alter-ego of the Transferee Companies and the true beneficiary of the Schemes. (See Def. Mem. at 5). After all, in the amended complaint's own words, "Moshe created [the Transferee Companies], but placed titular ownership in Shaindy's name, with the expectation that he would retain control over the assets held by [the Transferee Companies]." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81, 117). However, this argument ignores the fact that Moshe could only control the Transferee Companies
In similar vein, Shaindy contends that she cannot be held liable because she was not a "participant" in the conveyances. (Def. Mem. at 6). There appears to be a split of authority regarding whether a `passive' beneficiary or transferee who does not otherwise `participate' in the fraudulent conveyances may be held liable. Compare Sullivan v. Kodsi, 373 F.Supp.2d 302, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding no authority for the proposition that "beneficiaries and transferees" who do not participate in the fraudulent transfers may be held liable), with Federal National Mortgage Association v. Olympia Mortgage Corp., 792 F.Supp.2d 645, 655 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Courts applying Stochastic have repeatedly noted that one need only be a transferee or beneficiary to be a participant in a fraudulent transfer; not either a transferee or beneficiary of a fraudulent conveyance and a participant in the underlying fraud") (emphasis in the original); Integrity Electronics, 2016 WL 3637004, at *10 n. 7 (concurring with Olympia Mortgage). But the Court need not explore the issue at this juncture, because the allegations are sufficient to support the inference that Shaindy `participated' in the Schemes by any ordinary sense of the word. As recited in the amended complaint, Shaindy "operate[d]" the Transferee Companies "under the direction of Moshe." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80, 119). In addition, as to at least one of the Schemes, she signed (together with Zlaty) the operative corporate document that effected the fraudulent conveyance at issue. (See id. ¶ 94).
Perhaps the most compelling argument that Shaindy should not be held personally liable for the Schemes, though not explicitly raised in her motion papers, comes from ¶ 83 of the amended complaint, wherein the Government references (and, apparently, credits) Shaindy's 2014 testimony that she was not "aware" of the existence of any of the SL Companies, other than SL Holdings I. (Am. Compl. ¶ 83). At face value, this suggests that Shaindy may have been deceived by Moshe regarding the transactions that had been carried under her name; and from this it can be further be argued that she did not act with a
This argument, however, fails on both the facts and the law. It fails on the law because a mere lack of knowledge of the fraudulent conveyance is not a defense. Rather, DCL § 278 exempts from liability only those who are "purchaser[s] for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of purchase." DCL § 278(1) (emphasis added). Obviously, the proviso that an acquirer of the transferred assets must pay "fair consideration" evinces a clear intent by the statute's drafters that creditors may recover against acquirers who have not paid fair consideration, regardless of their knowledge, vel non, of the fraudulent nature of the transfer. And while DCL § 278, on its face, only addresses the traditional remedies of rescission and/or attachment, there is no reason why the rule should be different where "rescission is no longer practicable" and money damages are sought. Adelphia, 634 F.3d at 692. If the rule were otherwise, a debtor could easily circumvent the purposes and objectives of the DCL by giving the assets to a friend or relative, keeping them blissfully unaware of the fraud while retaining de facto control over the assets (or their proceeds, if the assets are later sold). Here, the Government alleges that the Schemes were effected without fair consideration (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 96, 114, 128), a point that Shaindy has not disputed for purposes of this motion. Therefore, her purported lack of awareness of the fraud is no defense.
Additionally, her argument fails on the facts because, in evaluating a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff, here the Government, must be "afforded every favorable inference." Marcus v. Barilla America NY, Inc., 14 F.Supp.3d 108, 115 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). Although one could infer that Shaindy's participation in the Schemes was not knowing and informed based on this singular item of testimony, no such conclusion is required. Scheme 2 centered primarily on the transfer of assets to SL Holdings I, and Shaindy personally signed the Membership Interest and Stock Transfer Agreement at the core of that Scheme. (See id. ¶ 94). The significance of SL Holdings II through V to Scheme 2, by contrast, was marginal (see id. ¶ 95), and these entities were not involved in Schemes 3 or 4 at all. Thus, even if Shaindy were ignorant of the existence of SL Holdings II through V, she might still have been generally aware of the existence and fraudulent nature of these Schemes. See Integrity Electronics, 2016 WL 3637004, at *10 n. 7 (finding "unavailing" the argument that beneficiary lacked "knowledge of the fraud," where beneficiary "was joint owner of the bank account, and joint owner of Realty, both of which were transferred the funds").
For the foregoing reasons, Shaindy's motion to dismiss is
SO ORDERED.