McDONALD, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs, Connecticut Independent
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the resolution of this appeal turns on the question of whether the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the department's declaratory ruling. Nevertheless, to put the trial court's decision and the parties' arguments in context, it is necessary to describe an earlier proceeding before the department that prompted the plaintiffs to seek the declaratory ruling.
With that framework in mind, the record reveals the following undisputed facts. In late 2009, the department initiated an investigation, pursuant to its authority under General Statutes § 16-11, after it learned that two gas companies
In July, 2010, the plaintiffs filed with the department a petition for a declaratory ruling pursuant to General Statutes § 4-176, which is the subject of this appeal. The plaintiffs' petition sought a declaratory ruling that would establish that: (1) the department's failure to promulgate regulations regarding its use of "participant" status in uncontested proceedings and the rights attendant to such status violated the act; and (2) the department's designation of the plaintiffs in the 2009 investigatory proceedings as "participants," rather than as parties, and its selective limitations on the plaintiffs' rights therein, violated the act and the plaintiffs' due process rights.
Prior to issuing its decision, the department informed the plaintiffs that it would issue a ruling only with regard to those aspects of the plaintiffs' petition that applied generically to the use of "participant status" in department proceedings. The department indicated that the conduct in Docket No. 09-09-08 would not be considered because the declaratory ruling process under § 4-176 is not an available conduit to review procedural rulings made in previous proceedings. Thereafter, the department denied the petition as to the remaining matters. It concluded that its use of the participant designation did not need to be promulgated as a regulation because such a designation neither bestows rights nor yields a substantive result, and it is not a rule of practice. Rather, the designation is an internal, routine procedure for managing dockets in uncontested proceedings, and any such rights and limitations are subsequently determined by the officer presiding over the uncontested proceeding. The department further distinguished its obligations under the act to promulgate regulations governing procedures in contested cases versus uncontested proceedings.
The plaintiffs appealed from the department's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. The department thereafter filed a brief in opposition to the appeal in which it asserted, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove aggrievement.
On appeal to this court, the department renews its claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' appeal because the plaintiffs neither pleaded nor proved that they are aggrieved by the department's ruling on their petition. The department further contends that the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief because they failed to demonstrate prejudice to their substantial rights as required under § 4-183(j). We agree with the department's jurisdictional claim.
"If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.... A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record....
"Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved.... The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second,
Thus, "[m]indful that it is a fundamental concept of judicial administration that no person is entitled to set the machinery of the courts in operation except to obtain redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or a representative capacity ... the plaintiffs were required to plead and prove some injury in accordance with our rule on aggrievement." (Citation omitted.) Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 495, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). Accordingly, "[i]t was the function of the trial court to determine ... first, whether the [plaintiffs'] allegations if they should be proved would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and second, if as a matter of law they would constitute aggrievement, then whether [the plaintiffs] proved the truth of [their] allegations. Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 54-55, 347 A.2d 89 (1974)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 300, 309, 603 A.2d 1131 (1992). Although the question of whether a party is aggrieved presents a question of fact in cases involving disputed facts; see id.; the question of whether the pleadings set forth sufficient facts, if presumed true, to establish a party's aggrievement presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. See Jones v. Redding, 296 Conn. 352, 364, 995 A.2d 51 (2010); Pomazi v. Conservation Commission, 220 Conn. 476, 479 n. 6, 600 A.2d 320 (1991).
In the present case, the trial court did not identify any allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint in support of its finding of aggrievement. Indeed, neither the facts that the trial court purported to be reflected in the record, nor the reasons set forth in support of its decision were alleged in that complaint. Irrespective of the trial court's view of the record, however, we must examine the complaint to determine whether it contains allegations that, if proved, would demonstrate that the plaintiffs had "a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share ... [and] that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 705, 945 A.2d 927 (2008). As we previously underscored, the subject matter of the controversy in the present case is the plaintiffs' petition for a declaratory ruling regarding the department's obligation to promulgate regulations prescribing the rights of participants in uncontested proceedings, not the department's 2009 investigatory proceeding.
Our review of the complaint convinces us that, even applying every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiffs, as we must; Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009); the complaint lacks factual allegations that, if true, would establish the plaintiffs' aggrievement. The complaint alleges the plaintiffs' names and addresses, but does not allege a single fact in relation to their membership. It contains no allegations regarding the plaintiffs' representative or individual interest in matters over which the department has jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs point to the unnumbered paragraph following their factual allegations in the complaint, in which they state the legal basis for their claim, as meeting their pleading obligation. Therein, they contend that they are "aggrieved by" the department's decision, in that the department's ruling is unlawful as to each of the six grounds set forth in § 4-183(j) as a basis for reversing an agency's decision.
It is well established that "[t]he mere statement that the appellant is aggrieved, without supporting allegations as to the particular nature of the aggrievement is insufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 542-43, 833 A.2d 883 (2003); Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978). A statement of legal grounds for seeking reversal is not an allegation as to the particular nature of the aggrievement. If that were the case, every administrative appeal under § 4-183 would satisfy the pleading requirements for aggrievement, and proof of aggrievement — a threshold requirement to the exercise of jurisdiction — would depend upon prevailing on the merits of the legal claim. Such a proposition cannot be reconciled with established law. See PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Cameron, 130 Conn.App. 238, 241, 22 A.3d 1282 (2011) ("aggrievement implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, is a threshold matter that must be resolved before addressing the claims raised on appeal"). Moreover, nothing material was added by alluding to
The plaintiffs contend, however, that their claim of being "aggrieved" must be read in light of the allegations that precede it. In particular, they point to the paragraphs in their complaint setting forth the declaratory ruling that they had requested from the department
The fact that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief was denied does not, in and of itself, establish aggrievement. As this court previously explained in rejecting a similar claim: "The plaintiffs filed their petition for a declaratory ruling under § 4-176. Subsection (a) of § 4-176 provides as follows: `Any person may petition an agency, or an agency may on its own motion initiate a proceeding, for a declaratory ruling as to the validity of any regulation, or the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the general statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.' ... Thus, § 4-176(a) confers broad rights on any member of the public to file a petition for a declaratory ruling without the need to establish
"The plaintiffs in the present case rely solely on the fact that they petitioned for the declaratory ruling to establish their personal interest in this appeal. This is not sufficient, for they have not asserted any specific, personal and legal interest in the declaratory ruling beyond that shared by the general public, any member of which also could have sought a declaratory ruling without showing a personal interest in the matter. We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the first requisite for classical aggrievement — that they had a specific, personal and legal interest in the decision of the commissioner different from that of the general public."
The plaintiffs' position also runs afoul of our case law addressing aggrievement in the specific context of requests to promulgate regulations. General Statutes § 4-174 permits any interested person to request the promulgation, amendment or repeal of a regulation. Nonetheless, in challenging a decision thereunder, this court has explained that a plaintiff must allege and prove that "it has a legally protectible interest in the [subject of the regulation]." Missionary Society of Connecticut v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 278 Conn. 197, 202, 896 A.2d 809 (2006); see id. at 204, 896 A.2d 809 ("[Section] 4-174 was not intended to grant the right to petition for regulations to persons who have no specific, legally protectible interest that would be, or potentially could be, affected by the regulations. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the defendant's denial of its request for the promulgation of regulations concerning commutation of the death penalty pursuant to § 4-174 and, therefore, has no standing to challenge that ruling."). Further, even if an agency is required to promulgate regulations on the subject matter, "[a]n administrative agency's failure to comply with a statutory mandate to adopt procedural rules can be challenged ... only by making a showing that some personal prejudice has resulted from the agency's failure to act. See Goldberg v. Insurance Department, 207 Conn. 77, 83-84, 540 A.2d 365 (1988), and cases cited therein; see also Eagle Hill Corporation v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 2 Conn.App. 68, 78, 477 A.2d 660 (1984)." In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 795, 632 A.2d 1114 (1993); see also Andross v. West Hartford, 285 Conn. 309, 327, 939 A.2d 1146 (2008) ("common concern for obedience to law is not a direct injury that supports standing" [internal
The plaintiffs' effort to distinguish this case law is unpersuasive. Effectively, the plaintiffs take the position that, when seeking a declaratory ruling under § 4-176 that an agency is legally obligated to promulgate regulations, they did not need to satisfy the aggrievement requirements that would have applied had they petitioned the department under § 4-174 to actually promulgate regulations. We disagree. Although the department conceded at oral argument before this court that the plaintiffs could pursue their request for regulations either by seeking them directly under § 4-174 or indirectly under § 4-176, which we assume is correct for purposes of this appeal, there is no basis in text, logic or fact to apply different standards of aggrievement for purposes of an administrative appeal from either decision pursuant to § 4-183.
The plaintiffs' reliance on their allegations as to the particular ruling requested vis-á-vis their treatment in the 2009 investigation similarly is not well founded. As the plaintiffs concede, those proceedings are not the subject of the present appeal. No reasonable inference can be drawn as to how the plaintiffs' treatment as a participant in that one proceeding could impair the plaintiffs' legal rights in the future in a manner to distinguish their concerns from those of any other member of the public that seeks to participate in uncontested proceedings before the department. Cf. New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 132, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993) ("[m]ere status ... as a party or a participant in a hearing before an administrative agency does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument before this court that the department properly could promulgate a regulation either precluding cross-examination by any participant in uncontested proceedings or allowing the official conducting such proceedings to confer such rights in his or her discretion. Cf. General Statutes § 4-177a (d) (providing, in relevant part, that, in contested cases, "[t]he presiding officer may... restrict the participation of an intervenor in the proceedings, including the rights to inspect and copy records, to introduce evidence and to cross-examine, so as to promote the orderly conduct of the proceedings").
Finally, to the extent that the plaintiffs contend that memoranda of law or exhibits submitted to the trial court cured any potential deficiencies in their allegations, they are mistaken. It is important to understand that the pleading requirement is not merely a matter of form. Rather, it provides an opportunity for the opposing party to answer in denial, thereby placing the jurisdictional fact(s) into dispute for the court's resolution. Memoranda of law are not pleadings. Although this court has made a few passing references to parties' briefs or memoranda in connection with the issue of aggrievement, these references simply acknowledge that such sources may provide a context from which a reviewing court can determine which reasonable inferences may be drawn from facts alleged in the pleadings. See, e.g., Connecticut State Medical Society v. Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 303-304, 524 A.2d 636 (1987). Moreover, although undisputed facts in an administrative record can supply the requisite proof in support of allegations of aggrievement; see State Library v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 824, 830-33, 694 A.2d 1235
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
"a. `Participant' status in uncontested proceedings at the department is separate and distinct from status as a `party' or `intervenor';
"b. The terms `participant' and `participant status' are not defined in any regulation promulgated by the department in accordance with the [act];
"c. The rights afforded to a `participant' at a hearing in an uncontested case held at the department are not defined in any regulation promulgated by it;
"d. The [act] and applicable case law require that the department promulgate regulations for the conduct of business before that agency, and a regulation which is not adopted in accordance with the procedures set forth in the [act] is invalid;
"e. Although department regulations define `party' and `intervenor,' no regulation promulgated by the department in accordance with the [act] defines `participant' or `participant status' in an uncontested case or set[s] forth the rights to be afforded to a `participant' in a department hearing or proceeding;
"f. The department's invocation of `participant status' and its selective award of rights to the [plaintiffs] in Docket No. 09-09-08, [Department] Investigation into the Contemplated Workforce Reductions by [the Gas Companies] constituted unpromulgated regulations; and
"g. The department's denial of the [plaintiffs'] request for party status, its designation of the [plaintiffs] as `participants' and its refusal to allow the [plaintiffs] the right to cross-examine at the hearing in Docket No. 09-09-08 was arbitrary, illegal, in violation of its authority as set forth in applicable law and its own regulations, and in violation of the [plaintiffs'] right to due process."
