JILL A. OTAKE, District Judge.
Petitioner James Glenn Barlow ("Petitioner") asks the Court to certify for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) its order granting Respondents' motion to dismiss, dismissing Respondents, and transferring the petition to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. ECF Nos. 24, 25. Petitioner's motion is DENIED.
Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the motion. "It is well- and long-established law that the docketing of a transferred case in an out-of[-]circuit transferee court terminates the jurisdiction of both the transferor court and the corresponding court of appeals." Gustafson v. Williams, No. 2:09-cv-01225-KJD-LRL, 2010 WL 4316750, at *2 & n.1 (D. Nev. Oct. 25, 2010) (citing NBS Imaging Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Cal., 841 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1988); Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1987)) (other citations omitted). Because Petitioner filed the motion after the case was transferred to and docketed in the District of Columbia,
Even if it did have jurisdiction, the Court would deny the motion because Petitioner has not demonstrated all three requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), including that the Court's discretion to transfer the petition constitutes a controlling question of law, or that there exists a substantial ground for differing opinion on the issue of the proper respondent for a habeas petition and the appropriateness of applying a traditional personal jurisdiction analysis in the habeas context. See Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010) ("That settled law might be applied differently does not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion." (citations omitted)). Petitioner also fails to demonstrate that this case presents the exceptional situation where allowing an interlocutory appeal will avoid protracted and expensive litigation.
The Court therefore DENIES Petitioner's Motion for Certificate of Appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.