CHARLES S. COODY, Magistrate Judge.
On October 25, 2006, Robert Knight ("Knight") was charged in a single count indictment of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (Doc. # 1). After several adverse rulings on his pre-trial motions,
On remand, the district court resentenced Knight to ninety-two (92) months and nineteen (19) days imprisonment to run concurrently with his state sentence. (Doc. # 91). The amended judgment was entered on October 28, 2009. (Id.) On October 30, 2009, based on a clear error in calculating the sentence, the district court adjusted Knight's sentence to a term of imprisonment of ninety five (95) months and seventeen (17) days. (Doc. # 92). Knight unsuccessfully appealed his sentence. United States v. Knight, 385 Fed. Appx. 936 (11th Cir. 2010).
On November 30, 2011, Knight filed a motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Knight raises two claims in his motion. First, Knight alleges that he was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because of the trial judge's "admitted mental health impairments and possible use of illegal drugs." (Doc. # 108 at 6). Knight also alleges that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the sentencing judge was "biased against African-American males." (Id. at 11).
Upon consideration of Knight's § 2255 motion, the pleadings, and the record, the court concludes that the motion for relief pursuant to § 2255 should be denied. The court further concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required in this case.
Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are extremely limited. A petitioner is entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 `is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). "[A] non-constitutional error that may justify reversal on direct appeal does not generally support a collateral attack on a final judgment, unless the error (1) could not have been raised on direct appeal and (2) would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Id. at 1232-33 (citations omitted); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (error of law does not provide basis for collateral attack unless claimed error constituted a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice"). The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier provides that it must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. ..." 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
After considering Knight's first direct appeal, on March 25, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit reversed Knight's sentence and remanded "with instructions that the district court adjust Knight's sentence for time served in state custody for his conviction for obstruction of justice." United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit reiterated its mandate.
Id.
On May 27, 2009, the court made the mandate the judgment of the court (doc. # 86). On October 27, 2009, the court imposed on Knight the original sentence of one hundred and twenty (120) months but credited Knight for the time he served in state custody which resulted in Knight receiving a sentence of ninety-two (92) months and nineteen (19) days in accordance with the mandate from the Eleventh Circuit. See Doc. # 99 at 14. On October 30, 2009, the court corrected a clear error in the calculation of Knight's sentence and sentenced him to ninety-five (95) months and seventeen (17) days imprisonment. Knight appealed this amended sentence contending that it was "substantially unreasonable." The Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed Knight's sentencing issues and affirmed his sentence. United States v. Knight, 385 Fed. Appx. 936 (11th Cir. 2010).
Knight now challenges the 2007 and 2009 sentencing proceedings. He contends that he was denied due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment during both sentencing hearings because "[it] is clear ... that [the trial judge] was severely impaired during 2007 and 2009, when he presided over Mr. Knight's sentencing hearings." (Doc. # 108 at 10). Knight also alleges that the trial judge was racially biased against him during the 2009 sentencing proceeding because the trial judge "inquired at the re-sentencing hearing whether he was authorized to increase the sentence." (Id. at 13).
The court first addresses the 2009 sentencing hearing. Knight argues that the trial judge's question regarding whether he was authorized to increase Knight's sentence demonstrates that the trial judge was racially biased against African-American men in general and him in particular. The court disagrees. Regardless of the court's question at the 2009 sentencing hearing, the trial judge was constrained by the mandate to "adjust Knight's sentence for time served in state custody." Knight, 562 F.3d at 1329.
Litman v. Massachuesetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). See also United States v. Irey, 458 Fed. Appx. 854, 855 (11th Cir. 2012) quoting United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996). When the appellate court issues a limited mandate, "the trial court is restricted in the range of issues it may consider on remand." Irey, 458 Fed. Appx. at 855 quoting United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003). See also U.S. v. Rodriguez, 259 Fed. Appx. 270, 278-279 (11th Cir., 2007) "Ruling on matters outside the scope of a limited remand constitutes an abuse of discretion." Irey, 458 Fed. Appx. at 855. See also United States v. Brown, 138 Fed. Appx. 180, 182 (11th Cir. 2005).
On remand, the district court was limited by the mandate to "reduce Knight's sentence based on the time he served in state custody." Knight, 562 F.3d at 1329. There is no dispute that the trial court did just that in accordance with the mandate. Consequently, Knight's arguments that his constitutional rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment were somehow violated during the 2009 sentencing hearing are meritless because the court did the only thing it was authorized to do under the limited remand from the appellate court.
U.S. v. Lindsey, 200 Fed. Appx. 902, 908 (11th Cir. 2006). Because the trial court did precisely was it was directed to do by the appellate court, Knight's claim that the court was racially biased against him entitles him to no relief.
Knight also asserts that the trial judge was mentally impaired and racially biased against African-American males during his 2007 sentencing proceeding. It is beyond dispute that the Due Process Clause of the requires a fair, unbiased tribunal. "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). See also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972). "The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualification." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009).
In Caperton, the Court reiterated that "most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level." 556 U.S. at 876 quoting FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948). And, "not every attack on a judge ... disqualifies him from sitting." Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881. The court must look to
Id, at 872 quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
One circumstance which requires recusal under the Due Process Clause involves a judge who has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) ("Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.") "The second instance requiring recusal... emerged in the criminal contempt context, where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the case but was challenged because of a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding." Caperton, 556 U.S. at 880.
In this case, Knight makes no allegation that the trial judge had a financial or "pecuniary" interest in this case. In addition, Knight does not allege that the trial judge had a conflict from participation in an earlier proceeding. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 880 ("[N]o judge is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.") While "the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias," due process does require "extreme facts that create[] an unconstitutional probability of bias." Id. at 883 & 886.
In the context of judicial impairment or incompetence, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have delineated the standard a petitioner must meet to establish that his due process rights to a fair tribunal have been violated. However, in Jordan v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court examined the question of juror insanity, and concluded that a demonstration by a "fair preponderance of the evidence" was not sufficient to establish a due process violation. 225 U.S. 167, 174 (1912).
Jordan, 225 U.S. at 176. In addition, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that a defendant must demonstrate by "clear and convincing evidence," that a juror was mentally incompetent to serve. See United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 714 (4th Cir. 1993).
As the law has developed in the areas of judicial bias and juror incompetence, there is no clear answer as to what constitutes a due process violation. However, in this case, the court concludes that Knight has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his 2007 sentencing hearing was constitutionally infirm. This is not a case of "extreme facts" wherein due process demanded the trial judge's recusal. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887 (in each case in which the Court has required recusal, the case involved "extreme facts that created an unconstitutional probability of bias that "`cannot be defined with precision'") (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986). Knight was found guilty after a bench trial based solely on stipulated facts. The trial court was not required to make credibility findings or resolve disputed issues of fact. This court has also thoroughly reviewed the sentencing transcript. At no time did the trial judge act inappropriately, or respond irrationally during the proceeding. During the hearing, the court asked cogent questions, and followed complex legal arguments regarding the sentencing guidelines. The trial judge explained his rulings on objections to Knight's pre-sentence report in which he overruled the government's objections and declined to apply an additional three (3) points to Knight's criminal history. The judge referenced case law, compared different statutes, and recalled specific facts from earlier proceedings. Consequently, the court concludes that Knight's claims against the trial judge do not rise to the level of a due process violation.
Knight relies on statements by the trial judge about his own mental capacity and impairments during criminal proceedings against the trial judge to suggest that the trial judge was impaired during Knight's proceedings.
Accordingly, it is the
ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on or before
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id., at 1328.
