TILMAN E. SELF, III, District Judge.
After a de novo review of the record in this case, the Court
Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may order sanctions if a party fails to appear for his deposition after being served with proper notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i); Hashemi v. Campaigner Publ'ns., 737 F.2d 1538, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal under Rule 37(d) for party's failure to appear for deposition). Such failure "is not excused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(2). Available sanctions include "any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi)," including dismissal of the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3).
"Because dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction, a district court may implement it only as a last resort, when a party's failure to comply with a court order is a result of willfulness or bad faith and lesser sanctions would not suffice." Zow v. Regions Financial Corp., 595 F. App'x 887, 889 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993)). "Nonetheless, if a party disregards an order despite being warned of the possible consequences, dismissal is generally not an abuse of discretion." Zow, 595 F. App'x at 889 (citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). "These principles apply with equal force to pro se parties." Zow, 595 F. App'x at 889 (citing Moon, 863 F.2d at 837).
Similarly, Rule 41(b) provides that an action may be dismissed "[i]f the plaintiff fails . . . to comply with these rules." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). But dismissal "is considered a sanction of last resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances." Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). "[D]ismissal may be appropriate when a plaintiff's recalcitrance is due to wilfulness, bad faith or fault." Phipps v. Blakeney, 8 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit has articulated a two-part analysis for determining when an action should be dismissed as a sanction under Rule 41(b): "[t]here must be both a clear record of wilful conduct and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate." Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005)). Findings satisfying both prongs must be made before dismissal is deemed an appropriate sanction. See Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1339.
Amerson's has acted in bad faith, and previous attempts to impose lesser sanctions than dismissal with prejudice have proven inadequate.
First, Plaintiff has not followed Court discovery instructions despite being warned that failure to do so could result in dismissal of his case. The Court's discovery instructions state, "
Further, Plaintiff has repeatedly ignored or disregarded court orders. For instance, Amerson has continuously attempted to add Timothy Ward, the new Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, as a Defendant despite the Court repeatedly denying his requests to do so. See [Doc. 90 denying Doc. 84] and [Doc. 71 denying Doc. 64 and Doc. 67]. Pending now before the Court is yet another motion to add Ward as a Defendant. [Doc. 113]. This conduct shows a complete disregard for the Court's previous Orders during this proceeding.
Accordingly, Amerson has disregarded the Court's warning about a possible dismissal, failed to participate in discovery, and has continually ignored the Court's orders. Further, Amerson's conduct in a previous case litigating this subject matter shows a pattern of similar bad faith conduct. In Amerson v. Sellers, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice after Amerson repeatedly failed to comply with Court Orders. See Order, Amerson v. Sellers, No. 5:15-cv-00008-MIT-MSH (M.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2015) Ecf No. 17. In Sellers, Amerson continually stated an inability to recast his complaint—because Defendants were "conspiring" against him—while simultaneously mailing a half dozen documents to the Court within the time period for compliance. Id. at 2. As in this case, Amerson stated an inability to follow court orders while his actions plainly showed otherwise.
Consequently, lesser sanctions—like issuing an Order compelling Amerson to take his deposition—would be insufficient, as made evident by Amerson's willful disregard for the Court's previous orders.
Based on the forgoing, the Court
are