ORDER

BETH BLOOM, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Amended Motion for Final Summary Judgment as to Count I, ECF No. [48], (the "Motion"). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, the record, all supporting and opposing filings, the exhibits attached thereto, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Anibal Antonio Aguilar Fernandez ("Plaintiff" or "Fernandez") was an employee of Defendant Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Winn-Dixie"). As further explained below, Plaintiff claims that Winn-Dixie terminated him after he reported several violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to management and to Defendant's hotline. Winn-Dixie, on the other hand, contends that it terminated Plaintiff for theft of store merchandise in violation of its policies. Plaintiff's Complaint contains a single count of retaliation in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).1 See ECF No. [1]. In its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of an FLSA retaliation claim. See ECF No. [48]. Plaintiff has since filed a Response in opposition and Defendant has filed a Reply. See ECF Nos. [50] and [52]. The Motion is now ripe for review.

1. Winn-Dixie Policies

Winn-Dixie is the owner and operator of a regional chain of grocery stores located in Florida and Georgia. See ECF No. [48] at ¶ 1.2 Defendant's Associate Handbook sets forth its policies, procedures and benefits for all employees.3 Id. at ¶ 2. One such policy contained within Winn-Dixie's Associate Handbook is its Open Door policy, which states:

Id. at ¶ 3. Defendant's Associate Relations System records any reports, whether to a manager, human resources representative or W-DIAL, and forwards such reports to the corporate headquarters to be addressed and investigated as necessary. Id. at ¶ 4. Defendant also has policies in place to ensure its compliance with the FLSA. Id. at ¶ 5. Such policy provides: "It is each Associate's responsibility to properly record all hours worked. By clocking in and out, Associates are acknowledging that they have properly recorded their hours. Associates may not perform any work off the clock. Failure to properly record all hours will result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination." Id.

During Plaintiff's most recent employment with Defendant in 2013 and 2014, Defendant utilized Workbrain software to record and manage employee time.4 Id. at ¶ 6. When employees clocked in and out during their shift, they would log into Workbrain at the punch station computer in the front or rear of the store, which electronically recorded such information. Id. at ¶ 7. To clock in, employees selected "Begin Shift" on the computer and typed in their employee identification number. Id. Similarly, to clock out, employees selected "End Shift" and re-entered their employee identification number. Id.

At Winn-Dixie, every associate receives a paid fifteen-minute rest break for each continuous four-hour work period and hourly associates who work a continuous shift of five hours or more are allowed an unpaid thirty-minute meal break. Id. at ¶ 8. Defendant requires that employees clock in and out for their rest breaks and meal breaks. Id. The Workbrain system does not allow any employees to clock in early or late for their scheduled shift without a manager override. Id. at ¶ 9. Although employees can clock out of the system without a manager override, any employee leaving early without manager approval is subject to termination. Id. at ¶ 10. Within the store, the only employees who have access to Workbrain and permission to make changes to employee time records are the salaried staff members consisting of the Store Director, Assistant Store Director, Service Area Manager or Fresh Manager. Id. at ¶ 11. When employee time records are changed, such changes are recorded in Workbrain, revealing the identity of the person who made the edits, the edits made, and the date and time of the edits. Id. According to Defendant's policies, "[i]f an Associate believes their time has not been properly recorded or has been altered, or that their pay is not correct, it is the Associate's responsibility to notify their Manager. If for any reason an Associate does not wish to discuss the situation with their Manager, they may contact Human Resources or call the `W-DIAL' at 1-877-919-3425." Id. at ¶ 12.

With regard to theft policies, "[i]nternal theft accounts for a large percentage of inventory shrink in the grocery industry." Id. at ¶ 15. Defendant's internal theft strategy is primarily prevention; however, if prevention does not work, its Asset Protection Department becomes actively involved in detecting, investigating, and resolving any internal theft cases. Id. The Asset Protection Department is Defendant's authorized investigative entity and all internal and vendor theft investigations are coordinated and managed through this department. Id. Defendant's theft policy indicates it "has a Zero Tolerance policy for individuals involved in acts of theft from the Company" and "[a]ny Associate engaged in theft-related activity will be terminated and prosecuted if all of the statutory requirements (elements of theft) are met." Id. at ¶ 16.

2. Plaintiff's Employment

Plaintiff began working for Winn-Dixie in February of 2007 until May of 2007 at the store in Miami Lakes. See ECF No. [48] at ¶ 17. On his first day of work for Winn-Dixie in 2007, Plaintiff participated in a New Hire Orientation and Training, during which he was informed of Winn-Dixie's rules, policies and procedures, including its Shrink Policy Statement, Associate Policy Awareness Confirmation, Wage and Hour Acknowledgment and Winn-Dixie Involved Associate Line confirmation. Id. As a result of his training, Plaintiff was aware that he "must never participate in any activity that causes a loss to" Winn-Dixie, including merchandise theft, which would result in termination. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff also knew he had a duty to report any violations of rules or policies that he observed, and that he could make a confidential report to Winn-Dixie's hotline, W-DIAL. Id. at ¶ 19.

Plaintiff ceased working for Winn-Dixie in May of 2007 and then resumed working for Defendant at the Sebring, Florida store in March of 2008. Id. at ¶ 20. Once again, he participated in a New Hire Orientation, which reaffirmed his awareness of Winn-Dixie's Shrink Policy Statement, Associate Policy Awareness Confirmation, Wage and Hour Acknowledgment and Winn-Dixie Involved Associate Line confirmation. Id. However, he only worked at the Sebring store for a brief period of time. Id. Plaintiff again resumed employment with Winn-Dixie on February 12, 2013 until his termination on October 17, 2014. Id. at ¶ 22. During this period, he worked at store #250 as a full-time meat cutter. Id. From April 10, 2014 until January 18, 2017, Pedro Leon ("Mr. Leon") was the Store Director of store #250.

3. The Alleged FLSA Violations

According to Plaintiff, Mr. Leon routinely told him to punch out and continue working off the clock so that his hours would not reflect any overtime.5 See ECF No. [50-1] at ¶¶ 4-5. For example, on occasions when Plaintiff was the only meat cutter in the meat department, Mr. Leon told him to punch out and finish all of the department's work. Id. During the first week of October of 2014, Plaintiff approached Mr. Leon to address various complaints he had with the company and its management. Id. at ¶ 6. Specifically, Plaintiff told Mr. Leon he did not want to work off the clock and be denied overtime compensation.6 Id. at ¶ 7. Mr. Leon told Plaintiff to quit. Id. at ¶ 8. He also said his wife was a lawyer so he would not suffer any repercussions. Id.

Although the exact period of time is unclear, Plaintiff also discovered that there were discrepancies with the hours reported on his pay stubs compared to his personal tally of hours worked. See ECF No. [50-1] at ¶ 9; ECF No. [39-1] at 74. He then approached Melissa Lawrence ("Ms. Lawrence") to address the discrepancies. Id. at ¶ 10. As further explained below, sometime after Plaintiff reported the alleged FLSA violations, Plaintiff's employment at Winn-Dixie was terminated. See ECF No. [50-1] at ¶¶ 12-30.

4. Plaintiff's Termination

On October 16, 2014, Mr. Leon reported to the Asset Protection Department that he observed Plaintiff exiting the store with bags of unpaid merchandise. See ECF No. [48-1] at ¶ 20. Following this report, Asset Protection Coordinator Juan Frank Morejon ("Mr. Morejon") began an investigation into Plaintiff and any potential losses he may have caused Winn-Dixie.7 Id. Winn-Dixie uses digital video surveillance systems in its stores. Id. at ¶ 22. Mr. Morejon pulled the video surveillance from store #250 for dates commencing on July 16, 2014 through October 16, 2014. Id. at ¶ 21. Although Plaintiff's affidavit attests that he never stole any food or merchandise, Winn-Dixie's review of the video surveillance led it to conclude that Plaintiff removed merchandise without paying for it on nine occasions. Compare ECF No. [50] at ¶ 45 with ECF No. [39-1] at ¶ 23. Significantly, Plaintiff does not deny that he is the person depicted in the surveillance videos. See ECF No. [50] at ¶ 38 ("It is true that Fernandez did not deny that he is the individual depicted.").

On October 17, 2014, at approximately 3:29 p.m., Mr. Morejon arrived at store #250 to review the investigation video details. See ECF No. [39-1] at ¶ 24. Based on Mr. Morejon's investigation, he determined that Plaintiff's actions were fraudulent and contacted Regional Asset Protection Manager, Christine Cunningham ("Ms. Cunningham"), to inform her of the results before requesting an interview with Plaintiff. Id. After he spoke with Ms. Cunningham, at approximately 4:14 p.m., Ms. Lawrence brought Plaintiff to the Associate Development Center room. Mr. Morejon interviewed Plaintiff with Ms. Lawrence acting as a witness. Id. at ¶ 25. At 4:41 p.m., Defendant contacted the Miramar Police Department and Plaintiff was arrested for theft. Id. at ¶ 26.

Plaintiff's employment at Winn-Dixie was terminated for theft on the date of his arrest, October 17, 2014. Id. Prior to his termination, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was never disciplined, reprimanded, or written up. See ECF No. [50-1] at ¶ 2-3. Defendant admits that Plaintiff was not terminated for any performance-related issues. See ECF No. [52] at ¶ 50. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was later acquitted at trial for the petit theft charges filed against him. However, as explained below, this ultimate disposition is not relevant to the Court's retaliation analysis.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citation to the record, including, inter alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if "a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). The court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the party's favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carlin Comm'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986)).

The moving party shoulders the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). If a movant satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party `must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App'x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Instead, "the non-moving party `must make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designating specific facts to suggest that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party's favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. But even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in controversy, a court cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence on the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has proposed. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268-69, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 S.W. 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's claim is for retaliation under the FLSA, which makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). When an FLSA retaliation claim is based upon circumstantial evidence, as is the case here, courts must apply the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., Inc., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010) ("When a plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence to prove her Title VII claim, as Plaintiff does here, we employ the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas . . ."). This requires the following evidence to prove a prima facie case of retaliation: "(1) [the employee] engaged in activity protected under [the] act, (2) [the employee] subsequently suffered adverse action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection existed between the employee's activity and the adverse action." Id. (quoting Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1997)). If the employee satisfies the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Id. From there, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the reason given for the adverse action is merely pretext. Id. Ultimately, to establish the third element of a retaliation claim — causation — the employee "must prove that the adverse action would not have been taken `but for' the assertion of FLSA rights." Id. (citing Reich v. Davis, 50 F.3d 962, 965-66 (11th Cir. 1995)).

1. Protected Activity

The FLSA makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who has "filed any complaint . . . under or related to this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). "Unofficial, oral complaints are protected activity under the FLSA." Henderson v. City of Grantville, Ga., 37 F.Supp.3d 1278, 1282-83 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (citing EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011) (finding that the phrase "filed any complaint" in the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision includes "oral complaints, as well as . . . written ones" provided the complaint is "sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection").

The Court finds that Plaintiff's evidence creates an issue of fact as to whether he engaged in protected activity under the FLSA. The retaliation claim is premised upon his complaints of two different forms of alleged FLSA violations: (1) he was forced to punch out and continue working off the clock to prevent payment of overtime wages and (2) management was altering his time records. See ECF No. [1]. In support of Defendant's argument that Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity, Winn-Dixie argues that "[t]here exists no evidence in this record that Fernandez ever made any such complaint." See ECF No. [48] at 15 (emphasis in original). According to Defendant, the lack of records documenting such complaints is the equivalent to a complete lack of evidence. Such an argument ignores Plaintiff's deposition testimony and sworn affidavit in which he indicated that he approached Ms. Lawrence, the Assistant Store Director, and reported discrepancies with the number of hours reported on his pay stubs compared to the number of hours he actually worked. See ECF No. [50-1] at ¶ 9; ECF No. [39-1] at 74. This likewise ignores Plaintiff's testimony in which he indicated that, during this timeframe, he called Winn-Dixie's hotline two to three times to report the FLSA violations. See ECF No. [39-1] at 83, 86. Moreover, Defendant's argument equally ignores Plaintiff's affidavit in which he states he approached Mr. Leon during the first week of October of 2014 to address various complaints, including complaints about working off the clock and being denied overtime pay.8 See ECF No. [50-1] at ¶ 7. Although Winn-Dixie argues "[t]here is no credible evidence that Fernandez made any complaint to [] Winn-Dixie upper management," it would be inappropriate to judge the credibility of evidence at the summary judgment stage. Based on the record evidence, the Court concludes that an issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff engaged in protected activity under the FLSA.

2. Adverse Employment Action

The Eleventh Circuit has defined an adverse employment action as "a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001), including "termination, failure to hire, or demotion." Blue v. Dunn Const. Co., Inc., 453 F. App'x 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d at 970). Defendant concedes that Plaintiff's termination is an adverse employment action. See ECF No. [48] at 14 ("Winn-Dixie concedes that Fernandez suffered an adverse action, which was his termination from Winn-Dixie on October 17, 2014"). Therefore, it is undisputed that Plaintiff satisfies the second element of a retaliation claim.

3. Causation

Although Plaintiff can survive summary judgment under the first two prongs of his retaliation claim, his inability to prove causation is fatal. To satisfy his prima facie burden, Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate causation by showing temporal proximity, but in order to evidence causation, such proximity must be "very close." See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001); Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action. . . . But mere temporal proximity, without more, must be `very close.'" (internal citations omitted)); see also Schoebel v. Am. Integrity Ins. Co. of Florida, No. 8:14-CV-426-T-27AEP, 2015 WL 4231670, at *2-4 (M.D. Fla. July 10, 2015) ("Generally, close temporal proximity between an employee's protected conduct and an adverse employment action is circumstantial evidence giving rise to an inference of causation."). If there is a delay of more than three months between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, then "the temporal proximity is not close enough, and the plaintiff must offer some other evidence tending to show causation." Henderson v. FedEx Express, 442 F. App'x 502, 506-07 (11th Cir. 2011). In addition, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that in cases alleging employment retaliation, a plaintiff must prove that "the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of an alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer," meaning an employee must prove "but-for causation." Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (holding that evidence showing retaliation was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action is insufficient to satisfy a prima facie case).

Here, Plaintiff attempts to satisfy the temporal connection by arguing that he complained about the FLSA violations to Mr. Leon during the first week of October of 2014 and was then terminated on October 17, 2014. Without more, such close temporal proximity would appear to create an inference of causation. However, a close temporal connection may become severed when there is an intervening act of misconduct that breaks the causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Henderson, 442 F. App'x at 506. Courts have found that even cases with "very close" temporal connections of one month or even three days will not satisfy the required but-for causation requirement when there is evidence of an intervening act of misconduct. See Diaz v. Florida, 219 F.Supp.3d 1207, 1220 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (granting summary judgment for employer when it was undisputed that, between the time of the alleged protected activity and the time of the termination, "[the plaintiff] was suspected of attempted theft of state property, which was an intervening act of misconduct"); Schoebel, 2015 WL 4231670 at *3 (granting summary judgment because an intervening act of misconduct, which consisted of sending inappropriate emails, was sufficient to break the causal connection). The Court's review of the record reveals that Plaintiff reported the alleged FLSA violations to Mr. Leon during the first week of October and was then suspected of stealing store merchandise on October 16, 2014. On the following day, Plaintiff was terminated. Although the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the termination is "very close," the suspected theft of store property constitutes an intervening act that breaks the causal chain. As a result, Plaintiff fails to show the requisite but-for causation necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.9

Having found that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the required but-for causation, the Court need not reach the pretext stage of the analysis. Henderson, 442 F. App'x at 507. But even if Plaintiff demonstrated the existence of causation, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to prove that Defendant's proffered reason for his termination — theft — was mere pretext. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant's asserted non-retaliatory reason for his termination is sufficient. See ECF No. [50] at 16. Instead, Plaintiff argues that sufficient evidence exists to prove this explanation was pretextual. The Court's analysis will, therefore, focus on the existence of pretext.

In support of his position, Plaintiff attempts to offer evidence of other comparators — evidence that other employees also shopped during store hours without any adverse consequences. Plaintiff's comparison to such individuals is like comparing apples and oranges. "A comparator is an employee similarly situated to the plaintiff in all relevant respects." Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). "The quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct must be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges." Id. "Misconduct merely `similar' to the misconduct of the disciplined plaintiff is insufficient." Id. "On-the-ground determinations of the severity of different types of workplace misconduct and how best to deal with them are exactly the sort of judgments about which we defer to employers." Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1341 (11th Cir. 2015). Defendant's stated reason for terminating Plaintiff was theft of merchandise, not shopping during store hours. Plaintiff does not present any evidence that there were other employees suspected of theft who did not suffer any adverse employment actions. Thus, Plaintiff's proffered comparators are not sufficiently similar to establish pretext.

"To show pretext in the absence of a comparator, a plaintiff must adduce evidence not only that the employer's proffered reason is false, but also that unlawful retaliation was the employer's true motive." Feise v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 683 Fed. App'x 746, 752 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993)). Specifically, Plaintiff must show either "that [Winn-Dixie's] proffered reason is unworthy of credence or . . . that [retaliation] more than likely motivated [Winn-Dixie] to fire [him]." Id. (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)). Based on the undisputed record evidence, a reasonable jury would be unable to find that Winn-Dixie's reason for terminating Plaintiff — internal theft—was unworthy of credence or that retaliation for raising FLSA violations more likely than not motivated Winn-Dixie to terminate him.

Plaintiff challenges Defendant's reason for terminating him by arguing that "the facts in this case seriously undermine this explanation . . . [as Plaintiff] never stole anything." However, "[t]he inquiry into pretext centers on the employer's beliefs, not the employee's beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker's head." Id. at 753 (quoting Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010)). It is undisputed that Winn-Dixie had detailed written policies that prohibited internal theft and that a violation of this policy was cause for immediate termination. Plaintiff argues that he did not violate this rule because he did not steal, but he does not dispute the existence of this internal theft policy. In Feise, supra, the plaintiff did not dispute that her employer had a policy against sleeping on the job but instead argued she was not sleeping. Id. at 753. Affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "an employer can hardly be said to have discriminated or retaliated against an employee if it terminated the employee based on a good faith belief that she violated a rule, even if the purported violation never actually occurred." Id. This case is no different. There is undisputed evidence that Winn-Dixie's Asset Protection Coordinator Mr. Morejon believed the surveillance video showed Plaintiff taking groceries from the store on nine different occasions without paying for them. In fact, Plaintiff does not dispute that he is the person depicted in the surveillance videos that Mr. Morejon reviewed as part of his internal theft investigation. Thus, regardless of whether Plaintiff actually stole the merchandise and regardless of whether Plaintiff was ultimately acquitted for the petit theft charges, no issue of fact exists as to whether Winn-Dixie's review of the surveillance video led it to believe that Plaintiff violated its internal theft policy. Courts cannot act as a "`super-personnel committee' that impermissibly decides for employers what conduct is sufficient to warrant termination." Id. at 753-54. And, although Plaintiff argues that Mr. Leon used "incomplete video excerpts" and "play[ed] `Honest Iago' successfully enough to have Plaintiff arrested," Plaintiff does not proffer evidence that the complete video excerpts showed him paying for the merchandise. Plaintiff offers argument but has failed to present any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Defendant's proffered reason for terminating him was pretextual. Without more, Plaintiff is unable to satisfy his burden to prove a claim for FLSA retaliation, requiring the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

DONE AND ORDERED.