VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court in consideration of Defendants City of Tarpon Springs, Tarpon Springs Police Department, and Steve Gassen's Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. # 19), filed on March 31, 2016. Plaintiffs Warren Gregory and Michelle Gregory filed a response in opposition on April 20, 2016. (Doc. # 30).
Warren and Michelle Gregory are husband and wife residing in the City of Tarpon Springs, Florida, upon a live-aboard boat. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 1, 4). Until recently, Warren anchored his live-aboard boat in a marina off property owned by a local businessman. (
Warren and Michelle travel by bicycles due to Michelle's physical disabilities; Michelle suffers from epilepsy. (
However, not everyone was so enamored with Warren's decorated bicycles. The Complaint alleges Officer Steve Gassen with the Tarpon Springs Police Department "followed [Warren] around and asked him to remove his bicycles. . . ." (
Then on December 14, 2013, Warren was arrested for aggravated assault by Gassen. (
Warren was again arrested on December 19, 2015, this time on the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. (
Michelle and her mother returned to the live-aboard boat after an outing to find a "large number of Tarpon Springs Police vehicles and officers," as well as Warren in handcuffs seated in the backseat of a police cruiser. (
The Complaint also alleges the Tarpon Springs officers knew Warren was not a felon, but he was nevertheless arrested on the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. (
Thereafter, Warren and Michelle filed the instant action on January 29, 2016. (
(
"A defendant served with a shotgun complaint should move the district court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) on the ground that the complaint provides it with insufficient notice to enable it to file an answer."
The Eleventh Circuit has "identified four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings": (1) "a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts . . ."; (2) a complaint that is "replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action"; (3) a complaint that does "not separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief"; and (4) a complaint that "assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against."
Although the Complaint here does not impermissibly incorporate every preceding allegation into each Count (in fact, not a single Count contains a paragraph incorporating earlier allegations by reference), the Complaint is nevertheless a shotgun pleading. For instance, Count I is brought under two federal statutes—42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985— and attempts to assert claims under four Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as referencing the Constitution of the State of Florida. Simply put, Count I is a hodgepodge of potential claims and constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleadings.
As parenthetically referenced above, none of the Counts explicitly incorporate any of the allegations listed under the header "Allegations Common to All Counts"; rather, the reader of the Complaint is left to infer incorporation. Assuming for the sake of argument such inferential incorporation is sufficient, then irrelevant allegations are incorporated into certain Counts. For example, Paragraph 30 alleges how "[t]he police interfered" with Warren's docking arrangement with a local businessman. But, whether the Defendants interfered with Warren's docking arrangement is irrelevant to establishing, for example, a claim of false arrest or of malicious prosecution.
In addition, all but one of the Counts make no mention as to the capacity in which Gassen is sued. While the caption of the Complaint states Gassen is sued in both his official and individual capacities, Warren and Michelle have not explained why Count VII specifies Gassen's capacity when the earlier Counts do not. The specification of capacity in Count VII could simply be a redundant allegation or it could signal a distinction between Count VII and the other Counts. In light of the "significant" distinction between individual and official capacity suits,
In ordering a repleader, the Court notes Warren and Michelle must separate each cause of action or claim into different counts. Additionally, each count brought against Gassen should specify the capacity in which he is being sued. Furthermore, ordering a repleader will afford Warren and Michelle an opportunity to clearly identify which of the "common" allegations are relevant to which claims by way of explicit incorporation, and to correct the numbering of the Counts. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Warren and Michelle must, as all plaintiffs must, present their claims discretely and succinctly.
Accordingly, it is
(1) Defendants City of Tarpon Springs, Tarpon Springs Police Department, and Steve Gassen's Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. # 19) is
(2) Plaintiffs Warren Gregory and Michelle Gregory may file an amended complaint by