THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
GRATTON, Chief Judge.
In these consolidated cases, John Ivan Odom appeals from the criminal court's order denying his motion for credit for time served in Docket Nos. 36951, 36952, and 36953, and from the post-conviction court's order summarily dismissing his applications for post-conviction relief in Docket Nos. 36957, 36958, and 36959.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2002 Odom pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, in three separate cases. In Docket No. 36951, he pled guilty to three counts of issuing a check without funds and one count of grand theft. In Docket No. 36952, he pled guilty to one count of issuing a check without funds. In Docket No. 36953, he pled guilty to one count of issuing a check without funds. In Docket No. 36951, the district court imposed determinate sentences of three years for each of the issuing a check without funds charges, and a unified sentence of ten years, with five years determinate, on the grand theft charge, with all the sentences to be served concurrently. In Docket No. 36952, the district court imposed a sentence of three years determinate to be served consecutively to the sentences in Docket Nos. 36951 and 36953. In Docket No. 36953, the district court also imposed a sentence of three years determinate to be served consecutively to the sentences in Docket Nos. 36951 and 36952. The district court retained jurisdiction in each case, ultimately placing Odom on probation in all three cases.
With respect to the criminal case, the district court set forth the undisputed facts as follows:
Multiple probation violations were filed against Odom in the above-entitled cases between June of 2005 and October of 2005. Before the 2005 violations could be addressed, a fifth probation violation report was filed on January 10, 2006. The Court issued a warrant ("the Idaho probation violation warrant") for Odom's arrest.
On March 7, 2006, Odom was arrested in Louisiana by Louisiana authorities for violation of a Louisiana felony crime known as "Misapplication of Payment by Contracts." At the time of his arrest on that charge, Louisiana officers also served the Idaho probation violation warrant(s) on Odom. An extradition hearing was held in Louisiana on March 13, 2006, and Odom waived extradition to Idaho. However he continued to be held in Louisiana pending resolution of the Louisiana charge. Ultimately Odom pled guilty to the Louisiana felony and on June 19, 2006 was sentenced to 18 months in prison in Louisiana. He was in the custody of Louisiana on Louisiana's charges from the time of his arrest on March 7, 2006 through sentencing on June 19, 2006.
Odom was discharged on parole from the Louisiana Penitentiary on December 5, 2006. He was in custody on the Louisiana charge until December 5. Following his release on parole he was not immediately extradited to Idaho pursuant to the Idaho arrest warrant that had been served in March 2006. It is not entirely clear in the record why Louisiana released Odom from all custody and failed to honor Idaho's probation warrant even though Odom had waived extradition on that warrant in March of 2006. Nevertheless after becoming aware of this Idaho reissued another probation violation warrant. Odom, who had been out of custody since December 5, 2006 was arrested on the new warrant on April 23, 2007 and was extradited to Twin Falls on May 7, 2007.
Upon returning to Idaho, the State filed more probation violations, and Odom admitted that he violated his probation by: (1) failing to pay restitution; (2) violating the law with respect to the Louisiana charges, as well as by driving without privileges; (3) having a checking account without prior authorization; and (4) absconding. The remaining allegations, including all previous probation violations that had been filed, were dismissed. The district court revoked Odom's probation and executed his prior sentences in all three cases. In each of the orders of commitment, the district court ordered that Odom "be given credit for any time served locally in this case and any time served previously with the Department of Corrections in this case." Odom did not appeal.
On July 18, 2008, Odom filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief addressing all three of his convictions, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel. In his application, Odom asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "appl[y] for the credit for all time incarcerated while under the agents [sic] warrant, a total of Eleven (11) months." The State filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal. Thereafter, Odom filed an amended application for post-conviction relief, in which he "requested that the credit for the time served in custody in Louisiana be considered appropriate for credit for time served in the instant matter," and also alleged that counsel should have "made a specific request for credit from the Louisiana incarceration time to be credited to him as part of the agreement."
The post-conviction court conducted a status hearing, during which the State asserted that "the credit for time served matter is something that's not within the post-conviction relief statute." The post-conviction court indicated that it would prefer for the criminal court to "deal with the credit for time served matter." Odom did not object, and the post-conviction court subsequently issued an order indicating that Odom's motions for credit for time served would be "presented and determined by the Honorable Randy J. Stoker in Mr. Odom's criminal cases."
Thereafter, Odom filed a motion in the criminal court for credit for time served based upon "the fact that his Louisiana matters became part of the probation violations in the above-entitled matters." The criminal court denied Odom's motion, concluding that "Odom cannot show that his incarceration in Louisiana was a consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which he was sentenced in [the Idaho cases]." The court did, however, grant Odom credit for time served from the time that he was rearrested on the second Idaho warrant on April 23, 2007, to May 7, 2007, when he was extradited back to Idaho.
Following the criminal court's ruling, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed Odom's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for credit for time served. The court noted that Odom's post-conviction counsel presented a request for credit for time served. The court concluded that the criminal court's ruling on the issue "essentially makes this claim moot" as Odom "received consideration by the sentencing court of his request for this credit." Because of the criminal court's ruling, the post-conviction court determined that Odom could not show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different."
Odom appeals from the criminal court's denial of his motion for credit for time served and from the post-conviction court's order summarily dismissing his post-conviction application.
II.
ANALYSIS
Odom contends that he is entitled, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2603, to credit for the post-judgment incarceration he served in Louisiana after the service of the Idaho bench warrant. He argues that the district court erred when it relied solely upon I.C. § 18-309 in applying the "for the offense" limitation in denying his request for credit for time served, because I.C. § 19-2603, which does not include the "for the offense" limitation, governs a request for credit for time served post-judgment following service of a bench warrant for a probation violation.1 We agree.
Whether the district court properly applied the law governing credit for time served is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006). We defer to the trial court's findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous. State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003).
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004).
By its language, I.C. § 19-2603 clearly applies to the facts of this case. That provision, which addresses credit for time served post-judgment in cases involving probation violations, states:
When the defendant is brought before the court in such case, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, the original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be executed according to law, and the time such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the defendant's sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench warrant.
(Emphasis added.) We have previously stated that I.C. § 18-309, the provision relied upon by the district court, "does not directly address the question of credit for time served after an entry of judgment for defendants, who . . . have been placed on probation but ultimately have had their probation revoked." State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280, 954 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis in original). In Lively, we reiterated that "I.C. § 19-2603 specifies that if a probationer has been arrested for a probation violation and the probation has been revoked as a result of the violation, the defendant's incarceration from the time of service of the bench warrant will count as part of the sentence." Lively, 131 Idaho at 280, 954 P.2d at 1076.
Odom argues that he is entitled to credit for time served in Louisiana from March 7, 2006, the date of the service of the Idaho bench warrant, until he was released from incarceration on the Louisiana charges and placed on parole on December 5, 2006. The State counters that Odom is not entitled to credit on his Idaho sentences for the time he was incarcerated in Louisiana because he was never effectively in custody on that warrant. The State asserts that the statute presupposes that when a warrant is served, the defendant is taken into custody and incarcerated on that warrant. Here, however, Odom was arrested on Louisiana charges, served the Idaho bench warrant, and incarcerated in Louisiana. After service of the Idaho bench warrant, extradition proceedings to Idaho ensued, though Odom remained incarcerated in Louisiana. The Idaho bench warrant was never revoked while Odom was in custody in Louisiana. Based upon the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603, a defendant is entitled to credit for time served from the time of service of the bench warrant, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.2
III.
CONCLUSION
Odom is entitled to credit for time served from March 7, 2006, until December 5, 2006. The order of the district court denying motion for credit for time served in Docket Nos. 36951, 36952, and 36953 and the order of the district court summarily dismissing applications for post-conviction relief in Docket Nos. 36957, 36958, and 36959 are vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
