SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY, District Judge.
Plaintiff Marisco, Ltd., hired Defendant GL Engineering & Construction, Pte., Ltd. ("GLEC"), to construct and deliver a dry dock. Marisco says that GLEC did not timely complete and deliver the dry dock and instead left Marisco with an unfinished dry dock that did not meet specifications. Marisco further asserts that GLEC's principals, Defendants Lim Sing Tian and Raymond Gan, misrepresented their experience and ability.
GLEC moves to compel Marisco to arbitrate its claims. Alternatively, GLEC says that Marisco should have attempted to mediate this matter before filing suit and that this court should dismiss the First Amended Verified Complaint or stay the case pending mediation. See ECF No. 9. Tian and Gan substantively join in the motion. See ECF No. 11. This court is unpersuaded by the motion and joinder and denies them.
Marisco wanted a floating dry dock in Hawaii. See First Amended Verified Complaint ¶ 18, ECF No. 6, PageID # 226. On December 17, 2015, GLEC submitted a bid for the construction of the dry dock. Id. ¶ 24, PageID # 228.
On December 30, 2015, Marisco sent GLEC $50,000 Singapore dollars to rent a location in Indonesia to build the dry dock, with the understanding that the funds would be applied toward the outstanding balance owed on the down payment of the contract price. Id. ¶ 30, PageID # 229.
On January 4, 2016, Tian and Gan met with Marisco representatives in Hawaii. Marisco says that Tian and Gan falsely represented 1) that GLEC had the experience, skill, and manpower to construct the dry dock per its specifications; and 2) that the Indonesia location was suitable for the construction and launching of the dry dock. Id. ¶¶ 31-37, PageID # 229-31.
A few days later, on January 7, 2016, Marisco told GLEC that the dry dock absolutely had to be completed and delivered by a "drop-dead date" of September 30, 2016. Id. ¶ 41, PageID # 232.
On January 9, 2016, GLEC increased its bid to build the dry dock by $690,000. In seeking this additional amount, Tian and Gan promised that they would personally ensure completion and delivery of the dry dock by September 30, 2016. Id. ¶ 44, PageID # 233. Marisco says it relied on that promise when it agreed to have GLEC build the dry dock and when it agreed to the increased price. Id. ¶ 45.
During the January 2016 meetings, Marisco told GLEC that the dry dock had to be built at a place where the water was at least five meters deep, so the dry dock could eventually be launched without damaging it. Id. ¶ 48, PageID # 234. Tian and Gan represented that they understood the depth requirement and that they would each personally ensure that it would be met so that the dry dock could be launched properly. Id.
On January 20, 2016, Marisco and GLEC entered into the agreement to build the dry dock. Id. ¶ 49, PageID # 234-35; ECF No. 6-1 (copy of Dry Dock Construction Agreement). GLEC agreed to build and perform all the work required by the dry dock plans. Agreement ¶ 1.1, ECF No. 6-1, PageID # 272. In return, Marisco agreed to pay a total of $9 million, with $1.8 million due immediately, followed by eight progress payments of $900,000, each progress payment to be paid upon completion of an additional 12.5% of the construction of the dry dock. Agreement ¶ 2.3(a), ECF No. 6-1, PageID # 274.
GLEC warranted that, when the dry dock was tendered for delivery, it would be free from defects in workmanship, would conform to the specifications, would be in a finished condition, and would be fit for its intended purpose. Agreement ¶ 4.1, ECF No. 6-1, PageID # 277. Section 4.4 of the agreement required GLEC to promptly correct nonconforming work after being notified of any defect and after GLEC had inspected the work to confirm the defect.
Section 16 of the agreement concerns "Dispute Resolution" and states:
Section 2.5 of the agreement states:
Marisco says GLEC transferred an unfinished, defective, and damaged dry dock to it in May 2017, well after the deadline of September 30, 2016. First Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 56-59, ECF No. 6, PageID #s 237-38.
Count I asserts that Tian and Gan fraudulently induced Marisco into entering into the dry dock construction agreement by 1) misrepresenting to Marisco in January 2016 that GLEC had the past ability, current experience, manpower, and supervisory staff to build the dry dock; 2) misrepresenting that the depth of the water where the dry dock was being built was at least 5 meters deep; and 3) falsely promising that Tian and Gan would personally ensure completion and delivery of the dry dock by September 30, 2016. First Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 136-37, ECF No. 6, PageID # 257.
Count II asserts a promissory estoppel claim against Tian and Gan, alleging that they induced Marisco to enter into the contract and made promises that induced Marisco to increase the contract price by $690,000. First Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 150-53, ECF No. 6, PageID # 260.
Count III asserts that GLEC breached the dry dock agreement's warranty provisions, specifically alleging that sections 4.1 and 4.2 of the agreement were breached when GLEC failed to deliver the dry dock as warranted and failed to correct the warranty breaches. First Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 161-63, ECF No. 6, PageID # 262.
Count IV asserts that GLEC actively concealed the warranty breaches to induce Marisco into accepting delivery of the dock and to avoid having to meet GLEC's warranty obligations. First Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 168-71, ECF No. 6, PageID #s 263-64.
GLEC argues in its motion that the present dispute must be arbitrated or mediated before this litigation goes forward. This court disagrees and therefore denies GLEC's motion. The court also denies the substantive joinder in the motion for the same reasons.
The parties agree that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") controls whether arbitration is required here. Under the FAA, arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. "The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act, requires enforcement of arbitration clauses in international contracts unless the clause is null and void." Aasma v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, Inc., 95 F.3d 400, 405 (6
The purpose of the FAA is to advance the federal policy favoring arbitration. See Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9
The FAA requires courts to "enforce the terms of arbitration agreements like other contracts." Lowden, 512 F.3d at 1220; see also Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal., 896 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9
In determining whether to compel a party to arbitrate, a district court may not review the merits of the dispute. Rather, the court's role under the FAA is limited "to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Munro, 896 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9
All parties agree that the arbitration clause contained in the Dry Dock Construction Agreement is valid and enforceable and should be construed under the FAA. This motion therefore turns on whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate encompasses any or all claims asserted in the First Amended Verified Complaint.
The relevant arbitration agreement language in the Dry Dock Construction Agreement states:
GLEC argues that, because Marisco's claims pertain to matters of "administration, materials, and workmanship" relating to the dry dock, those claims must be arbitrated. GLEC says, for example, that Marisco is asserting a warranty claim that concerns materials and workmanship.
But the language GLEC relies on is part of a larger sentence requiring the parties to "use the procedure set forth in Section 2.[5] for arbitration by an agreed surveyor to resolve disputes over contract administration, materials, and workmanship." Section 2.5 states:
Additionally, section 16.1 does not simply refer to requiring arbitration for "disputes over contract administration, materials, and workmanship." Instead, it explains that "The disputes referable to the agreed surveyor under the procedure outlined in Section 2.5 are: (a) status of work for progress payments under Section 2.5 . . . ." In other words, the description of disputes referable to the surveyor pursuant to section 2.5 modifies the earlier sentence requiring the parties to use "arbitration by an agreed surveyor to resolve disputes over contract administration, materials, and workmanship." Both sections appear to govern arbitration of progress payment claims, allowing an arbitrator or surveyor to summarily decide such claims.
GLEC views the warranty claim as a progress payment dispute, noting that Marisco withheld the final progress payment on the ground that GLEC's work was allegedly not completed in accordance with specifications. However the dispute before this court is not at heart a dispute about any progress payment. GLEC conceded at the hearing that Marisco could have brought the same claims even if Marisco had made all payments. Marisco is the master of its claims, and Marisco is not suing to keep the final payment. Marisco's claims cannot be recharacterized by GLEC as involving progress payments for purposes of sections 16.1 and 2.5. GLEC is not even claiming that the final progress payment should have been made. If Marisco were seeking a declaratory judgment providing that it could retain the final payment, the arbitration clause might well have been triggered. But that is not the situation before this court.
Because GLEC does not demonstrate on the present record that any claim falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the court denies the motion to the extent it seeks to require arbitration of Marisco's claims.
GLEC argues that, under section 16.2 of the Dry Dock Construction Agreement, Marisco should have mediated this case before filing it. GLEC asks this court to stay or dismiss this case to allow the parties to mediate their dispute. GLEC's argument is unpersuasive.
Section 16.2 of the parties' agreement states:
Under section 16.2, the parties must use "best efforts" to resolve a dispute. When those "best efforts" fail, unless the claim is one that must be arbitrated, the parties may turn to litigation. While section 16.2 mentions "mediation" in its heading, there is no mandatory mediation requirement set forth in it. The parties are just directed to meet in an effort to agree upon a procedure to resolve the dispute.
GLEC argues that Marisco failed to use its "best efforts" to resolve the dispute. However, Marisco has done enough to survive the present motion.
On June 9, 2017, well before filing the original Verified Complaint on June 4, 2018, Marisco sent GLEC, Tian, and Gan correspondence asking "that GLEC
It appears that representatives of Marisco and GLEC met on July 10 and 11, 2017, verifying various construction defects. See ECF No. 1-3. PageID #s 108-16.
On August 11, 2017, Marisco again sent correspondence to GLEC, Tian, and Gan, noting that they had not communicated with Marisco with respect to the alleged construction defects. See ECF No. 1-4. The letter states: "If GLEC does not respond immediately to Marisco, assuring Marisco that GLEC will pay for all labor and all materials to bring the Dry Dock into compliance with GLEC's Warranties . . ., then Marisco will litigate this issue." Id., PageID # 122. The following day, GLEC acknowledged receipt of Marisco's claims. See ECF No. 1-8, PageID # 143.
On August 27, 2017, GLEC responded. See ECF No. 1-5. GLEC argued that, because the final inspection had not occurred, its 30-day period to cure deficiencies had not started. Id., PageID # 128. GLEC stated that it fully intended to comply with its contractual obligations. Id. On August 30, 2017, GLEC again noted that it had the right to inspect and comment with respect to alleged defects at a final inspection of the dry dock. See ECF No. 1-6, PageID # 131.
On January 22, 2018, GLEC told Marisco:
ECF No. 1-9, PageID # 147.
It appears that Marisco planned to inspect the claimed inadequacies in the Dry Dock from May 9 to 11, 2018, but travel arrangements caused a postponement to May 30 to June 1, 2018. See ECF No. 1-10, PageID # 202. GLEC then pushed the inspection dates to June 4 to 6, 2018, because one of its engineers was hospitalized. See ECF No. 1-12, PageID # 204.
The present action was filed on June 4, 2018. See ECF No. 1. Marisco filed its First Amended Verified Complaint on June 6, 2018.
Given the present record, the court cannot say that Marisco failed to use its "best efforts" to resolve issues before filing the present complaint. From August 2017, Marisco had been telling GLEC that it was going to litigate this matter. While GLEC responded that it had the right to inspect alleged defects, the record does not establish that GLEC could not inspect the dry dock during the many months until suit was filed. Under these circumstances, the court cannot conclude on this motion that Marisco failed to use its "best efforts" to resolve issues before filing this action. See Jewel Companies, Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores NW., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 n.11 (9
This court also notes that, since it heard argument on this motion, the parties agreed to attempt to settle this matter before this court ruled on the present motion and joinder. See ECF Nos. 18 and 19. The parties subsequently stipulated to a stay of this action to pursue settlement rather than litigation. See ECF No. 40. At this point, it can hardly be said that Marisco has failed to pursue an informal resolution of the matters raised in this case.
The court denies GLEC's motion and the substantive joinder.
IT IS SO ORDERED.