Filed: May 08, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-1386 E.H. v. New York City Department of Education UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N
Summary: 14-1386 E.H. v. New York City Department of Education UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NO..
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14-1386
E.H. v. New York City Department of Education
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
3 8th day of May, two thousand fifteen.
4
5 PRESENT:
6
7 RALPH K. WINTER,
8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10
11 Circuit Judges.
12 ______________________________________________
13
14 E.H., individually and on behalf of M.K., a minor,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- No. 14-1386
19
20 NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
21
22 Defendant-Appellee.
23 __________________________________________
24
25 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: LAWRENCE D. WEINBERG, Esq., Bloomfield, NJ.
26
27 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: TAHIRIH M. SADRIEH, Richard Dearing, for Zachary W.
28 Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New
29 York, NY.
1
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
2 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and REMANDED.
3 Plaintiff-Appellant E.H. is the mother of M.K., a ten year-old child who has been diagnosed
4 with autism. During the 2010-11 school year, M.K. attended the Rebecca School – a private school
5 for children with neurodevelopmental disorders, including autism, which uses a teaching
6 methodology known as the “DIR/Floortime” method. Defendant-Appellee New York City
7 Department of Education (“DOE”) reimbursed E.H. for M.K.’s tuition after an independent hearing
8 officer (“IHO”) determined that the DOE failed to offer M.K. a free appropriate public education
9 (“FAPE”) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §
10 1400 et seq. On February 14, 2011, the DOE convened a Committee on Special Education to
11 develop an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) and Behavioral Intervention Plan for M.K.’s
12 2011-12 school year. The resulting IEP placed M.K. in a specialized classroom within a school
13 offering year-round services, assigned him a dedicated crisis-management paraprofessional and
14 weekly meetings with therapists, and set academic, social, physical and behavioral goals. Many of
15 the goals came directly from a report created by the Rebecca School.
16 On June 27, 2011, E.H. filed a due process complaint, arguing that the IEP failed to provide
17 M.K. a FAPE, and expressing her intention to re-enroll M.K. at the Rebecca School and to seek
18 tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. After a three-day hearing, the IHO agreed that M.K. had
19 been denied a FAPE and ordered the DOE to fund M.K.’s tuition. The DOE appealed to a state
20 review officer (“SRO”) who, on July 25, 2012, reversed the IHO after concluding that the IEP was
21 “sufficient to address the student’s demonstrated needs and [was] designed to enable him to make
22 progress.” J.A. 24. E.H. then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
2
1 of New York (Daniels J.), seeking reversal of the SRO’s decision. The parties cross-moved for
2 summary judgment and, on March 21, 2014, the district court affirmed. This appeal followed. We
3 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
4 issues on appeal.
5 * * *
6 Under the IDEA, school districts must provide “all children with disabilities a free
7 appropriate public education,” which consists of “special education and related services tailored to
8 meet the unique needs of a particular child, and . . . reasonably calculated to enable the child to
9 receive educational benefits.” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.
10 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Parents who believe the district has failed to offer a FAPE
11 may enroll their child in a private school and seek tuition reimbursement, which “will be granted
12 only if (1) the proposed IEP failed to provide the student with an appropriate public education;
13 (2) the parent’s private placement was appropriate to the child’s needs; and (3) equitable
14 considerations support the parent’s claim.” Hardison v. Bd. of Educ. of the Oneonta City Sch. Dist.,
15
773 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 2014). Parents seeking reimbursement must bring their claim to state
16 administrators – in New York, an IHO and SRO – before filing in federal court. 20 U.S.C. §
17 1415(i).
18 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment in an IDEA case de novo. R.E. v.
19 N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
694 F.3d 167, 184 (2d Cir. 2012). But although we “engage in an
20 independent review of the administrative record,” we must give “due weight” to the state
21 administrative decisions, “mindful that the judiciary generally lacks the specialized knowledge and
22 experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” M.H. v.
3
1 N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 240 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
2 often means deferring to the “final decision of the state authorities, even where the reviewing
3 authority disagrees with the hearing officer.”
Id. at 241. Only if the SRO’s decision is
4 “insufficiently reasoned to merit . . . deference,” may we disregard it in favor of the IHO’s decision.
5
Id. at 246.
6 E.H. first argues that the DOE committed both procedural and substantive errors in crafting
7 M.K.’s Behavioral Intervention Plan because it failed to conduct a functional behavioral assessment
8 and mischaracterized several of M.K.’s behaviors. We disagree. To begin with, under the IDEA
9 “[t]he party requesting [a] due process hearing shall not be allowed to raise issues at the due process
10 hearing that were not raised [in the due process complaint], unless the other party agrees otherwise.”
11 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B). Although we do not apply this rule “mechanically,” C.F. ex rel. R.F. v.
12 N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
746 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2014), E.H.’s due process complaint did not so much
13 as mention the Behavioral Intervention Plan, let alone identify these shortcomings. See T.M. ex rel.
14 A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist.,
752 F.3d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 2014). The SRO was therefore correct
15 to find these arguments forfeited.
16 Moreover, the district court correctly decided that the DOE’s Behavioral Intervention Plan
17 was neither procedurally nor substantively inadequate. In New York, school districts must conduct
18 a “full [functional behavioral assessment] for a student who exhibits behavior that impedes
19 learning,” and “develop a [Behavioral Intervention Plan] to address that behavior.”
Id. at 169. The
20 “failure to conduct an adequate [assessment] is a serious procedural violation,” but “does not rise
21 to the level of a denial of a FAPE if the IEP adequately identifies the problem behavior and
22 prescribes ways to manage it.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the DOE evaluated
4
1 M.K.’s psychological reports and his progress at the Rebecca School, spoke to M.K.’s teacher, and
2 asked E.H. for input. Because this process “adequately identifie[d]” M.K.’s “behavioral
3 impediments” and created “strategies to address that behavior,” the DOE’s failure to conduct a
4 formal assessment did not deny M.K. a FAPE. M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d
5 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2013); see also A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist.,
6
553 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 2009). The resulting Behavioral Intervention Plan also accurately
7 characterized M.K.’s behavior, most notably his spitting and biting. It was not until after the IEP
8 was created that M.K.’s teachers noticed changes in those behaviors, and neither E.H. nor M.K.’s
9 teachers apprised the DOE of the changes. We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion
10 that the Behavioral Intervention Plan was adequate.
11 E.H. next argues that the DOE failed to provide a FAPE because the classroom to which it
12 assigned M.K. already had six students enrolled and therefore lacked space for him. However, when
13 a plaintiff challenges the adequacy of an IEP, “[o]ur evaluation must focus on the written plan
14 offered to the parents,” and “[s]peculation that the school district will not adequately adhere to the
15 IEP is not an appropriate basis for unilateral placement.”
R.E., 694 F.3d at 195. Furthermore, as
16 the SRO decided, the testimony on which E.H. relies does not establish that the DOE’s selected
17 classroom lacked space for M.K. The DOE’s witness testified that, when the school year began in
18 July 2011, the class had six students. But E.H. rejected the DOE’s placement in June 2011, before
19 the beginning of the school year. The DOE’s witness testified that, at that time, the district
20 anticipated that a spot in the classroom would be open for M.K. The DOE had no obligation to keep
21 that spot available after E.H. rejected its IEP.
22 Finally, E.H. contends that the IEP is inadequate because it adopts goals that the Rebecca
5
1 School created for M.K., but does not require that the Rebecca School’s “DIR/Floortime” teaching
2 methodology be used to implement those goals. We have held that, because of their specialized
3 knowledge and experience, state administrators are generally superior to federal courts at resolving
4 “dispute[s] over an appropriate educational methodology.” M.H., 685 F.3d at 244. That deference
5 is warranted, however, only if the state administrators weigh the evidence about proper teaching
6 methodologies and explain their conclusions. See
id. at 252; R.E., 694 F.3d at 194.
7 In this case, neither state administrator applied its expertise to determine whether the
8 “DIR/Floortime” methodology is necessary to implement the goals in the IEP. The IHO noted that
9 the IEP adopts the Rebecca School’s goals without requiring the use of the “DIR/Floortime” method,
10 but did not assess whether the IEP is “likely to produce progress” toward M.K.’s goals even without
11 that teaching methodology.
M.H., 685 F.3d at 224. On appeal, the SRO also failed to evaluate
12 whether M.K. could progress without “DIR/Floortime.” Instead, it concluded that the IHO should
13 not have addressed the methodological issue because E.H. failed to raise the matter in the due
14 process complaint. J.A. 15-16 n.7. But that decision was incorrect – E.H.’s due process complaint
15 contained at least three objections to the IEP’s failure to adopt the “DIR/Floortime” methodology.
16 And contrary to the district court’s decision, the SRO’s general conclusion that the IEP was
17 “sufficient to address the student’s demonstrated needs,” J.A. 24, is no replacement for a direct
18 evaluation of the evidence on teaching methodology. As we explained in M.H., a “failure to
19 consider any of the evidence regarding . . . methodology . . . is precisely the type of determination
20 to which courts need not
defer.” 685 F.3d at 252.
21 Although we “appreciate the[] desire to resolve this case now without further litigation, . .
22 . [i]t would be imprudent for this panel, without any educational expertise,” to evaluate if the
6
1 “DIR/Floortime” methodology is necessary to implement the goals in the IEP. E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
2 of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 463 (2d Cir. 2014). The SRO failed to address the issue not because the
3 record lacked evidence from which it could decide whether the IEP is appropriate, but because it
4 committed a legal error. We therefore vacate the district court’s decision and remand so that the
5 district court can direct the SRO to determine, in the first instance, whether the DOE denied M.K.
6 a FAPE by adopting the Rebecca School’s goals without also adopting the “DIR/Floortime”
7 methodology. Cf. M.T. ex rel. N.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
47 F. Supp. 3d 197, 208 (S.D.N.Y.
8 2014); Y.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
2013 WL 5722793, No. 12-civ-2590 (WHP), at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
9 Sept. 24, 2013). If the SRO concludes that the DOE denied M.K. a FAPE, either the SRO or district
10 court must also address whether the Rebecca School is an appropriate alternative placement and
11 whether equitable considerations favor reimbursement. See
Hardison, 773 F.3d at 376.
12 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and
13 REMANDED.
14
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
17
7
