SMITH, Presiding Judge.
In this child custody dispute, Donna Segars and Richard Segars ("the Segars") appeal from the order of the Morgan County Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the Georgia Department of Human Services, acting by and through the Morgan County Department of Family and Children Services ("DFACS"). Because the trial court correctly determined that the issue of custody had already been decided in the juvenile court and thus could not be relitigated in superior court, we affirm.
The Segars are the paternal grandparents of A.S., the minor child whose custody is at issue here. On July 20, 2009, the Segars filed a petition for temporary letters of guardianship in the Probate Court of Baldwin County, where they reside. On July 22, 2009, by order of the Juvenile Court of Morgan County, two-month-old A.S. was taken from the hospital, where she was born prematurely, into shelter care. At the 72-hour hearing, on July 27, 2009, the Segars were present and represented by counsel. The juvenile court entered an order consented to by the parents, finding that A.S. was deprived due to their history of drug use and domestic violence and awarding temporary custody to DFACS.
On July 31, 2009, the Segars filed a motion to intervene in the deprivation proceedings before the juvenile court. That motion was denied on August 19, nunc pro tunc August 11, 2009. The record contains no appeal of that order, and it appears that the Segars did not seek to appeal the denial of their motion to intervene.
On December 11, 2009, DFACS filed a separate action in the juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father of A.S. The Segars were aware of the termination action at the latest by January 19, 2010, when they filed this action and alleged that the termination action was pending.
Instead, on January 19, 2010, the Segars filed a "Complaint for Custody" in the Superior Court of Morgan County, beginning the action which forms the subject of this appeal. In that complaint, they noted that A.S. had been taken into shelter care, that the child was found to be deprived, that they filed a motion to intervene which was denied, that a final order of temporary custody was entered, and that DFACS had filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The Segars sought temporary and permanent custody of A.S., and prayed that the juvenile court action be stayed until their superior court action could be heard.
Eight days later, on January 27, 2010, the juvenile court held a hearing in the termination proceeding, taking evidence and hearing testimony from witnesses, including Dr. Priscilla Faulkner, a licensed psychologist.
Concluding that none of the relatives identified in DFACS's search were suitable placements for the child under OCGA § 15-11-103, the juvenile court placed physical and legal custody with DFACS for purposes of adoption.
A month later, on February 25, 2010, the Segars moved for a permanent injunction in the superior court action, seeking an order prohibiting DFACS from placing A.S. for adoption until the custody action was heard on the merits. Thereafter, DFACS responded to the motion for injunction and moved for judgment on the pleadings. On May 4, 2010, the superior court held a hearing on the pending motions, and on May 28, 2010, it entered an order treating DFACS's motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of DFACS. This appeal followed.
The superior court correctly held that it could have had jurisdiction over an original petition for custody, but the juvenile court had already taken jurisdiction and decided the Segars's contentions adversely to them. Therefore, nothing remained to be decided in the superior court.
In determining the issue of competing jurisdictions, we have repeatedly applied the principle that "where common law courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court taking jurisdiction will retain it." Lincoln v. State, 138 Ga.App. 234, 235(2), 225 S.E.2d 708 (1976). See also State v. Henderson, 281 Ga. 623, 624(1), 641 S.E.2d 515 (2007) ("Where courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court taking jurisdiction will retain it.")
In our recent decision of Long v. Long, 303 Ga.App. 215, 692 S.E.2d 811 (2010), concurrent jurisdiction over custody clearly existed in the superior and juvenile courts because a divorce action was pending in superior court simultaneously with a deprivation action in juvenile court. But even in that case, once the juvenile court had exercised its jurisdiction over the issue of custody, we applied the principle that "whichever [court] first takes jurisdiction will retain it." (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Id. at 218(2), 692 S.E.2d 811. We held that, because "the juvenile court had already exercised its jurisdiction over the temporary custody of [appellant's] children in light of the deprivation action, ... we cannot conclude that the superior court had good reason to interfere." Id. at 219(2), 692 S.E.2d 811 Because the juvenile court had prior jurisdiction, we reversed the superior court's injunction forbidding DFACS, the temporary custodian of appellant's children, from allowing appellant custody or unsupervised visitation. Id.
Long controls the outcome in the case before us. Once the juvenile court took jurisdiction of the deprivation action and, later, the termination action, it took jurisdiction of the entire case of the minor child A.S., including the issues of disposition and custody under OCGA §§ 15-11-58 and 15-11-103. The superior court correctly found that it had no good reason to interfere with the valid jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
In their brief, the Segars raise four related enumerations of error, none of which have merit because they ignore the central issue of jurisdiction. First, they seize on language in the superior court's order that notes that they "did not exhaust their remedies at law in the Juvenile Court of Morgan County." From this, they argue that the trial court improperly applied the rule regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. In support of their argument, they cite to the dissent in Patterson v. Ellerbee, 268 Ga.App. 826, 603 S.E.2d 308 (2004). But the majority in that case, while not directly on point, is significant here because it reaffirms the principles allocating jurisdiction between the juvenile and superior courts.
In Patterson, after the juvenile court refused to appoint counsel for a parent in a deprivation proceeding, the parent filed a class action in superior court on behalf of all parents who had been denied counsel in deprivation proceedings. Id. at 827, 603 S.E.2d 308. The superior court dismissed, and we affirmed, holding that the superior court
The Segars also contend that the superior court, having found that an original petition for custody is proper in that court, should have entertained their petition. They further contend that their petition was timely. But these contentions ignore the fact that the superior court lacked jurisdiction.
The Segars incorrectly assert that they were without a remedy. As the superior court correctly observed, they could have appealed the denial of their motion to intervene in the deprivation action, but failed to do so. Furthermore, they could have moved to intervene in the termination action, but failed to do so. See J.M.T., supra, 275 Ga. App. at 528, 621 S.E.2d 535 (holding juvenile court erred in denying motion to intervene in termination action by paternal relatives).
The superior court correctly determined that it could not hear a custody matter as to which the juvenile court had already taken jurisdiction and had exercised that jurisdiction by terminating parental rights and placing physical and legal custody of the child in DFACS. We therefore affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
MIKELL and DILLARD, JJ., concur.