JAY C. GANDHI, Magistrate Judge.
Misty Dawn Thomas ("Plaintiff") challenges the Social Security Commissioner's decision denying her application for disability benefits. Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by (1) failing to provide a full and fair hearing, and (2) improperly evaluating a Department of Rehabilitation vocational evaluation report in assessing her residual functional capacity ("RFC"). (See Joint Stip. at 14-17, 25-26, 37-39, 42-43.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff for the reasons discussed below.
As a general rule, "Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits." Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000). "The ALJ in a social security case has an independent duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered." Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ must be "especially diligent" when, as here, the claimant is unrepresented. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2010).
Here, first, the ALJ erred by failing to inquire into Plaintiff's claim at the hearing that her submission to the Agency was "incomplete," and by simply disregarding the concern as not "constitut[ing] a legal objection." (Administrative Record ("AR") at 50, 54); McLeod, 640 F.3d at 885; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150.
Second, the ALJ improperly limited Plaintiff's attempt to present evidence and argument during the hearing. (AR at 62); see McLeod, 640 F.3d at 885; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. Significantly, Plaintiff indicated she had a "ton of stuff" to present and discuss at the hearing,
Third, Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to question the vocational expert ("VE").
Thus, the ALJ failed to provide a full and fair hearing.
As a rule, an ALJ is required to consider and give due weight to all relevant evidence in the case record, including opinion evidence from non-medical sources who have seen the claimant in a professional capacity. An ALJ must consider such evidence and provide germane reasons in order to properly disregard it. See Turner v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2010); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, first, the ALJ provided no discussion of the vocational evaluation report.
Second, the omission is especially pronounced considering the vocational evaluator's opinion — that Plaintiff could not engage in full-time competitive employment — does not comport with the ALJ's findings that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, and none of the limitations from the report were included in the hypotheticals to the VE. (AR at 482); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ erred by failing to present restrictions in vocational report to VE or state reasons for disregarding it in the written decision); Butler v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2816971, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (ALJ erred by failing to incorporate restrictions in vocational evaluation report into RFC or pose restrictions to VE).
Thus, the ALJ improperly evaluated the vocational evaluation report.
With error established, this Court has discretion to remand or reverse and award benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Where no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to direct an immediate award of benefits. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004). But where outstanding issues must be resolved before a determination can be made, or where the record does not make clear that proper evaluation of the evidence would require a disability finding, remand is appropriate. Id. at 594.
Here, in light of the error, ALJ must conduct another administrative hearing and assess the evidence, including the vocational evaluation report, on an "open record." See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d 487, 495-96 (9th Cir. 2015); Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014). Given the necessity of remand, the Court need not address Plaintiff's remaining contentions.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT judgment shall be entered