HUGH LAWSON, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Sabrina Harvey, an African American woman, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), contending that Defendants UHS Pruitt Holdings, Inc. ("UHS-Pruitt") and Lowndes County Health Services, LLC ("LCHS"), d/b/a Heritage Healthcare of Valdosta,
Plaintiff filed a Request for Oral Hearing in relation to the pending motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 19, p. 15). The Court has thoroughly reviewed the briefs and the evidence of record and concludes that a hearing is not warranted. Plaintiff's request for oral argument is therefore denied.
Local Rule 56 provides,
M.D.Ga. L.R. 56;
Plaintiff failed to comply with these requirements. Plaintiff filed what she captions as her response to Defendants' statement of material facts. (Doc. 19, pp. 4-6). However, Plaintiff's eight paragraph response wholly fails to address any of the 48 statements of fact propounded by Defendants and does not include a single citation to the record. The Statement of Material Facts contained in Plaintiff's response brief is similarly devoid of record citations and cannot be construed as either a response to Defendants' statement of undisputed material facts or as Plaintiff's statement of disputed material facts for the purpose of satisfying the rule. M.D.Ga. L.R. 56 ("Affidavits and the introductory portions of briefs do not constitute a statement of material facts.") The Court accordingly deems admitted Defendants' statement of facts that are properly supported by citations to the record.
Defendant LCHS, which operates the nursing home facility formerly known as Heritage Healthcare of Valdosta, hired Plaintiff Sabrina Harvey as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN")
In general, the nursing staff reports to the Director of Nursing ("DON"). (Doc. 18-5, p. 73). However, the DON typically does not work on the weekends and instead delegates her supervisory authority to a rotating crew of weekend supervisors. (Doc. 18-5, p. 73-74). The LPNs and CNAs on duty report to the weekend supervisor, who then conveys any issues that may arise to the DON. (Doc. 18-5, pp. 72-73). The weekend supervisor's role thus entails supervising staff, counseling staff, and addressing staff members' requests, complaints, and concerns. (Doc. 18-2, ¶ 23). It is the responsibility of the weekend supervisor to enforce policy and to report personnel issues to the DON for disciplinary action. (Doc. 18-5, pp. 78-81). The weekend supervisor plays no role in hiring or firing employees. (Doc. 18-5, p. 82).
Sometime in January 2011, Jennifer Simmons, an LPN also employed by LCHS, reported to LCHS's Administrator Phil Herndon that on January 7, 2011, Plaintiff, in the presence of Stephanie Burgess, a white LPN, and Yolanda Mincey, an African American LPN, made a comment to Simmons that Simmons found offensive.
The nursing home's Administrator Phil Herndon continued to investigate the matter. (Doc. 18-2, ¶ 35). Concerned that during her weekend shifts Plaintiff routinely supervised both Simmons and the other LPNs who witnessed the alleged interaction, Herndon determined it wise to discover (1) whether Plaintiff made the alleged statement; and (2) if Plaintiff did make the statement whether she intended the comment to be derogatory toward Simmons. (Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 35-36). Herndon obtained written statements from Stephanie Burgess and Yolanda Mincey, who both purportedly verified the statement made by Plaintiff. (Doc. 18-2, ¶ 37; Doc. 19-1, p. 3). Herndon ultimately concluded that Plaintiff made an intentionally derogatory comment and that she lied about making the statement in the course of the investigation. (Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 37-38).
Making false statements constitutes a violation of LCHS's company policies. (Doc. 18-2, ¶ 39). Additionally, because Plaintiff served as a part-time supervisor of both the person to whom she directed the allegedly offensive remark and the witnesses of the interaction, LCHS categorized her behavior as unprofessional conduct. (Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 39-40). LCHS terminated Plaintiff on February 24, 2011 on these grounds. (Doc. 18-2, ¶ 41).
Plaintiff filed a timely Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that LCHS discriminated against her on the basis of her race when the nursing home terminated her for making an allegedly disparaging statement toward a co-worker but did not terminate a white co-worker, who she contends made a substantively similar remark. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 9, 29-30). The EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue on February 3, 2014. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). This lawsuit ensued.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must evaluate all of the evidence, together with any logical inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact."
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants UHS-Pruitt and LCHS discriminated against her on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII by treating her differently than a similarly-situated employee of another race and argues that Defendants' proffered reasons for terminating her are mere pretext for race discrimination. Plaintiff further contends that her former employer caused damage to her personal and professional reputation, subjected her to the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspired to deprive her of both her job and her right to equal protection. Defendants deny these allegations. Finding that Plaintiff has failed to meet her evidentiary burden to prove her allegations of race discrimination, and determining that Plaintiff's remaining claims lack any cognizable merit, the Court concludes that Defendants' are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendants move the Court to dismiss Defendant UHS Pruitt Holdings, Inc. ("UHS-Pruitt") as a party to this case. Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that UHS-Pruitt and LCHS engaged in a joint venture in the management and operation of the nursing home formerly known as Heritage Healthcare of Valdosta. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 14-19). According to Plaintiff, Defendants are thus jointly and severally liable for discriminating against Plaintiff in her employment. UHS-Pruitt disputes this characterization and shows that UHS-Pruitt is a holding company that does not otherwise participate in the business of LCHS. Therefore, UHS-Pruitt is not liable for any alleged violations of Title VII.
Title VII defines an employer as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of the twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The term "employer" is to be interpreted liberally.
At issue here is whether UHS-Pruitt may be considered a joint employer for the purpose of adjudicating Plaintiff's Title VII claims. Two entities may be considered joint employers where they "contract with each other for the performance of some task and one company retains sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment of the other company's employees."
The evidence does not support a finding that UHS-Pruitt and LCHS jointly employed Plaintiff. First, there is no evidence of a contract between UHS-Pruitt and LCHS. (Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 8-9). Further, the undisputed facts show that UHS-Pruitt is a holding company with no employees. (Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 6, 16). LCHS is a subsidiary of United Health Services of Georgia, Inc., which is a subsidiary of UHS-Pruitt. (Doc. 18-2, ¶ 6). UHS-Pruitt is a separate corporate entity that does not participate in the management or business of LCHS; does not exercise control over the terms and conditions of employment of LCHS's employees; and does not participate in decisions to hire or to terminate any LCHS employees, including Plaintiff. (Doc. 18-2, ¶¶ 7, 10-15, 17, 19).
Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that UHS-Pruitt exercised any degree of control over LCHS and its employees. Accordingly, the Court finds that no joint employer status exists between the two Defendants and dismisses Plaintiff's claims against UHS-Pruitt.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence.
To establish a prima face case of discriminatory discharge, Plaintiff must produce evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she was terminated from that position; and (4) either she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside his protected class or she was replaced by a person outside of her protected class.
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff, who is African American, is a member of a protected class; that she met the requisite qualifications as an LPN; and that she suffered an adverse employment action when LCHS terminated her. However, Plaintiff's prima facie case for race discrimination fails because Plaintiff has not produced evidence that she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee of another race.
To draw a valid comparison, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she and any proffered comparators "are similarly situated in all relevant aspects."
Plaintiff offers only one comparator for the Court's consideration: Stephanie Burgess. According to Plaintiff's deposition testimony, Burgess, who also worked as an LPN for Defendants, initiated the conversation about Jennifer Simmons. (Doc. 18-5, p. 91). It was during this interchange that Simmons purportedly overheard Plaintiff utter the allegedly offensive remark that Simmons was either "queen of the throne" or "heir to the throne." Plaintiff claims that Burgess made a similar comment. (Doc. 18-5, p. 92). However, to Plaintiff's knowledge Burgess was neither subjected to an investigation nor terminated. (Doc. 18-5, pp. 108-09, 128, 136).
Defendants argue that Burgess is not a proper comparator because Plaintiff served in a supervisory capacity and Burgess did not. A comparator need not have the same job title as the plaintiff to qualify as a comparator: "Admittedly, differences in job ranks between a plaintiff and another employee are not, in and of themselves, dispositive as to whether the two individuals may be compared for purposes of evaluating a discrimination claim."
There is not enough evidence in the record for the Court to draw any meaningful conclusion about the role Plaintiff's weekend supervisor title played in LCHS's decision to terminate Plaintiff and to take no ostensible action against Burgess. Ultimately, the distinction does not matter, though, because Plaintiff has produced no evidence beyond her mere allegation that Burgess engaged in similar conduct.
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court still finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has made absolutely no effort to confront Defendants' proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her or to show that the reason given was merely a pretext for race discrimination.
The employer has the burden of production, not persuasion to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for termination, a burden that has been described as "exceedingly light."
Defendants have met their "exceedingly light" burden to articulate what a reasonable fact finder may consider a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. After conducting an investigation and concluding that Plaintiff engaged in unprofessional conduct and then provided a false statement when questioned about the behavior of which she was accused, LCHS made the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. While Plaintiff may disagree with the reason proffered by her employer for her termination, she has utterly failed to confront this reason head on and to present even a shred of evidence that LCHS's proffered reason is but pretext for discrimination. The crux of Plaintiff's pretext argument is that she never made the "queen of the throne" or "heir to the throne" comment and hence was not dishonest when asked about the statement.
Plaintiff's unsupported denial is insufficient to establish pretext. "A plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute [her] business judgment for that of the employer. Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason."
The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that an employer may terminate an employee for a good or bad reason without violating federal law.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff raises three additional claims: (1) that "Defendants have caused Plaintiff to suffer and endure a severe stigma on [her] personal and professional reputation in the eyes of [her] professional peers" (Doc. 1, ¶ 38); (2) that Defendants have subjected her to intentional infliction of emotional distress (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 39-41; and (3) that Defendants, motivated by race, conspired to "discharge Plaintiff from [her] lawfully held employment" and to "deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws" (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 42-46). Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on these claims. Defendants thus argue that Plaintiff has abandoned the claims and that they are entitled to summary judgment.
In several unpublished decisions, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff may abandon her claims on summary judgment by failing to address those claims in a response brief.
Plaintiff alleges in Count II of her Complaint that "[b]y discharging Plaintiff for no reason, or at best a pretextual reason, the Defendants have caused Plaintiff to suffer and endure a severe stigma on [her] personal and professional reputation." Plaintiff cites no legal basis for this claim. To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim for slander or defamation, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, "[a]ctions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, except for injuries to the reputation, which shall be brought within one year after the right of action accrues." A suit for slander or defamation qualifies as one relating to injury to the reputation. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4(a);
Plaintiff premises this claim on her discharge, which occurred on February 24, 2011. Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until April 14, 2014, which falls well outside the statute of limitations. The Court therefore grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint.
In Count III of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that by discharging her, Defendants inflicted intentional emotional distress on Plaintiff. To recover on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must show that "(1) defendants' conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal connection existed between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional harm was severe.
Because the Court finds this claim devoid of any merit, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The legal basis for the allegations asserted in Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint is unclear. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired through their policies and actions to discharge Plaintiff; that in so doing Defendants deprived Plaintiff of equal protection; and that Defendants were motivated by race.
To the extent that Plaintiff intends to assert a claim under § 1981, Defendants are also entitled summary judgment. Section 1981 provides that all persons in the United States "shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The same analytical framework and proof requirements for Title VII discrimination cases applies to claims of race discrimination raised under § 1981.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) is granted, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.