In this case we consider an environmental review process which commenced in 2002. During the course of that process the developers of a residential real estate project prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) which was certified by a county board of supervisors in 2003. The EIR was challenged in a prior writ proceeding and as a result of the challenge a writ was issued compelling the county and the developers to prepare a supplemental EIR (SEIR) which more thoroughly considered the impact of the project on water quality. The SEIR was circulated and certified in 2007.
Appellants contend that in this second proceeding under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code,
We also reject appellants' contention that, following circulation of a draft version of the SEIR, the county should have recirculated the SEIR with a reference to the then recent observation of larvae of an endangered toad species in a creek near the project and permitted public comment on that fact. The county's decision to approve the SEIR without recirculation is supported by a number of circumstances disclosed in the record: the 2003 EIR assumed the toad species had been observed in the vicinity of the project but determined the project would have no significant impact on the toad because the toad was not observed on the site of the proposed development and the site was not a suitable habitat for the toad; public comment on the adequacy of this analysis was received and in challenging the adequacy of the 2003 EIR, appellants argued, among other matters, that observation of the toad in
Because the county's compliance with the earlier writ and the adequacy the SEIR had been determined in the prior proceeding and because the county was not required to recirculate the 2003 EIR or the 2007 SEIR, we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it denied appellants' petition challenging the validity of the 2007 SEIR.
However, we reverse a postjudgment order which compels payment of attorney fees to the developers from one of the appellants. Because the developers' attorney fees claim is based on the terms of an agreement between the developers and appellant, it should not have been resolved by way of a motion for attorney fees in this CEQA proceeding and in any event the trial court erred in finding that appellant breached the terms of its agreement with the developers.
On August 1, 2002, defendant and respondent County of Orange (the county),
As proposed by CCRC, Silverado Canyon Ranch consists of 12 custom home sites, averaging 5.3 acres per lot, on 68.7 acres of privately held land within the boundaries of the Cleveland National Forest. The project site was formerly part of a family farm known as Holtz Ranch.
Importantly, the 2003 biological study included a list of "sensitive wildlife species that have been recorded in the site vicinity but have not been detected on the site." The arroyo toad, bufo microscaphus californicus, was among the species listed in the 2003 biological study as having been recorded in the vicinity of the project but not detected on the site of the project. The draft EIR concluded the probability of the arroyo toad occurring on the project site was "very low; no suitable habitat, nearest population is 1.5 km away in Silverado Creek." Based on the finding of only one nonnesting sensitive bird species on the project site, the 2003 biological study concluded the project would not result in direct or indirect impacts to any sensitive species listed as threatened or endangered by either the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) or California's Department of Fish and Game (CDFG).
In response to the draft 2003 EIR, members of the public commented negatively on the analysis in the biological study, and in particular its conclusion that the arroyo toad was not present on the project site and would not be indirectly impacted by the project. One commenter stated: "How can it be assumed that, for example Arroyo Toad, Quino Checkerspot (QCB) and Burrowing Owl do not occur on this site? Arroyo Toad is known to occur in Santiago Creek (CDFG 2002). All three of these species require a protocol survey to be conducted in order to show presence or absence. Failure to detect a given individual species during site visits of general or other focus does not necessitate their absence. . . . There is throughout the [draft EIR] an implicit assumption that because no sensitive species other than Cooper's Hawk was detected, there is no potential for their occurrence. This implies that every species that inhabits the project site in any form was detected during the site visits made by [the drafters of the biological study.] This is simply not a reasonable assumption."
Another commenter stated: "[T]he DEIR states that arroyo southwestern toads were not detected on the site. However the toad has been found in the vicinity of the site (35 juveniles observed in Silverado Creek; see Federal Register, Volume 65, Number 111; Proposed designation of critical habitat for the arroyo southwestern toad.) Therefore it is highly likely the project will have a significant indirect impact on this federally listed species."
A third commenter stated: "No arroyo toad (a listed threatened/endangered species documented to exist in the area) studies were done on-site, including upon the 46 acres that SHOULD have been listed as part of the project."
"As described FEIR Response to Comment A1-2, the site was re-evaluated for its potential to harbor the federally endangered arroyo southwestern toad, and it was concluded that no suitable habitat exists on-site either for breeding or for foraging."
The final EIR noted that the arroyo toad had been seen 1.5 miles downstream from the project but concluded that no USFWS protocol level survey was necessary: "A protocol-level search would require that a qualified biologist conduct at least six day and six night visits (same 24-hour period) to areas of suitable arroyo toad habitat between March 15 and June 1. Based on the existing conditions at the Silverado Ranch site and the fact that this species has not been located in similar habitats in this region, there is little justification for a detailed study to conclusively determine the absence of the species from the site."
Following circulation of the draft 2003 EIR, the receipt of comments and the preparation of responses to the comments, the county certified the final EIR for the project in August 2003.
After the county certified the final EIR for the project in August 2003 and again after the county approved a tentative subdivision map for the project in October 2003, plaintiffs and appellants Rural Canyons Conservation Fund and Ray Chandos (collectively Rural Canyons) challenged the actions taken by the county in two petitions for writ of mandate filed in the Orange County Superior Court. After Rural Canyons's petitions were filed, its petitions were consolidated as Rural Canyons v. County of Orange (Super. Ct. Orange County, 2008, No. 03CC00422).
Rural Canyons challenged the adequacy of the 2003 EIR on a number of grounds, including but not limited to the failure of the EIR to identify as a
Of significance here, Rural Canyons's 2003 petition also alleged: "Despite evidence in the record that the Arroyo Toad, a federally endangered species, has been found near the Project site, both upstream and downstream of the site, and despite the fact that directed surveys for this species were never conducted for the Project by the EIR preparers, the EIR concludes that the Project would have no significant impact on the Arroyo Toad. This conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record."
The trial court granted Rural Canyons's petition with respect to its claims that the EIR was inadequate in its failure to adopt appropriate mitigation measures for the loss of coastal sage scrub and in its failure to properly evaluate and mitigate the impact of the project on water quality. However, with respect to Rural Canyons's remaining claims, including its allegation the EIR did not properly evaluate the impact of the project on the endangered arroyo toad, the trial court found that "the Respondents' findings are supported by substantial evidence and Respondents have proceeded in the manner required by law."
In light of its determination of Rural Canyons's claims, on August 23, 2004, the trial court entered a judgment which in part granted Rural Canyons's claims for relief and in part denied them. In addition to the judgment, the court issued a writ that in part commanded the county to "[o]btain a study of the baseline water conditions and quality in the project area," and to "[p]repare and circulate a supplemental EIR disclosing and evaluating the baseline water data collected and tested for, and the baseline water conditions and quality reviewed in, the study. . . ." The writ further ordered the county to provide public hearings on the actions that it took "to comply with this Court's judgment and writ."
None of the parties challenged the trial court's 2003 judgment granting in part and denying in part Rural Canyons's claims.
In April 2005, during the public comment period for the draft SEIR, Robert Haase, a zoologist with the Department of Defense, discovered arroyo toad larvae in Silverado Creek approximately 330 feet from the project site.
In May 2005, Haase confirmed two more sightings of the arroyo toad in the general vicinity. Between June 17 and June 21, 2005, in surveys conducted for a different developer, biologist T'Shaka A. Toure reported sighting 25 to 35 arroyo toads between the stages of late tadpole to early metamorphosis in Silverado Creek, 1.6 miles downstream from the project.
Rural Canyons and others notified the county of the arroyo toad sightings and asked the county to circulate a revised SEIR to address the impacts of the project on the arroyo toad and its habitat.
CCRC retained biologist Peter Bloom to survey the project site and the portion of Silverado Creek that is adjacent to the site, for the presence of arroyo toads. Bloom looked for arroyo toads in that area on five days and nights between June 29 and July 27, 2005. In addition, on six days and nights in the following year—between March 24, 2006, and July 16, 2006—Bloom conducted a second survey of the area. Bloom reported that he found no evidence of arroyo toads.
In support of their request for recirculation, project opponents presented a letter from a USFWS biologist, who was concerned that, in light of the Haase and Toure observations and notwithstanding the Bloom surveys, there was a high likelihood the arroyo toad was present on or near the project site. The biologist reasoned as follows: "Although arroyo toads were not observed at Silverado Creek in 2006, they can remain buried in the soil for extended periods of time, emerging to breed or forage only when conditions are appropriate, so based on the observation of breeding arroyo toads at this location in 2005, it is likely that toads are still present in suitable habitat along Silverado Creek. This population of arroyo toads appears to breed intermittently and may be particularly difficult to observe on a year to year
The principal biologist retained by CCRC, David Levine, strongly disagreed with the USFWS biologist as to the significance of Haase's observation of toad larvae near the project site and the probability arroyo toads were present on the project site. At the hearing at which the SEIR was certified, Levine stated: "The information that is out there that wasn't in the EIR and it went through our offices is that there are larvae found in 2005, period. That is the only fact that we have to deal with. Where those larvae came from, what the adults were, whether or not those turned into—metamorphed into adults, nobody knows. [¶] . . . [¶] [Y]ou kind of have to use a probability analysis. If we've only got a handful of larvae, no adult sightings, the probability of [the toads reaching the project site] gets to be very far removed. You know, many orders of magnitude for that actually to occur that there be an adult toad estivating on the Holtz Ranch. That would be a very unlikely event in my opinion. . . ."
Levine also recognized that arroyo toads have a 1,000-foot dispersal zone and the project was within that zone. However, because Haase only reported seeing a relatively small number of toad larvae,
The county certified the final SEIR on October 2, 2007, without recirculating a draft which noted the Haase observation of toads in the vicinity of the project. The SEIR noted Haase's recent arroyo toad larvae sightings, but rejected the request of commenters that in light of the sightings the SEIR be recirculated: "The issue of alleged project impacts to the Arroyo Toad and the Toads presence near the Project site (both upstream and downstream) was alleged in the Rural Canyons Conservation Fund v. County of Orange, et al, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 03CC00422. The Court rejected this claim and found the County had supported its previous determination with substantial evidence. This portion of the EIR remains valid. The commenter provides no new evidence about the Arroyo Toad or habitat that was not already considered or known when the FEIR was certified."
On November 5, 2007, Rural Canyons filed a new action in Orange County Superior Court, case No. 37-2008-00087783, challenging the validity of the SEIR. Silverado Modjeska Recreation and Park District (the District) joined Rural Canyons as a petitioner in the 2007 action, which was assigned to the same judge who was still presiding over the 2003 action.
Shortly after Rural Canyons and the District initiated their 2007 action, CCRC moved in the 2003 action to discharge the trial court's earlier writ in the 2003 action. The parties submitted a substantial administrative record concerning whether the water quality study complied with the writ and CEQA, and extensively briefed those issues on the motion to discharge the writ. Acting in the 2003 action, the trial court granted the motion to discharge the writ. The trial court's order granting the discharge states: "[T]he County has complied with the commands of the Writ, thereby justifying the Writ being discharged. The Court further finds that in so complying with the commands of the Writ, the County has complied with CEQA* with respect to the issues alleged in the instant action."
On the same day it heard CCRC's motion to discharge the writ in the 2003 action, the trial court heard Rural Canyons's and the District's motion to transfer their 2007 action to a neutral county pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 394. The trial court granted the motion and transferred the 2007 action to the San Diego County Superior Court.
The 2007 petition alleged two substantive causes of action: the first cause of action alleged the SEIR did not comply with the writ issued in the 2003 action; the second cause of action alleged the discovery of the arroyo toad constituted significant new information and that the county's failure to circulate a revised SEIR to address the discovery of the arroyo toad violated CEQA. After the 2007 action was transferred to San Diego County Superior Court, the trial court heard CCRC's demurrer to the petition. The trial court sustained CCRC's demurrer to the first cause of action without leave to amend and overruled the demurrer to the second cause of action.
In sustaining CCRC's demurrer to the first cause of action, the trial court noted that the order discharging the writ in the 2003 action included a finding
In overruling the demurrer to the second cause of action, the trial court noted the 2007 action made allegations about the impact of new arroyo toad observations which were not litigated in the 2003 proceeding. In light of the trial court's ruling on the demurrer, the trial court eventually issued an order which limited the parties' briefing to the 2007 petition's arroyo toad allegations.
On appeal Rural Canyons argues the trial court erred in sustaining without leave CCRC's demurrer to the water quality allegations set forth in the 2007 petition's first cause of action and in thereafter denying the petition with respect to the remaining arroyo toad allegations. We find no error in either ruling.
We reject Rural Canyons's contention that the trial court erred in determining the 2007 petition's first cause of action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. In the first cause of action, entitled "NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE PEREMPTORY WRIT OF ADMINSTRATIVE MANDAMUS," the 2007 petition alleges the SEIR does not adequately comply with the directive in the writ issued in the 2003 action that required the county to evaluate the baseline water conditions and quality in the project area, and to state what measures would be used to mitigate the environmental impacts of the project on water quality. The 2007 petition sought "mandate relief" under the first cause of action "including an order denying discharge of the writ."
Res judicata bars the 2007 petition's first cause of action because that cause of action is based on the same primary right that the court in the 2003 action adjudicated in deciding the county's motion to discharge the writ, namely, the right to ensure the county's compliance with the writ's directives to obtain a study of the baseline water condition and quality in the project area, to circulate an SEIR evaluating the baseline water data collected, and to state the measures to be used to mitigate any environmental impacts of the project on water quality. The parties submitted a substantial administrative record concerning whether the water quality study complied with the writ and CEQA, and extensively briefed those issues on the motion to discharge the writ. In the order discharging the writ, the court stated: "The Court hereby finds that the County has complied with the commands of the subject [w]rit issued in the 2003 [a]ction. As the Court stated on the record at the [h]earing on [CCRC's] [m]otion, the Court is of the opinion that the County has complied with the commands of the [w]rit, thereby justifying the [w]rit being discharged. The Court further finds that in so complying with the commands of the [w]rit, the County has complied with CEQA* with respect to the issues alleged in the instant action. The Court further finds that the 2003 [a]ction is closed. The Court takes no position and has rendered no view on the 2007 [a]ction."
The trial court's unambiguous ruling that the county complied with the commands of the writ and that in doing so, complied with CEQA "with respect to the issues alleged in [the 2003] action" reflects full adjudication of the issues and the primary right that plaintiffs sought to litigate through their first cause of action in the instant action. The order discharging the writ in the 2003 action decided the merits of the issue of the county's compliance with the writ, and is final.
Rural Canyons and the District stated in their complaint that they brought the instant action "on their own behalf and on behalf of all other citizens interested in [the County's] compliance with CEQA and the Guidelines." Rural Canyons's petition and complaint in the 2003 action similarly stated that the 2003 action was brought "for the purpose of enforcing important public policies of the State of California with respect to the protection of environmental values, public health and public participation under CEQA." Rural Canyons and the District's pursuit of CEQA claims on the public's behalf in this action against the same parties Rural Canyons named in the 2003 CEQA action—which was also brought on the public's behalf—"is sufficient to show a `common interest' in the enforcement of CEQA, for purposes of a privity determination." (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 230 [103 Cal.Rptr.3d 124] (PCL), citing Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 675, 689-693 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 39] [two organizations that alleged distinct causes of action in the public interest against the same defendant under same antipollution statute were in privity].)
Rural Canyons also contends certain statements the trial court made in its tentative ruling and during oral argument on CCRC's motion to discharge the writ demonstrate the court did not intend to preclude Rural Canyons or the District from challenging the SEIR or the county's writ compliance in the present action. In its tentative ruling on CCRC's motion to discharge the writ in the 2003 action, the trial court stated: "The court . . . finds that by discharging the writ the court has not deprived petitioners of the ability to now challenge the adequacy of the SEIR. By accepting the affirmations in the
The trial court later stated: "[The 2003 action] is closed and I in no way render an opinion or suggestion as to what the issues are in the [2007] case." When asked whether the court was suggesting that the issues in the 2003 action should be relitigated, the trial court stated: "The court's of the opinion that the County has complied with the commands of the writ justifying the writ being discharged. That in so complying with the commands of the writ it is in compliance with CEQA to the extent that the deficiencies found by the court in the [2003] action existed. The court takes no position and has rendered no view on the [2007] case except that it needs to go to a neutral county."
Accordingly, we disregard the trial court's tentative ruling and the comments the court made during oral argument on the motion to discharge the writ in the 2003 action, and consider only the trial court's final order on the
Next, Rural Canyons contends the county violated CEQA by failing to circulate a revised SEIR following Haase's 2005 observation of the arroyo toad near the project site. As we have indicated, we find the county's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The principles governing recirculation either after the close of the comment period following release of a draft EIR but before certification of a final EIR (§ 21092.1
However, recirculation is required under section 21092.1 when "the new information added to an EIR discloses (1) a new substantial environmental impact resulting from the project or from a new mitigation measure proposed to be implemented (cf. Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a)(1), (3)(B)(1)); (2) a substantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact unless mitigation measures are adopted that reduce the impact to a level of insignificance (cf. Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a)(3)(B)(2)); (3) a feasible project alternative or mitigation measure that clearly would lessen the environmental impacts of the project, but which the project's proponents decline to adopt (cf. Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a)(3)(B)(3), (4)); or (4) that the draft EIR was so fundamentally and basically inadequate and conclusory in nature that public
"By way of contrast, section 21092.1 was intended to encourage meaningful public comment. [Citation.] Therefore, new information that demonstrates that an EIR commented upon by the public was so fundamentally and basically inadequate or conclusory in nature that public comment was in effect meaningless triggers recirculation under section 21092.1." (Laurel Heights, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1130.)
In summarizing the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 21092.2 and in particular its adoption of the "significant new information" language, the court stated: "[T]he Legislature apparently intended to reaffirm the goal of meaningful public participation in the CEQA review process. [Citation.] It is also clear, however, that by doing so the Legislature did not intend to promote endless rounds of revision and recirculation of EIR's. Recirculation was intended to be an exception, rather than the general rule. Significantly, at the time section 21092.1 was enacted, the Legislature had been and was continuing to streamline the CEQA review process. Recognizing the legislative trend, we previously have cautioned: `[R]ules regulating the protection of the environment must not be subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic, or recreational development and advancement.' [Citation.]" (Laurel Heights II, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1132, fn. omitted.)
Importantly, in determining whether the lead agency erred in failing to recirculate the challenged EIR, the court in Laurel Heights II applied the
The parties dispute which statute applies to the county's determination that the SEIR could be certified without recirculation. Rural Canyons argues the controlling statute is section 21092.1, while CCRC and the county maintain the controlling statute is section 21166. As the court in Laurel Heights II noted, the only material difference between the two statutes is that under section 21092.1, recirculation of an uncertified EIR is required where the EIR is so fundamentally defective that it deprived the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment and under section 21166 such a flaw is not grounds for recirculation of a certified EIR. (Laurel Heights II, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) Here, there is no contention that either the EIR or SEIR was so fundamentally flawed that it deprived the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment. Indeed, as we have discussed, the arroyo toad issue was discussed in the 2003 EIR, was commented upon by Rural Canyons and was litigated in Rural Canyons's challenge to the 2003 EIR. Thus we need not and do not decide which statute applies here: in either case recirculation is required if any one of the first three circumstances discussed by the court in Laurel Heights II is present. (Ibid.)
Our review of the record fully supports the county's decision that none of the three circumstances requiring circulation are present here. Briefly, the new information provided by Haase in 2005 did not disclose either (1) a new substantial environmental impact from the project, (2) a substantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact, or (3) a feasible project alternative or mitigation measure.
The last circumstance requiring recirculation is of course the easiest with which to dispense: the arroyo toad observations plainly were neither a project alternative nor a mitigation measure. The first two circumstances—a new substantial environmental impact or a substantial increase in the severity of an impact—plainly require more analysis.
In River Valley Preservation a transportation agency certified an EIR for a trolley extension through a river flood plain. The EIR assumed that the extension would require berms along 3,800 feet of the flood plain eight to 10 feet high; after the EIR was certified, the agency determined the berms would have to be 20 to 30 feet high. In rejecting the contention that the substantially higher berms required preparation and circulation on of a new environmental document, we relied on the fact that the original EIR "carefully reviewed, discussed and analyzed the effects of flood flows from the use of elevated berms (at eight to ten feet) including mitigation measures." (River Valley Preservation, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.) In light of the scope of the prior EIR, we concluded the change in the height of the berms was not a matter with "substantial environmental ramifications" warranting the preparation of a new environmental document. (Ibid.)
Thus, we begin our analysis by examining the rationale of the 2003 EIR with respect to the project's potential impact on the arroyo toad. The 2003 EIR concluded Silverado Canyon Ranch would have no substantial impact on the arroyo toad because, although the toad had been found in the vicinity, the toad had not been found on the project site and most significantly the project site was not a suitable habitat for the arroyo toad. As we have seen, in response to comments about the likely presence of toads in the area, the final 2003 EIR reexamined the suitability of the project site and again determined that it was not a suitable habitat for the arroyo toad. Plaintiffs themselves alleged in their 2003 petition the 2003 EIR reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the toad had been found both upstream and downstream from the project site and notwithstanding that no toad surveys of the area were performed by the drafters of the EIR.
As we have seen, rather than resolving the question without further data, CCRC and the county obtained further surveys in Silverado Creek, both in 2005 and 2006. As we have also seen, the later Bloom surveys were unable to duplicate Haase's observation. More significantly though, the CCRC biologist, Levine, did not believe Haase's larvae sighting substantially increased the probability that arroyo toads are present on the project site. Although disputed by the USFWS biologist, it is axiomatic that the county could rely solely on the CCRC biologist in finding that the Haase report did not represent significant new information. (Association of Irritated Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1397 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 718].)
While, in this "battle of the experts" noted by the trial court, the county was not required to accept the conclusion of the USFWS biologist, in our view the USFWS biologist's analysis nonetheless offers valuable insight on the question of whether, for recirculation purposes, Haase's observation represents new material information. As the biologist explained and Haase himself stated, arroyo toads, which had only previously been observed in the area in 1985, can remain buried in the soil for extended periods of time and are difficult to observe on a year-to-year basis.
In the end, then, even as viewed by the USFWS biologist, Haase's observations at most only amplified the very arguments made by commenters on the draft 2003 EIR and litigated unsuccessfully by Rural Canyons in its 2003 action.
In June 2003, the District and CCRC entered into a written agreement in which CCRC agreed to dedicate approximately 46.3 acres of land known as "the Riviera" to the county as permanent regional open space and to contribute funds to be used for cleanup, restoration and enhancement of the Riviera. The agreement provided, among other things: "The sole obligation of the District under this Agreement is not to appeal and/or litigate CCRC's plans for development of the Project Site . . . as currently proposed."
The agreement also included a provision in which the District agreed to indemnify CCRC "from and against any and all liabilities, [l]osses, costs, expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees) . . . caused by, resulting from, or in any way connected with . . . the District's breach of this Agreement . . . ." That provision was followed by a reciprocal indemnity provision, in which CCRC agreed to indemnify the District against costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, resulting from CCRC's breach of the agreement.
The trial court granted CCRC's motion for attorney fees. In its order, the trial court did not expressly state the District had breached the agreement. However, the court noted that the District's "sole obligation" under the agreement was not to litigate CCRC's plans to develop the project, and stated: "In the event [the District] decided to litigate against CCRC regarding the Project, the District promised to [indemnify CCRC against costs, including reasonable attorney fees]." The court thus implicitly, but necessarily, found the District had breached the agreement by bringing the instant CEQA action against CCRC, and that the District was obligated to pay CCRC's attorney fees and costs under the indemnity provision. As we discuss, we conclude the trial court erred both procedurally and substantively in awarding CCRC attorney fees and costs against the District.
In seeking attorney fees as costs authorized by contract under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), based on the District's alleged breach of contract, CCRC's motion was governed by Civil Code section 1717 (notwithstanding the fact that CCRC did not cite that statute in its motion and has not cited it on appeal). Civil Code section 1717 applies to attorney fee awards that are authorized by contract and incurred in litigating claims that sound in contract. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615, 617 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 830, 951 P.2d 399]; Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 927 [65 Cal.Rptr.3d 242] [right to attorney fees founded in contract is controlled by Civ. Code, § 1717].) Because CCRC's request for attorney fees and costs was necessarily based on the claim the District breached the agreement and because the agreement provides for recovery of such fees and costs as a result of the breach, it is within the scope of Civil Code section 1717.
Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) provides, in part: "In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to
Here, there was no action within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a) on the contract that contains the attorney fee provision at issue. Rather, CCRC brought a postjudgment motion in which it requested contractual attorney fees as the prevailing party in the instant CEQA action, based on the attorney fee provision in the agreement. No breach of the agreement was raised or litigated in the CEQA action. As we have discussed, in granting CCRC's motion for attorney fees, the trial court necessarily adjudicated CCRC's claim the District breached the agreement by joining this action as a plaintiff. However, we are not aware of any authority that would support the proposition that a trial court may adjudicate a breach of contract in the first instance in ruling on a postjudgment motion for contractual attorney fees in an action that was not an action on the contract.
CCRC's argument it is entitled to attorney fees as a prevailing party in the instant CEQA action indicates it views the agreement as providing for the recovery of fees to the prevailing party in any CEQA action between the parties. However, the agreement provides for the recovery of attorney fees resulting only from the other party's breach of the agreement. If the District breached the agreement by joining the instant CEQA action against CCRC, that fact would not entitle CCRC to recover attorney fees and costs in the instant CEQA action. Rather, it would entitle CCRC to recover such reasonable fees and costs resulting from the breach in a separate action for breach of contract or express contractual indemnity under the indemnity provisions of the agreement, if CCRC prevailed in that action.
Because the parties have fully briefed the merits of the substantive issue of whether the District breached the agreement, in the interest of judicial economy we review the trial court's ruling on that issue. (See Bosco v. Justice Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 179, 182 [143 Cal.Rptr. 468].)
Substantively, we conclude the trial court's ruling that the District breached the agreement was erroneous because the agreement expressly defines a breach as the failure to cure an alleged breach after receipt of proper notice of the alleged breach, and CCRC failed to give the District proper notice of breach. Under the heading "
The provision of the agreement that defines a breach is not ambiguous. The clear and explicit meaning of the provision is that a party may be held in breach of the agreement only after receiving written notice of breach from the other party by prepaid certified mail or courier and failing to cure the breach within 30 days of receiving that notice. There is nothing in the record showing CCRC provided the District with such notice of breach, or that it accorded the District 30 days to cure the alleged breach as expressly required under the agreement.
CCRC contends its opposition to the District's motion to transfer this action to San Diego County provided adequate notice of breach because those papers contained the following argument heading: "
Although this portion of CCRC's opposition to the motion to transfer shows CCRC viewed the District's joining in this action as inconsistent with the District's promise not to oppose the project, it did not constitute direct notice to the District that CCRC believed the District breached the agreement and start the clock ticking for the District to cure within 30 days the alleged breach. Indeed, the term "breach" does not appear anywhere in the opposition papers. CCRC's opposition to the motion to transfer was thus insufficient to constitute notice of breach under the express provisions of the agreement, and therefore did not trigger the 30-day period to cure.
Because the agreement unambiguously provides the District shall be deemed in breach of the agreement only upon its failure to perform any obligation under the agreement after receipt of written notice of breach and failure to cure the breach within 30 days, the trial court erred in ruling the District breached the agreement, and CCRC was therefore entitled to recover attorney fees under the agreement.
The judgment denying the "New and Supplemental Petition for Peremptory Writ of Administrative Mandamus and Complaint for Injunctive Relief" is affirmed. The county and CCRC are awarded their costs with respect to Rural Canyons's appeal. The order awarding CCRC attorney fees against the District is reversed. The District is awarded its costs on appeal.
Nares, J., concurred.
It is undisputed that larvae of the arroyo southwestern toad—an endangered species—were observed 328 feet from the project site, and adult toads were seen in the same general area, after the original environmental impact report (EIR) circulated. The original EIR had concluded that the project would not result in a direct or indirect impact to any species listed as threatened or endangered, and specifically, that the probability that the arroyo toad was present at the project site was "very low" because the habitat was not suitable. Despite the subsequent discovery of this endangered species so close to the project site, and despite having conceded in the supplemental EIR (SEIR) that the post-EIR sightings of arroyo toad tadpoles in the immediate vicinity of the project site constitute "new information," the County of Orange (County) contends that it was not required to recirculate the SEIR to address the potential impact of the project on this endangered species, and disingenuously maintains that, "it is unclear from the record whether arroyo toads exist near the project."
Under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) Guidelines,
The majority's analysis rests entirely on the fallacy that because the toad has not been observed on the project site itself, the project will not have a potential significant impact on the toad or its habitat. However, it is undisputed that arroyo toad larvae and adult toads were discovered as near as
Because there is no evidence in the record that supports the County's finding that the project will have no potential significant impact on the arroyo toad or its habitat, I dissent from part 1B of the majority opinion in which the majority concludes that the County was not required to address the potential impact in a revised SEIR.
A subsequent or supplemental EIR must be prepared by the lead agency or by any responsible agency if "[n]ew information, which was not known and could not have been known at the time the environmental impact report was certified as complete, becomes available." (§ 21166, subd. (c).) "The [CEQA] Guidelines . . . generally define `new information' as information which shows that the project will have new or more severe `significant effects' on the environment not disclosed in the prior EIR." (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1125 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 231, 864 P.2d 502] (Laurel Heights II), citing Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a).) "A `significant effect' is further defined in the Guidelines as a `substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change.'" (Laurel Heights II, supra, at pp. 1125-1126, citing Guidelines, § 15382.) Under the Guidelines, a "potential . . . impact on endangered, rare or threatened species" (italics added) such as the arroyo toad, is deemed "per se significant." (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 449 [53 Cal.Rptr.3d 821, 150 P.3d 709] (Vineyard), citing Guidelines, § 15065, subd. (a)(1).) When the test for "new information" is satisfied, section 21166 requires preparation of a subsequent EIR. (Environmental Council v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 428, 437 [185 Cal.Rptr. 363].)
Zoologist Robert Haase—who, unlike Peter Bloom and David Levine, is not affiliated with any party to this case—prepared field observation reports in April and May of 2005 in which he documented sightings of both arroyo toad larvae and adult arroyo toads very near the project site. He provided copies of those reports to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and to California's Department of Fish and Game (CDFG). In June 2005, biologist T'Shaka A. Toure reported sighting 25 to 35 arroyo toads between the stages of late tadpole to early metamorphosis "in the same general area as the Haase sightings of 4/23/05."
In a letter dated June 6, 2007, from USFWS to CCRC Farms, LLC, and the County regarding Haase and Toure's arroyo toad sightings, USFWS stated that it was "concerned about this population of arroyo toads because it appears to be a relatively small population that breeds intermittently and therefore may be vulnerable to threats such as loss and degradation of habitat." After noting that the Bloom surveys, which were conducted later in 2005 and 2006, did not document arroyo toads, USFWS stated: "[W]e still believe there is a high likelihood that arroyo toads are present in the Silverado Canyon Ranch property." USFWS set forth a number of reasons to support that conclusion, including (1) the fact that arroyo toads are known to move into upland habitat over one kilometer (or 0.62 miles) from the nearest stream, and the project site was well within that dispersal range; (2) there were no substantial barriers to arroyo toad dispersal from where the toads were sighted to the project site; and (3) the project site contained suitable upland habitat for arroyo toads.
Respondents do not dispute that Haase and Toure observed arroyo toads near the project site in 2005. The original EIR, which was certified in 2003, stated that the probability of occurrence of the arroyo toad on the project site was "very low; no suitable habitat; nearest population is 1.5 [kilometers] away in Silverado Creek." In fact, in discounting the need for a protocol-level search of the area to ascertain whether the arroyo toad might be present, the EIR stated, "Based on the existing conditions at the Silverado Ranch site and the fact that this species has not been located in similar habitats in this
In upholding the County's decision not to revise the SEIR to address the new information concerning the arroyo toad and circulate it for public comment, the trial court indicated that it viewed Haase's reports of arroyo toad sightings, and Bloom's report of no arroyo toad sightings, as a "battle of the experts."
The County's finding that, "the Arroyo Toad is not present on the project site, and therefore, implementation of the project . . . will not affect, either directly or indirectly, the toad or toad habitat," is based solely on Bloom's report that he did not find evidence of arroyo toads during his surveys. The relevant portion of the SEIR states, "[B]ased on the results of [the Bloom surveys], the Arroyo Toad is not present on the project site, and therefore, implementation of the project . . . will not affect, either directly or indirectly, the toad or toad habitat." (Italics added.) As discussed above, however, the Bloom survey does not support these conclusions. Rather than constituting substantial evidence to support this finding, the Bloom surveys establish only that Bloom found no evidence of arroyo toads on the footprint of the project itself. Bloom's surveys do not support the conclusion that the project will not have a potential significant impact on the toad or its habitat. Bloom did not dispute the Haase or Toure sightings, and he expressed no view as to whether, given the Haase sightings, the project could have a potential significant impact on the toad or its habitat. Yet, respondents cite no evidence in the record, other than Bloom's report, as support for the County's finding that the arroyo toad is not present on the project site, and therefore, that the project will not affect the toad or its habitat.
The majority cites the testimony of biologist Levine, who, the majority observes, "did not believe Haase's larvae sightings substantially increased the probability that arroyo toads are present on the project site." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 306.)
Levine's testimony should be disregarded in its entirety because his basic premise, i.e., that only "a handful" of larvae and no adult toads were seen near the project site, is inaccurate. As noted, ante, Haase reported seeing larvae in "significant numbers," and also reported sighting adult toads in the same general area, and Toure reported observing 25 to 35 arroyo toads in the stages of late tadpole to early metamorphosis in the same general area as the Haase sightings. Levine clearly either misunderstood or intentionally misrepresented Haase's report. In any event, Levine's conclusion that arroyo toads are probably not present on the project site is based on the erroneous assumption that only a small number of larvae were observed near the project site. Further, Levine focused only on the question whether "arroyo toads were present on the project site" (maj. opn., ante, at p. 294, italics added), or more specifically, whether they were "`estivating on the Holtz Ranch,'" which is not the relevant inquiry.
The relevant inquiry under CEQA is whether there is new information, i.e., information that was not known and could not have been known at the time the EIR was prepared, showing that the project will have new or more severe "significant effects" on the environment not disclosed in the prior EIR. As noted above, under the CEQA Guidelines, a "potential . . . impact on endangered, rare or threatened species" such as the arroyo toad, is deemed "per se significant." (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 449, italics added, citing Guidelines, § 15065, subd. (a)(1).) The toad need not be present on the project site in order for the project to impact the toad or its environment. The
In its letter dated June 6, 2007, USFWS stated that the Bloom surveys that reported no arroyo toad sightings, "were inadequate to determine that arroyo toads are absent from the property or the surrounding environment. The surveys by Mr. Bloom in 2005 were not protocol surveys, as they were conducted primarily in late July after most toads in this portion of their range have metamorphosed and become harder to detect because they are buried underground or are foraging in the upland environment. In 2006, it was much drier than in 2005, and it appears that there was no breeding along Silverado Creek that year. [¶] Although arroyo toads were not observed at Silverado Creek in 2006, they can remain buried in the soil for extended periods of time, emerging to breed or forage only when conditions are appropriate, so based on the observation of breeding arroyo toads at this location in 2005, it is likely that toads are still present in suitable habitat along Silverado Creek. This population of arroyo toads appears to breed intermittently and may be particularly difficult to observe on a year to year basis, as evidenced by the fact that, prior to 2005, the last documented observation of arroyo toads in the immediate area was in 1985 . . . ."
In a similar vein, Haase told the county planning commission that 2006 was a bad year for detecting arroyo toads. He stated, "I work with . . . Arroyo Toads all the time every day, and I didn't detect any Arroyo Toads [in 2006] in known habitat on Camp Pendleton where they are well-known to occur." He added that the arroyo toad "can be cryptic for long periods of time and remain in upland habitats. They only go to extreme channels to breed. At the time that the 2006 survey was done . . . the conditions did not exist to detect [arroyo] toads, period."
There is no evidence in the record that refutes USFWS's and Haase's assertions that the arroyo toad can remain underground and undetectable for long periods of time, including during dry periods. The Bloom report establishes only that Bloom did not observe the arroyo toad; it does not disprove that arroyo toads were observed near the project site in 2005, nor does the Bloom report negate USFWS's conclusion that it is likely that arroyo toads are still present in that area. Bloom apparently was never asked, and did not address, whether the toad might still be present near the project site.
Throughout its opinion, the majority adopts Levine's mischaracterization of the nature of the Haase sightings, repeatedly stating that Haase reported sighting arroyo toad larvae in Silverado Creek, and concluding that the sighting of larvae does not have "significant environmental ramifications."
The majority's conclusion that the project will not impact the toad or its habitat because the toad has not been observed on the project site itself, is fallacious. If the County's statement in the SEIR that the arroyo toad "is not present on the project site" refers to the fact that the toad has not been seen within the "footprint" of the project, that fact clearly does not support the inference that the project will have no effect on the toad or its habitat. Again, it is undisputed that arroyo toad larvae were observed as near as within 328 feet of the project site in 2005, including in Silverado Creek, immediately adjacent to the site, and that adult toads were seen in the same general area a month after the larvae sightings. It is also undisputed that the dispersal zone of the arroyo toad is 1,000 feet. The project site is thus undisputedly within the dispersal zone. If the toad remains in the immediate area, as the USFWS and Haase believe, there is no evidence in the record that would support the conclusion that the project—the development of 12 custom homes on 68.7 acres—would not have a potential adverse impact on the toad or its habitat. In fact, the only evidence in the record on this point is to the contrary. The administrative record contains abundant evidence and information showing that the project will have at least a potential significant impact on the arroyo toad or its habitat in the area near the project site where Haase observed the arroyo toads.
As noted, in its June 6, 2007 letter to CCRC and the County regarding the arroyo toad sightings, USFWS expressed concern "about this population of arroyo toads because it appears to be a relatively small population that breeds intermittently and therefore may be vulnerable to threats such as loss and degradation of habitat." (Italics added.) With its original briefing, Rural Canyons Conservation Fund submitted a USFWS proposed designation of
USFWS further reported:
"Human activities that affect water quality, influence the amount and timing of nonflood flows or frequency and intensity of floods, affect riparian plant communities, or alter sedimentation dynamics can reduce or eliminate the suitability of stream channels for arroyo toad breeding habitat. Degradation or loss of surrounding riparian and upland habitats reduces and eliminates foraging and overwintering habitat. The introduction of nonnative plant and animal species can reduce the quality of all habitats used by arroyo toads; lead to detrimental levels of competition and predation, or reduce the availability of toad food. Run-off from roads can decrease habitat quality for arroyo toads and roads provide access for humans, domestic animals, and invasive species that can lead to additional habitat degradation.
"The effects of such activities and factors may not become apparent until many years later when the habitat finally becomes sufficiently degraded that arroyo toads can no longer reproduce and survive. Combined with the normal climatic fluctuations in the arroyo toad's range, which can include consecutive years of extremely high or low rainfall, human impacts can cause temporary or permanent extirpations of toads from some areas. Human
The project unquestionably will involve, or result in, some of the types of human activity that, according to the USFWS, pose a potential threat to the arroyo toad. For example, the original EIR for the project notes that initial grading and infrastructure construction for the project, including road construction, will involve 239,500 cubic yards of cut and fill, and that "[w]ith remedial grading, a total of approximately 450,000 cubic yards of cut and fill will be balanced on-site." In addition, the County's draft SEIR reported that clearing, grading, excavation, and construction activities associated with the project "may impact water quality due to sheet erosion of exposed soils and subsequent deposition of particles and pollutants in drainage areas. Grading activities, in particular, lead to exposed areas of loose soil, as well as sediment stockpiles, that are susceptible to uncontrolled sheet flow. The use of materials such as fuels, solvents, and paints also present a risk to surface water quality due to an increased potential for non-visible pollutants entering the storm drain system. If uncontrolled, these materials could lead to water quality impacts, including the discharge of sediment-laden runoff, prohibited non-storm water discharges, and ultimately the degradation of downstream receiving water bodies, such as Silverado Creek and the Santa Ana River. This is considered a potentially significant impact." (Italics added.)
A letter to the County from Canyon Lakes Conservation Fund concerning the post-EIR arroyo toad sightings noted that Haase observed arroyo toad larvae "at the confluence of where `silt eroding' from the pre-project construction activities dumped into Silverado Creek." As noted, USFWS reported that silt eroding into streams can cover and suffocate arroyo toad eggs. In addition, a Silverado resident testified before the County that soil and debris from a pad that CCRC or one of its subcontractors illegally graded prior to the certification of the original EIR fell into Silverado Creek and was washed directly onto the area where the arroyo toads were sighted. Further, a letter to the County submitted on behalf of two conservation groups, Center for Biological Diversity and Endangered Habitats League, informed the County that the arroyo toad population that was observed at the confluence of
In view of the above evidence and information, which was presented to the County before it certified the SEIR, it is disingenuous to maintain that because the arroyo toad has not been observed on the project site itself, the project will not have a potential significant impact on the toad or its habitat. The only reasonable conclusion is that the project will have at least a potential adverse impact on the arroyo toad or its habitat if, as USFWS believes, arroyo toads are still present in the area near the project site where Haase observed them. The County cites no evidence other than evidence to the effect that the toad is not on the project site, and fails entirely to address potential offsite impacts of the project.
The uncontroverted sightings of the endangered arroyo toad near the project site after the original EIR was certified and during the public comment period for the SEIR, unquestionably constitute new information that showed that the project would have a new or more severe "significant effect" on the environment than was disclosed in the original EIR, within the meaning of section 21166 and Guidelines section 15162, subdivision (a). The new or more severe effect of the project is "significant" under the Guidelines because, as discussed above, there is evidence that the project will result in a "potentially substantial . . . adverse change" to arroyo toad habitat (Guidelines, § 15382; see Laurel Heights II, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1126), and therefore will have a "potential . . . impact on [an] endangered, rare or threatened species . . . ." (Vineyard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 449; see Guidelines, § 15065, subd. (a)(1).) The USFWS's designation of portions of Silverado Creek, including the site of the Haase sightings, as "critical habitat" for the arroyo toad, underscores this point.
"(a) Substantial changes are proposed in the project which will require major revisions of the environmental impact report.
"(b) Substantial changes occur with respect to the circumstances under which the project is being undertaken which will require major revisions in the environmental impact report.
"(c) New information, which was not known and could not have been known at the time the environmental impact report was certified as complete, becomes available."
"There is . . . a precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive form—any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue." (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956]; see Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 358, 875 P.2d 73], overruled on another point in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 163 P.3d 106].) We decline to take judicial notice of the items specified in categories 3 and 5 because those items are not relevant to our discussion or disposition of this matter. (Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 953, fn. 2 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 786].) In addition, in a CEQA case, the only evidence that is relevant to the question of whether there was substantial evidence to support an agency's decision under review is evidence that was before the agency when it made its decision. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 573, fn. 4 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268].) We decline to take judicial notice of the items in categories 4 and 7 because they were not before the county when it made its decision to certify the SEIR without revising it to address the arroyo toad sightings. We otherwise grant Rural Canyons's request for judicial notice.
CCRC has also asked that we take judicial notice of portions of the administrative record created with respect to the 2003 EIR. We grant CCRC's request.
Rural Canyons has also moved to strike a portion of the brief that CCRC filed in response to the amicus curiae brief that Center for Biological Diversity filed. We deny the motion but will disregard any improper material in CCRC's answering brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(1)(C); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 405, fn. 14 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51, 834 P.2d 745]; Matuz v. Gerardin Corp. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 203, 206-207 [254 Cal.Rptr. 725].)
The majority asserts that Haase's 2005 sightings of adult toads "were in no sense new" (maj. opn., ante, at p. 306, fn. 16) because the 2003 EIR reported that arroyo toads had been seen 1.5 miles from the project site. The majority fails to acknowledge, however, that the fact that arroyo toad larvae were seen 328 feet from the project site—at the point where drainage from the project would flow into Silverado Creek—clearly establishes, as Haase stated, that breeding age adult toads occupy that area as well as the adjacent upland area.
