Filed: Aug. 13, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-2271 Weng v. Lynch BIA Christensen, IJ A200 171 300 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 14-2271 Weng v. Lynch BIA Christensen, IJ A200 171 300 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N..
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14-2271
Weng v. Lynch
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 171 300
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
13th day of August, two thousand fifteen.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ZHEN TAO WENG, AKA WENG ZHENTAO,
Petitioner,
v. 14-2271
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Michael Brown, Law Office of Michael
Brown, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Kiley Kane, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Ann M. Welhaf,
Civil Division, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Zhen Tao Weng, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 28, 2014,
decision of the BIA affirming an August 21, 2012, decision of
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Weng’s application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhen Tao Weng, No. A200 171 300
(B.I.A. May 28, 2014), aff’g No. A200 171 300 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.
City Aug. 21, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for
the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237
(2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are well
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.
Mukasey,
534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). For
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asylum applications like Weng’s, governed by the REAL ID Act,
the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances . . . base a credibility determination on the
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or
witness’s account,” and inconsistencies in an applicant’s
statements and other record evidence “without regard to
whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64.
Here, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence.
Weng sought asylum and related relief based on his practice
of Christianity. The IJ reasonably relied on discrepancies
among Weng’s testimony, the testimony of his friend, Ni Sha,
and Ni Sha’s affidavit in denying his claim. Ni Sha testified
at a hearing on August 15, 2012, that she went to church with
Weng on August 6, 2012, just nine days before. However, she
signed an affidavit earlier that same day, August 6, attesting
to her attendance before she ever went to church with Weng.
Both Weng and Ni Sha testified that they saw each other for the
first time at church, but, when confronted with Ni Sha’s
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affidavit, admitted that they first saw each other at Weng’s
attorney’s office, earlier on August 6, where Ni Sha signed the
affidavit. The IJ reasonably found that these discrepancies
cast doubt on the heart of Weng’s claim — that he was a practicing
Christian and also undermined his claim that he would be singled
out for persecution in China on that basis. Xian Tuan Ye v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). The IJ was not required to credit Weng’s explanation
for these discrepancies — that he thought he was being asked
about the first time he saw Ni Sha at church — because it was
unpersuasive: he was asked about the first time he saw Ni Sha
on August 6, not the first time he saw her at church, and the
epidode occurred just nine days prior to the hearing.
The IJ also did not err in finding that Weng’s corroborating
evidence was insufficient to rehabilitate his incredible
testimony. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.
2007) (per curiam). Weng submitted a letter from his church
in Michigan welcoming him after his first visit, but presented
no witnesses from that church to establish that he attended more
than once. He also submitted a letter from his church in
Brooklyn stating that he attended since January 2011, but again
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presented no witnesses to corroborate that fact (Ni Sha merely
testified that she attended church with him on August 6, 2012).
He testified that the underground church he attended in China
was raided and police were informed that he attended the church
(thus leading him to apply for asylum), but submitted no
statements from anyone who attended the church.
Considering the discrepancies in the record, Weng’s
insufficient explanation, and his failure to submit
corroborating evidence to rehabilitate his testimony, the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 155-56. The agency did not
err in denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
because those claims were based on the same factual predicate.
Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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