Filed: Sep. 19, 2019
Latest Update: Sep. 19, 2019
Summary: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER J. PHIL GILBERT , District Judge . This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's motion for a reduction of his criminal sentence following the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220; 2-3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010), as set forth in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018) (Doc. 168). The Court construes this as a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B). The defendant pled
Summary: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER J. PHIL GILBERT , District Judge . This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's motion for a reduction of his criminal sentence following the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220; 2-3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010), as set forth in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018) (Doc. 168). The Court construes this as a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B). The defendant pled g..
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. PHIL GILBERT, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's motion for a reduction of his criminal sentence following the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220; §§ 2-3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010), as set forth in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018) (Doc. 168). The Court construes this as a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
The defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine (Count 2), one count of distribution of marijuana (Count 4), and two counts of distribution of cocaine (Counts 5 and 6), all of which were committed before 2010 (Doc. 70). Because of an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 alleging one prior felony drug conviction (Doc. 68), the statutory sentencing range for Counts 2, 5, and 6 as charged was no more than 30 years and for Count 4 as charged was no more than 10 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) & (D). Because the defendant's relevant conduct was at least 10,000 kilograms but less than 30,000 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, and because he was sentenced before Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)1, the Court found he was subject to a statutory minimum of 20 years on Count 2. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). The Court imposed a sentence of 360 months in prison on Counts 2, 5, and 6, and a sentence of 120 months in prison on Count 4.
The defendant now asks the Court to reduce his sentence in light of § 404 of the First Step Act.2 Section 404 allows the Court to reduce a defendant's sentence for a crack cocaine offense, but only if the Court had imposed that sentence before another statute—the Fair Sentencing Act—modified the statutory sentencing range for that crack cocaine offense. First Step Act, § 404(b). In essence, the First Step Act retroactively applies the Fair Sentencing Act's lower statutory sentencing ranges and allows the Court to bring past sentences into line with the lower ranges. The authority to reduce a sentence applies only to (1) federal offenses (2) committed before August 3, 2010, the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act, (3) for which the Fair Sentencing Act changed the statutory penalty range, i.e., certain crack cocaine offenses. See First Step Act, § 404(a). Whether to reduce a sentence is at the discretion of the Court and is not required by the First Step Act. First Step Act, § 404(c). In sum, the Court now may, but is not required to, reduce a defendant's sentence if application of a statutory range changed by the Fair Sentencing Act would have resulted in a sentence lower than the defendant's original sentence.
The Court turns to the specifics of the defendant's case. The defendant's convictions are not the type of convictions covered by § 404 of the First Step Act, so he is not eligible for a sentence reduction. While he committed the federal offenses before August 3, 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the applicable statutory sentencing range for the defendant's crimes. On the contrary, it only changed the statutory penalty range for certain crack cocaine offenses, Fair Sentencing Act, § 2(a) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) & (b)(1)(B)(iii)), and the defendant was not convicted of any crack cocaine offense. To the extent his relevant conduct included crack cocaine and caused his statutory maximum on Count 2 to increase to 20 years pre-Alleyne, that statutory minimum was independently justified by the 6.6 kilograms of powder cocaine included in his relevant conduct. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II). In other words, his statutory range would have been the same both before and after the Fair Sentencing Act due to his powder cocaine relevant conduct. Consequently, the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the applicable statutory penalties as contemplated by § 404(a) of the First Step Act. For this reason, the First Step Act does not authorize a reduction in the defendant's sentence.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) based on the First Step Act's retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act (Doc. 168).
IT IS SO ORDERED.