JOEL B. TOOMEY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on September 27, 2017, seeking to collect the amount Defendant owes on three defaulted student loans, plus attorney's fees and costs.
(Doc. 1-1.) Exhibit A also indicates that interest continues to accrue in the amount of $0.59 per day. (Id.)
Exhibit B states in part:
(Doc. 1-2.) Exhibit B also indicates that interest continues to accrue in the amount of $0.03 per day. (Id.)
Exhibit C states in part:
(Doc. 1-3.) Exhibit C also indicates that interest continues to accrue in the amount of $0.09 per day. (Id.)
Plaintiff served the Complaint upon Defendant's spouse and co-resident, Keshia Meadows, at their usual place of abode on October 14, 2017. (Doc. 5 at 2.) Defendant has not appeared. The Clerk of Court entered a default against Defendant on November 14, 2017. (Doc. 7.) Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on December 1, 2017 and served it on Defendant, via mail, the same day. (Doc. 8 at 3.) Defendant has not responded to the Motion after being given adequate time to do so.
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment. First, when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend a lawsuit, the clerk of court is authorized to enter a clerk's default against the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after receiving the clerk's default, the plaintiff must apply to the court for a default judgment, except in limited circumstances when application may be made to the clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). A default judgment may be entered "against a defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). A default judgment may be entered "against a defendant who never appears or answers a complaint, for in such circumstances the case never has been placed at issue." Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1986).
All well-pleaded allegations of fact are deemed admitted upon entry of default, but before entering a default judgment, a court must ensure that it has jurisdiction over the claims and that the complaint adequately states a claim for which relief may be granted. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); see also GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Assocs., Ltd., 218 F.Supp.2d 1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) ("A default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.") (citations omitted). A sufficient basis must exist in the pleadings for the judgment entered. See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. A defendant "is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law." See id.; see also Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that "facts which are not established by the pleadings of the prevailing party, or claims which are not well-pleaded, are not binding and cannot support the judgment").
Rule 8 provides that a complaint must include (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint meets the requirements of Rule 8 if, in light of the nature of the action, the complaint provides factual allegations, which are assumed to be true, sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.").
A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions," which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Thus, in ruling on a motion for final default judgment, the Court must determine whether a sufficient factual basis exists in the complaint for a judgment to be entered. See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.
Finally, when a plaintiff seeks the entry of a default judgment against an individual defendant, the plaintiff must comply with Section 3931 of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, which requires, inter alia, the filing of an affidavit by the plaintiff:
50 U.S.C. app. § 3931(b)(1).
Upon review of the Complaint, the Motion, and other relevant filings, the undersigned recommends that a default judgment be entered. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which provides that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States." (See Doc. 1 at 1.) Further, the Complaint adequately states a claim for which relief may be granted. The Complaint alleges that Defendant owes three debts to the United States and the attached Certificates of Indebtedness state that Defendant executed promissory notes for loans that were reinsured by or issued through the United States Department of Education.
Section 1921 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code authorizes imposition of the $50.00 fee for service of the Complaint and summons. See also Davis v. Sailormen, Inc., Case No. 6:05-cv-1497-Orl-22JGG, 2007 WL 1752465, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2007) ("While section 1920(1) only mentions fees of the United States Marshal, fees of a private process server may be taxed, so long as they do not exceed the statutory fees authorized in § 1921 [currently generally $65.00].").
"[A] judgment by default may not be entered without a hearing [on damages] unless the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation." United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see also SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, the judgment Plaintiff seeks is capable of mathematical calculation. Plaintiff seeks a judgment of $10,532.47 plus pre-judgment interest from June 10, 2017 to the date of entry of judgment, plus post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 thereafter. (See Docs. 1 & 8.) A hearing on damages is therefore not required. Moreover, the recommended judgment does not "differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
Finally, Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). The Non-Military Status Affidavit that is part of the Application and Declaration for Entry of Defendant's Default ("Declaration") (Doc. 6) attests that Defendant is not serving in the military. (Id. at 4-5.) The Declaration also states that, upon Plaintiff's information and belief, Defendant is neither an infant nor an incompetent person. (Id. at 1.)
Accordingly, it is respectfully
"a. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff United States of America, and against Defendant Stephon B. Meadows, 1611 Elsa Drive, Jacksonville, Florida 32218 in the sum of $10,684.41
b. Post judgment interest will accrue at the statutory rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
c. The Clerk of Court is further directed to terminate any pending motions and close the file."
