MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN J. THARP, Jr., District Judge.

Plaintiff Cezary Wojcik brings this eight-count Amended Complaint alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights by Cook County Sheriff's Deputies and Cermak Memorial Hospital employees, deliberate indifference to medical needs, failure to train and to set relevant policies and respondeat superior liability by Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart and Cook County, and indemnity. The defendants bring this motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, the motion is granted as to the Monell claims but denied as to the remainder of the Amended Complaint.

BACKGROUND1

On June 27, 2013, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Sharon Sullivan sentenced Wojcik to ten days incarceration. Am. Compl. ¶ 11, Dkt. 16.2Wojcik's mittimus mandated that he serve out his sentence at Cermak Memorial Hospital ("Cermak") due to his poor health; Wojcik suffers from Parkinson's disease, a seizure disorder, diabetes, arthritis in both knees, severe anxiety, and decreased motor function. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12; see also Resp. Ex. A ¶ 1, ECF No. 32.3The mittimus further stated that Wojcik was "to be administered the medications listed on the attached letter [Xanax, Clonazepam, Depakote ER, Prozac, Mysoline, and Norvasc] as per the orders of Jerry A. Jakimiec, M.D." Resp. Ex. A ¶ 2. (capitalization altered); see also Am. Compl. ¶ 14. Defendant Sherriff's Deputy Kaloudis "was tendered [Wojcik's] mittimus for processing" on June 27, 2013. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. Defendant Sherriff's Deputy Ali (with Kaloudis, "deputy defendants") transported Wojcik to Cermak. Id. ¶ 16.

While incarcerated at Cermak, Wojcik did not receive the medications referenced in the mittimus despite his numerous requests for medical attention. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21-22. Wojcik states that the deputy defendants failed to present the mittimus to officials at Cermak despite their knowledge of its contents. Id. ¶ 17. Alternatively, Wojcik states that defendants Drucilla Kilgore, Paul Skrivan, Dawn Howell, and/or Rebecca Massi (collectively, "Cook County defendants") were "made aware" of his medical needs, were verbally informed of the mittimus, and disregarded the medical instructions contained in the mittimus. Id. ¶ 18. Wojcik alleges that both the deputy defendants and the Cook County defendants were acting in the scope of their employment at all relevant times. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.

As a result of not receiving his prescribed medications, Wojcik suffered a seizure,4and on June 30, 2013, Wojcik was transferred to the emergency room at Rush Medical Hospital. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23. The Amended Complaint states that the medical professionals at Rush Medical Hospital found that the incarceration at Cermak Memorial Hospital exacerbated Wojcik's pre-existing conditions. Id. ¶ 24.

Wojcik brought suit against the deputy defendants and the Cook County defendants as well as Cook County and Sheriff Tom Dart.5The pending motion seeks to dismiss all eight claims in the Amended Complaint: Counts I-II, alleging that the deputy defendants and Cook County defendants, respectively, were deliberately indifferent to Wojcik's medical needs; Counts III-IV, alleging that Sheriff Dart and Cook County, respectively, did not establish a policy of following mittimus instructions and/or failed to train their staff to follow mittimus instructions; Counts V-VI, alleging respondeat superior liability of Sheriff Dart and Cook County, respectively, for the willful and wanton conduct of their employees; and Counts VII-VIII, alleging indemnification against Sheriff Dart and Cook County, respectively.

DISCUSSION

"To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "`A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Adams, 742 F.3d at 728 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although a court must accept all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true when reviewing the complaint, conclusory allegations merely restating the elements of a cause of action do not receive this presumption: "A complaint must allege facts to support a cause of action's basic elements; the plaintiff is required to do at least that much." Adams, 742 F.3d at 728 (emphasis added).

II. Counts I and II: Deliberate Indifference

Wojcik claims that the deputy defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by failing to present his mittimus to the Cook County defendants at Cermak and/or the Cook County defendants were deliberately indifferent by ignoring the mittimus and his requests for medical care. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18, 30, 34-35. The Eighth Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes a duty on states "to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals." McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006)). Prison officials violate this duty "if they display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners." McGee, 721 F.3d at 474 (quoting Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1010). To state a claim for deliberate indifference, Wojcik must prove: (1) that he has an objectively serious medical need, one that has "been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention," Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012); and (2) that the defendants were aware of his serious condition and were deliberately indifferent to it. See McGee, 721 F.3d at 481.

As stated in the Amended Complaint, Wojcik suffers from a number of medical conditions, for which he had been prescribed medication by a physician, including Parkinson's disease, a seizure disorder, diabetes, arthritis in both knees, severe anxiety, and decreased motor function. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. The defendants do not dispute Wojcik's repeated assertions that his illnesses are "objectively serious." See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 14, 18, 24. Thus, Wojcik has adequately pleaded that his medical conditions are objectively serious.

As to the deputy defendants' awareness and deliberate indifference, Wojcik asserts that the deputy defendants were tendered the mittimus for processing yet failed to present the mittimus to the officials at Cermak. Id. ¶¶ 15-17. Taking those allegations as true, as the Court must at this stage, Wojcik has sufficiently alleged his claim. Rule 8 only requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Wojcik's recitation of relevant facts is certainly short, taking those facts as true (and they are indeed facts, not legal conclusions, which are not entitled to the presumption of truth, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678), Wojcik is entitled to relief.

In a remarkable argument, the deputy defendants assert that it is not deliberately indifferent to ignore a judicial mandate or court order and that, because the Sheriff's Office is not responsible for the medical care of inmates, the deputy defendants could not have been indifferent to Wojcik's medical needs. Reply 3-4, ECF No. 33; Resp. 5. The only case the defendants cite to support that the Sheriff's Deputies cannot be liable does not support this surprising contention. See Reply 3-4 (citing Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1991)). Although the court in Holmes concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a policy of deliberate indifference to judicial mandates, it did not hold, as the defendant's maintain, that the failure to deliver court orders does not constitute deliberate indifference on that specific occasion. Holmes, 930 F.2d at 1201 (noting the "the critical question whether the Sheriff's failure to deliver the court orders to Cermak was the product of a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the disposition of court orders") (emphasis added).

There should be no room for doubt on this score: If a judge orders Sheriff's deputies to deliver medical information to County employees who are providing medical treatment to a prisoner or detainee, a failure to comply with that order that supports an inference of deliberate indifference is actionable.6A refusal to relay information necessary to a prisoner's medical care may be every bit as indicative of indifference to the prisoner's medical treatment as is a decision by a medical professional not to provide necessary treatment. See, e.g. Bramlett v. Dart, No. 14 C 5939, 2015 WL 4148711, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2015) ("As plaintiff explains, it was the responsibility of the Sheriff, as the official who controls and supervises Cook County Jail, to ensure that the medical needs of inmates are adequately met . . . By alleging that Sheriff Dart failed in that responsibility, plaintiff states a claim against him." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) (permitting deliberate indifference to medical needs claims against a number of officers of the Cook County Sherriff's Office).

The deputy defendants also argue that they cannot be liable for failing to transfer the mittimus because the Amended Complaint states that the Cook County defendants had actual knowledge of the mittimus, which, therefore, rebuts the prior claim of failure to transfer. Mem. in Supp. 5-6. The defendants misunderstand Wojcik's Amended Complaint, however; Wojcik clearly states that Counts I and II are pleaded "in the alternative":

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18 (emphasis added). While the defendants are correct that if the Cook County defendants were made aware of the mittimus, then the deputy defendants must have presented the mittimus to employees at Cermak, this inconsistency does not require dismissal of either or both claims. It is well established that a party may make inconsistent pleadings in a single suit and that "[i]f a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2); see Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, this inconsistency is not a basis upon which to dismiss Wojcik's Amended Complaint. Either the deputy defendants failed to present the mittimus and, as a result, Wojcik did not receive the required care or the Cook County defendants failed to adhere to the mittimus and, as a result, Wojcik did not receive the required care. Under either set of facts,7Wojcik has stated a claim for relief. The motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts I and II.

As to the Cook County defendants, Wojcik states that they were made aware of his medical needs, either via the mittimus or via his requests for medical attention, yet they failed to administer his medications as directed in the mittimus. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, 21-22. Again, taking these facts as true, Wojcik has stated a claim for relief. It remains to be seen whether the facts will bear out these allegations as to each of the Cook County defendants.

II. Counts III and IV: Monell Claims

With respect to Counts III and IV, however, Wojcik has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court established that § 1983 applied to municipalities and other local government units under certain circumstances. Id. at 690. Although "a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory," municipal liability exists "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." Id. at 691, 694. The Seventh Circuit has identified three ways in which a municipality could violate § 1983 "(1) through an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) through a `wide-spread practice' that although not authorized by written law and express policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a `custom or usage' with the force of law; or (3) through an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with `final decision policymaking authority.'" Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting McTigue v. City of Chi., 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995)).

Unlike his deliberate indifference claims, which are premised upon facts, Wojcik merely asserts the existence of a number of policies on the part of both Dart and Cook County, policies not to train their personnel to follow mittimus instructions or to provide medical care. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 42, 47. Wojcik has not pleaded any facts to support the alleged existence of these policies, however: "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679; see also McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[L]egal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth."). Disregarding the conclusory assertions, Wojcik has stated nothing more than a single instance of alleged mistreatment by the deputy defendants and Cook County defendants. One instance does not a policy or practice make. See Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (a plaintiff must plead more than "one . . . or even three" incidents to establish a "widespread custom or practice"); see also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) ("Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker."). Here, Wojcik has stated nothing more than a single incident, his experience in June 2013. Disregarding his conclusory policy allegations, Wojcik has failed to state a Monell claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion to dismiss is, therefore, granted without prejudice on Claims III and IV.

III. The Remaining Counts

The respondeat superior claims, Counts V and VI, and the indemnification claims, Counts VII and VIII, are dependent upon the conduct alleged in the deliberate indifference claims. Because the Court has not dismissed the underlying claims, the dependent claims, too, survive. The motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts V-VIII.8

* * *

Counts III and IV of Wojcik's Amended Complaint are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion to dismiss is denied as to the rest of the Amended Complaint. To the extent that Wojcik can attempt, in good faith, to cure the deficiencies in the dismissed Counts, he may file a Second Amended Complaint within 30 days of this order. In the absence of a timely filed Second Amended Complaint, those Counts will be dismissed with prejudice.