ENTRY ON ORAL ARGUMENT

MATTHEW P. BROOKMAN, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before Matthew P. Brookman, United States Magistrate Judge, on the Order of Reference issued by District Judge Richard L. Young, on July 25, 2016. (Docket No. [16]). The parties have filed their briefs. (Docket No. [20], Docket No. [25], no reply filed). Oral argument was held on August 7, 2017, at which Ms. Myers was represented by Timothy E. Staggs and the Commissioner was represented by Emily Cohn and Kathryn E. Olivier. All appeared by telephone.

Following the argument, the Court issued the appended findings. For the reasons expressed therein, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. Final judgment shall enter in favor of Commissioner.

SO ORDERED.

THE COURT: We're back in the matter of Trina Marie Myers versus Nancy Berryhill, the acting commissioner for the Social Security Administration. The parties have made their oral arguments and I'm prepared to render an opinion on the record now.

Just by way of background or kind of setting things up, plaintiff argues here legal error regarding the application of the regulations to the residual functioning capacity. Does not seek remand for further proceedings but a remand to award benefits. And by way of background, plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income in March of 2012. She alleged disability beginning November 2008 due to previous applications — I'm sorry. Strike that. After her application was denied initially and on review, a hearing was requested and held and the ALJ denied plaintiff's application. The appeals counsel denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision in this matter.

At Step 2, the ALJ found that plaintiff's severe impairments were degenerative joint disease in the right knee, obesity, bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and a history of substance abuse. Considered singly or in combination, these impairments, nor plaintiff's nonsevere impairments, were not found to meet the listings. The ALJ's residual functional capacity was as follows, and I'm quoting here directly.

Light work is defined in 20 Code of Federal Regulations 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). This includes lifting and carrying up to 20 pounds occasionally or less than 20 pounds frequently; sitting six hours in an eight-hour workday; standing and/or walking for at least two hours in an eight-hour workday; no climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; no exposure to unprotected heights; occasional bending, stooping, kneeling, balancing and climbing of stairs; work that is unskilled in nature, such that it involves only simple and repetitive tasks; only occasional contact with the public or peers; work that is regular in expectations; and work that does not involve fast-paced tasks or factor-like tasks.

At Step 4 the ALJ found Ms. Myers was able to perform past relevant work as a house cleaner. This resulted in a finding of no disability and there was no Step 5 analysis conducted as a result of that.

Now, this Court reviews the commissioner's decision to determine if it, as a whole, is supported by substantial evidence and whether the commissioner has employed the correct legal standards. The ALJ in this case found the claimant capable of the residual function capacity to perform light work as defined by the regulations; and in particular, we're talking about 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), including and relevant to this appeal, standing and/or walking for at least two hours in an eight-hour workday. Plaintiff here contends that it was legal error for the ALJ to find her standing and/or walking was limited to two hours a day and that she could still do light work.

The regulations, however, provide in relevant part that light work requires a good deal of walking or standing and Social Security Ruling 83-10 further provides light work includes frequent lifting or carrying. This necessitates being on one's feet up to two-thirds of a workday. Thus, a full range — and I quote, a "full range" of light work requires standing or walking off and on for a total of approximately six hours of an eight-hour workday.

A plain reading of these regulations does not support the contention that light work must equate to the ability to stand or walk for one-third or two-thirds of a workday. The ruling only makes it clear that a full range of light work requires up to two-thirds of a workday standing or walking. Does not say that something less than a full range might still be light work. Importantly, where it may be that some or even most light work requires the ability to stand or walk for a third to two-thirds of the day, it does not necessarily mean that plaintiff's past relevant work of a housekeeper required the full range of light work. I think that's what's important in this case.

And here an impartial medical expert, Dr. Besen, testified as to the plaintiff's physical impairments. There's no contesting his findings, including the standing/walking capabilities where his testimony was consistent with the claimant was capable of walking/standing at least two hours of an eight-hour workday, and that's at the transcript pages 76 through 77.

The vocational expert was present for the examination. During the VE's testimony, the ALJ asked, based on the limitations alluded to by Dr. Besen, could the plaintiff perform past relevant work either as she performed it or as it's generally performed in the state or national economy. The VE testified that based on that hypothetical, cleaner/housekeeper would be available.

The ALJ then downgraded the hypothetical to that of a sedentary, to which the VE responded that it would no longer be available. In his decision the ALJ adopted and RFC that aligned with Dr. Besen's testimony; and in fact, plaintiff doesn't object that the ALJ's RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. Just that it was legal error to find someone capable of light work position based on the walking/standing restrictions that were included in the RFC. But the VE's testimony, of course discounts that argument.

This case is — the Court has looked at Johnson v. Barnhart, 2014 Westlaw case 1427118 out of the Northern District of Illinois. This case is distinguishable, I believe, from Johnson v. Barnhart. There, the Northern District remanded — Northern District of Illinois remanded where the ALJ's RFC, which he charactered as light work, yet limited the plaintiff to two hours standing/sitting. But it's important to note that that was a Step 5 finding that the claimant could complete light work jobs.

In Johnson, the Court relied on Medical-Vocation Guidelines instead of employing a vocational expert. This is important because when an RFC does not coincide with a full range of a category of work, such as here where the plaintiff's RFC did not fully align with either light work or sedentary work, it's appropriate to employ the vocational expert. And that was expressly stated in Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, a 7th Circuit case from 2005.

The VE then considered the plaintiff's past relevant work as to the specific limitations provided from the medical expert's testimony. Also, the ALJ in Johnson found that the claimant was unable to perform past relevant work and instead said that although the plaintiff could stand/walk at least two hours, he could perform a significant range of light work at Step 5. Again, this is Step 5 analysis in Johnson and we're talk talking about Step 4 analysis here.

Here it appears the ALJ did not identify specific jobs in Step 5, a point the Court took issue with and noted — I'm sorry. In Johnson, the ALJ did not identify specific jobs in Step 5 and that was a point the Court took issue with and noted that's what necessitated the remand there.

In sum, this case is not akin to Johnson. The regulations and rulings do not support plaintiff's arguments that plaintiff's sit/stand limitations ruled out all light work jobs, particularly plaintiff's past relevant work which the VE testified based on limitations and impairments, she was still capable of performing. In that context I find that that was not legal error. For these reasons the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ in this matter. Mr. Staggs, any further record that you wish to make today?

MR. STAGGS: No. No further record at this time. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Cohn, any further record that on the commissioner would like to make at this time?

MS. COHN: No, not at this time. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you all. I appreciate the arguments today. I appreciate your work on the briefs. We will get the appropriate docket entries on the docket just as soon as we can. Otherwise, we'll be in recess. Thank you.