Plaintiffs Timothy L. Harney and Patricia A. Muldoon brought this civil action against the City of Chicago and one of its police officers, Joseph Midona, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendant Midona entered their residence and arrested them without a warrant or probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. Agreeing that there are no genuine issues of material fact or legal grounds on which plaintiffs are entitled to proceed, we affirm that court's grant of summary judgment. The following facts are taken from the undisputed findings submitted to the district court, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to defendants and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor.
Harney and Muldoon are married and occupy one unit of a three-unit condominium building in Chicago, Illinois. Pamela DeVarela occupies one of the other two units.
In April 2004, DeVarela contacted the Chicago Police Department to complain about damage to a mirror on her vehicle. Officer Midona was dispatched to respond to her complaint. Although DeVarela had no proof, she claimed that the damage was caused by Harney and Muldoon. Lacking any evidence of the identity of the offender, Midona's police report indicated that the damage was caused by an "unknown offender." At this time, Midona also apparently gave DeVarela his personal cell phone number in the event of any further incidents.
On September 21, 2004, DeVarela's dog bit Harney. Harney reported the incident to the City of Chicago and obtained medical treatment for the dog bite.
A couple days later, DeVarela telephoned Officer Midona on his cell phone, requesting that he prepare a second police report. This time DeVarela reported that on September 21, 2004, Harney and Muldoon chased her up the stairs and pushed her as she tried to enter her unit's door.
On May 16, 2005, DeVarela again called Midona to complain about damage to her vehicle. The next day, Midona and Sergeant Woznicki met with DeVarela and were shown a videotape consisting of clips DeVarela compiled from two separate videotapes.
(App. 3.)
Midona testified at his deposition that the first clip showed Harney removing the valve cap from DeVarela's tire, letting out the air and putting the cap on his own car. Midona acknowledged, however, that he could not actually see Harney take the valve cap off or even see the valve cap, but he believed the video corroborated DeVarela's claim that Harney had let the air out of her tire and taken the valve cap.
As for the second clip, Midona described the video as showing Muldoon walking behind DeVarela's car, scratching the back of the vehicle with some object, then opening the garage door again and leaving. He testified at his deposition that he heard a scratching noise on the tape. DeVarela also showed Midona and Woznicki the damage to her car that she believed Muldoon had caused. Midona observed a long scratch along the back of the car, although he did not recall at the time of his deposition whether it was on the trunk or the bumper.
DeVarela told Midona and Woznicki that she wanted to press charges. Woznicki advised her to first obtain an estimate of the cost of repairing her car and then contact the police. DeVarela obtained an estimate that same day.
The next day, on May 18, 2005, Midona received another call from DeVarela. Midona then went to the condominium building with detectives Kurt Kourakis and Gloria Ekerman, who had been assigned to investigate. The detectives went to DeVarela's unit to talk with her. While DeVarela gave Kourakis her account of how her vehicle had been damaged, DeVarela's roommate showed Ekerman the video clips. DeVarela later played the same video for Kourakis, identifying the people on the videotape were Harney and Muldoon. Kourakis later testified about the contents of the video he viewed, which was consistent with the district court's description above.
DeVarela then provided the detectives with this "compilation" video as well as the repair estimate for her car. After finishing with DeVarela, the detectives went with Midona to arrest Harney and Muldoon.
Harney contends that he heard someone ring the doorbell. The record is unclear as to the location of the doorbell, but giving plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt, we will assume it was located outside of the front walkway of the condominium building rather than directly outside of Harney and Muldoon's particular unit.
In response to the doorbell, Harney exited his condominium unit and saw the
Once Harney stepped outside his unit, Midona advised that he was under arrest and that there was a videotape of him letting air out of DeVarela's tire. Midona also asked to speak with Muldoon, informing Harney that there was also a videotape of Muldoon keying DeVarela's car. Harney told the officers that Muldoon had been injured and was in bed.
While still outside of his unit, Harney told the officers that he would go get Muldoon. The officers followed Harney into the unit. Harney did not invite the officers in, but he also did not instruct them to remain outside or tell them that he would be right back. The record does not reveal whether the door had closed prior to the officers entering the unit or if they slipped in behind Harney prior to the door closing.
The officers walked about eight to ten feet into the unit to the kitchen. Harney went to the bedroom to tell Muldoon that the police wanted to speak with her about keying DeVarela's car. While Harney was speaking with Muldoon, the officers instructed Harney and Muldoon that they needed to come out of the bedroom. Harney had not heard the officers enter behind him and did not know that they were in the unit until he was instructed to leave the bedroom. Even so, neither Harney nor Muldoon objected to the officers' presence in their home.
Harney and Muldoon came out of the bedroom, and Muldoon was informed that she was under arrest. Harney and Muldoon then followed the officers outside of the condominium building and were taken to the police station. Harney was charged with misdemeanor theft; Muldoon was charged with felony property damage. Both trials were to the bench. In both, the trial judge directed a finding of not guilty, concluding that the videotape evidence did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Harney and Muldoon then filed the present lawsuit, alleging violations of § 1983 against Midona and the City of Chicago and state law claims against DeVarela. The district court granted summary judgment to Midona and the City of Chicago as to all claims. The court found that qualified immunity shielded Midona as to plaintiffs' false arrest claims. As for plaintiffs' unlawful arrest claims, the court concluded that Harney was arrested in public and that the officers had implied consent to enter Harney and Muldoon's condominium unit to arrest Muldoon. The court's grant of summary judgment to Midona mooted plaintiffs' indemnification claim against the City of Chicago.
The court reviews the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to defendants de novo and may affirm on any basis supported by the record and law. See Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir.2007). In addition to the appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment, appellants also raise an evidentiary challenge to the district court's consideration of certain videotapes at summary judgment. The court reviews this challenge for abuse of discretion. See Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir.2010). The court also reviews for abuse of discretion the district court's awarding of costs to defendants. See U.S. Neurosurgical, Inc. v. City of Chi., 572 F.3d 325, 333 (7th Cir.2009).
Midona produced two videotapes in support of his motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that these videotapes are not the ones Midona viewed on May 18, 2005. Rather, Midona viewed the compilation video that DeVarela claims to have created from the two separate videotapes submitted at summary judgment.
Harney and Muldoon fail to substantiate their suggestion that Midona did not view the portions of the video clips relevant to this lawsuit. As explained in the district court's opinion, while the videotapes submitted in support of summary judgment contain footage not contained in the compilation video, and therefore Midona did not view the entirety of the footage submitted at summary judgment, there is no dispute that Midona viewed the portions of the tape relevant to the court's determination of whether probable cause existed. (App. 9 n.6.) The content of the videotape — what Midona saw and how he interpreted it — is material to whether probable cause existed, not the format of the content absent some substantiated claim that the excerpted video clips had been tampered. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering these videotapes in its discussion of plaintiffs' false arrest claims.
For the first time on appeal, plaintiffs also argue that the videotapes cannot be produced in an admissible form. "In granting summary judgment, the court may consider any evidence that would be admissible at trial. The evidence need not be admissible in form (for example, affidavits are not normally admissible at trial), but it must be admissible in content." Stinnett v. Iron Works Gym/Exec. Health Spa, Inc., 301 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted). Even though defendants were apparently unable to produce the original or copy of the compilation video Midona viewed prior to Harney's and Muldoon's arrests, Midona himself was competent to testify as to the portions of the two original videotapes he viewed prior to their arrests. See Fed.R.Evid. 1004 (allowing for admissibility of other evidence of content).
Turning to the merits of Harney and Muldoon's claim that they were falsely arrested, plaintiffs must demonstrate that Midona lacked probable cause to arrest them. See Mucha v. Vill. of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1056 (7th Cir.2011). "Probable cause exists if `at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, [to believe] ... that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.'" Mucha, 650 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir.2009)). Probable cause does not require that the existence of criminal activity is more likely true than not, rather (true to its label) probable cause simply requires "a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity exists." Mucha, 650 F.3d at 1056-57 (citing Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 722-23 (7th Cir.2010); Mannoia v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir.2007)).
Moreover, the court's inquiry is limited to what the officer knew at the time of the arrest and not what has been gained from hindsight. Mucha, 650 F.3d at 1057. The court considers the evidence
Here, Midona had ample reason to find probable cause for Harney's and Muldoon's arrests. Initially, Midona relied on DeVarela's complaint, namely her statement that air had been released from her tire while located in a closed garage to which only a few, including defendants, had access and that the back of her car had been scratched, along with Midona's own visual inspection of the car.
Even if Midona's reliance on DeVarela's complaint was somehow questionable, the videotape obviated any taint from the complaint. The videotape shows Harney bending down to examine DeVarela's tire and shows Muldoon walking past DeVarela's car with keys in her hand. While far from definitive proof, these video clips substantiate motive (Harney's own deflated tire), opportunity (Harney's and Muldoon's uninterrupted access to DeVarela's car) and means (Harney's unexplained, prolonged inspection of DeVarela's tire).
The district court concluded that fact issues as to what the videotape actually depicts precluded a finding that Midona had probable cause to arrest as a matter of law. (App. 10.) Still, the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding qualified immunity shielded Midona from liability. In so holding, the court concluded that a reasonable officer could have believed that the arrests were lawful. (Id. at 14.) Arguably at least this is all that probable cause itself requires — namely, a showing that "a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution" with the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest believed that the suspect committed an offense. Mucha, 650 F.3d at 1056. As the district court apparently held, a good faith defense arguably requires something even less than probable cause — that is, a good
Here, plaintiffs Harney and Muldoon failed to put forth evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Midona lacked probable cause at the time of their arrests. Contrary to plaintiffs' apparent position, the fact that the state trial judge decided the videotape evidence was insufficient to find either Harney or Midona guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not undercut the finding of probable cause for the arrests. Scruggs v. United States, 929 F.2d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Acquittal does not establish the lack of probable cause[.]"). Moreover, though not required, the fact that Midona undertook to engage two detectives in further investigation and the decision to arrest undermines any argument of even subjective bad faith here. The court, therefore, affirms the grant of summary judgment as to this claim, albeit on a different basis than that relied on by the district court.
In addition to the false arrest claim, Harney and Muldoon also challenge the lawfulness of their arrests without a warrant, but for divergent reasons.
"[P]olice officers may constitutionally arrest an individual in a public place (e.g., outside) without a warrant, if they have probable cause." Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir.2001). Harney contends that he was arrested in the curtilage of his condo and, therefore, his warrantless arrest was in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The "curtilage" has been described by this court as the area "so close to and intimately connected with the home and the activities that normally go on there that it can reasonably be considered part of the home." United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir.2002). In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), the United States Supreme Court described four factors to be considered in determining whether an area constitutes the curtilage of a home:
It is undisputed that Harney's arrest occurred in the walkway outside of the condominium building, but inside of a gate.
More critically, the record does reveal that the area of Harney's arrest was in an area shared by all of the tenants of the condominium building. Absent certain particular facts not alleged here, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of multiple dwelling buildings. See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767-68 (7th Cir.2007) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway of a duplex building); United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that tenants in a multi-family building lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of the building); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment building's common entrance).
Moreover, the fact that a gate barred — to some unknown extent — public viewing or access does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy in common or shared areas. See United States v. Nettles, 175 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1093 (N.D.Ill. 2001) ("Generally speaking, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in common or shared areas of multiple dwelling buildings. This is so even where the common areas are otherwise locked to exclude persons that are not tenants of the buildings." (citations omitted)). Indeed as noted, the record at least suggests, if not definitively establishes, that the officers were invited into this area by plaintiffs' co-tenant DeVarela in the course of their investigation.
Having failed to put forth sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the area of Harney's arrest constituted the curtilage of the condominium building, plaintiffs have not established Midona was required to have a warrant to arrest Harney. Accordingly, the court affirms the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Harney's claim of unreasonable arrest.
"A warrantless entry into a residence to effect an arrest is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir.2000). Where someone with the authority to do so gives consent to enter, however, the entry is reasonable and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Moreover, consent may be manifested in a non-verbal manner. Id. For example, this court, on more than one occasion, has found that the act of opening a door and stepping back to allow entry is sufficient to demonstrate consent. See, e.g., Walls, 225 F.3d at 862-63; Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir.2001).
Plaintiffs cite to Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747 (7th Cir.2004), for support that Midona lacked consent to enter. In Hadley, the court concluded that "[t]he consent of Hadley's mother was procured by an outright and material lie, and was therefore ineffectual." 368 F.3d at 749. Recognizing that Hadley is clearly distinguishable on its facts from those here, plaintiffs instead point to the court's recognition that "[t]he fact that a person answers a knock at the door doesn't mean that he agrees to let the person who knocked enter." Id. at 750. But this, too, does not reflect the situation Midona and his fellow officers encountered.
The court held that, while Mrs. Macek's instruction to the officer to "`wait here'... give[s] us pause," "[h]er subsequent silence and apparent acquiescence persuades us that Conneely's presence in the home was not against Mrs. Macek's apparent wishes." Id. at 384-85. Relying on the undisputed fact that Mrs. Macek did not "verbally object" or "physically respond in any way that might relay the message she disapproved of his movement," the court found Mrs. Macek's simple surprise at Officer Conneely's presence "falls well short of demonstrating that under the totality of the circumstances her consent was not voluntary." Id. at 385.
The facts at issue here present a far easier question than that posed in Gerald M. Before going into his condominium, Harney was informed that he was under arrest and that the officers intended to place Muldoon under arrest. Most likely, Harney did not ask Midona and the other officers to wait outside of the condominium unit because he understood (or should have understood) that, having himself been arrested, he was not free to go anywhere without the officers accompanying him or, at least, consenting to his doing so without them. In any event, Harney simply told them that he would go and get Muldoon out of the bedroom. Further, like in Gerald M., the fact that neither Harney nor Muldoon objected to the officers' presence in their condominium unit or otherwise indicated that they had not consented to their presence provides additional support that Harney implicitly consented to the officers' entry. See also Walls, 225 F.3d at 863 ("Her consent is further illustrated by her actions after they entered the residence in motioning for them to follow her to the kitchen where she could speak with them privately.").
Even if the court were to find consent lacking, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate — and cannot demonstrate in light of this court's holding in Gerald M. — that Officer Midona's following of his prisoner Harney into his apartment was unreasonable, much less a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Sparing, 266 F.3d 684, 691 (finding officers entitled to qualified immunity because the law surrounding "doorway arrests" was not clearly established at the time of the arrest). Indeed, this court's holding in Gerald M. would undermine any sense of "fair warning" to Officer Midona that his conduct was unlawful. Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir.2008) (describing policy underlying qualified immunity).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), a prevailing party is entitled to recover "[c]osts other than attorneys' fees... as of course." Among the costs a court may tax are: "(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; [and] (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Plaintiffs challenge the district court's award of costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 in four respects, three of which warrant little discussion. Dealing with those three first — the district court's award of (1) costs for binding deposition transcripts; (2) so-called "excessive" costs for transferring VHS tapes to DVDs and duplicating the DVDs; and (3) $529 for copies of Midona's cell phone records — the court agrees that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that these costs are unreasonable or otherwise contrary to the Judicial Conference policy since all fall within allowable categories of expenses. See Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir.2005) (noting that the losing party has the burden of demonstrating that taxed costs are not appropriate).
Plaintiffs also challenge the district courts award of $475.00 for court reporter "appearance fees" in addition to the per page transcript fee. The parties agree that the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 54.1 governs the award of transcription costs. It provides in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs argue that defendants are entitled to $3.65 per page — the regular copy rate established by the Judicial Conference of the United States. In addition to this amount, the district court also awarded appearance fees which exceed the per page allowable amount and which plaintiffs contend are contrary to the plain language of Rule 54.1.
In Extra Equipamentos E Exportacao v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2008), we affirmed the district court's award of attendance fees, holding that "the separate attendance fee is properly regarded as a component of the fee for the transcript." See also Held v. Held, 137 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir.1998) ("[W]e have previously held that even though [deposition attendance fees] are not specifically mentioned in the statute, the district court may award them in its discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)."). This holding does not fully resolve the issue posed
Some of the district courts awarding appearance fees above the per page rate point to this court's award of appearance fees in addition to the maximum allowable rate in Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 457 (7th Cir.1998). While in Cengr, the court awarded a per page transcription costs and "court reporter services" fees, there is no indication in the opinion that the losing party raised a challenge or the court even considered whether an award of appearance fees would result in a per page amount exceeding the maximum allowed under Local Rule 54.1. Certainly, the plain language of Local Rule 54.1 does not appear to support awarding appearance fees where the total award would exceed the allowable per page amount, but similarly, the rule does not expressly preclude such an award rather than addling the prevailing party with this cost. Since this issue arises solely out of the application of the district court's own local rule and would appear best addressed by an amendment of that rule clarifying the availability of court reporter appearance fees over and above the allowable per page amount, and since it would appear plaintiffs fail to address this issue at all in their reply brief, the issue will be deemed waived here.
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
