MICHAEL R. BARRETT, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon the Magistrate Judge's January 20, 2016 Report and Recommendation ("R&R") which recommends that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed and this matter be closed on the docket of the Court. (Doc. 17).
Notice was given to the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R. (Doc. 23).
When objections are received to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation on a dispositive matter, the district judge "must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After review, the district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge completed a comprehensive review of the record and the same will not be repeated here.
Plaintiff argues that the absence of the trigger point test in Dr. Fixler's notes does not mean that fibromyalgia was improperly diagnosed. The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff had waived any argument pertaining to her diagnosis of fibromyalgia by failing to present any arguments related to the ALJ's findings in her Statement of Errors. The Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's conclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff's objections on this point are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored Plaintiff's non-severe impairment of anxiety disorder at Step Two of the sequential evaluation. As one district court has succinctly explained:
Katona v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-CV-10417, 2015 WL 871617, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2015). The Magistrate Judge explained that in assessing Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ explicitly accounted for Plaintiff's anxiety disorder by limiting her social interactions and work pace. (Doc. 17, PAGEID #741). The Magistrate Judge also included a quote from the ALJ's opinion to demonstrate that the ALJ addressed all of Plaintiff's severe and non-severe impairments, including Plaintiff's anxiety disorder. (Id.) Therefore, the Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's conclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff's objections on this point are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not give proper weight to the opinions of his treating physician, Dr. Fixler, and Monica Saleh, a certified nurse practitioner. The Magistrate Judge addressed this argument in great detail in her R&R. (Doc. 17, PAGEID # 741-750). Much of Plaintiff's objection is a repetition of the Magistrate Judge's analysis. Plaintiff does not seem to question this analysis other than note that the Magistrate Judge cited an unpublished opinion to conclude that Plaintiff waived an argument that the ALJ applied greater scrutiny to the opinion of Dr. Fixler than to the opinions of the non-examining state agency physician and consultants. (Doc. 19, PAGEID #765).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly gave "great weight" to the opinion of Dr. Ward. Plaintiff points out that no psychological testing was done by Dr. Ward, and his clinical interview took place three months after Plaintiff's alleged onset date. Plaintiff also argues that there is no evidence that the accommodations the ALJ included in the RFC would resolve the symptoms described by Dr. Ward.
As to the weight given to Dr. Ward's opinion, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence in the record. The ALJ noted that Dr. Ward examined Plaintiff and diagnosed her with depression and generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 20). The ALJ noted Dr. Ward's findings and stated that the findings "are consistent with the claimant's mental health treatment history and the lack of serious mental health symptoms in the record." (Tr. 20).
Plaintiff's second argument—related to the accommodations in the RFC for Plaintiff's mental impairments—was addressed by the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge stated that Plaintiff had not explained how the RFC restrictions imposed by the ALJ fail to sufficiently account for the opinion of Dr. Ward. (Doc. 17, PAGEID# 752). In her objections, Plaintiff clarifies that she does not claim that the ALJ erred in his purported accommodations, but instead Plaintiff is arguing that there is no evidence that the accommodations would resolve the issues. However, the Court notes that Dr. Ward was the source of the accommodations. (Tr. 531). Therefore, the Court finds that the RFC is based on substantial evidence and Plaintiff's objections on this point are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately explain why the opinions of the non-examining state agency physicians and psychologists are entitled to great weight. Plaintiff explains that the ALJ's explanations are conclusory. However, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ's opinion is sufficiently specific to allow this Court to perform its judicial review function. The Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's conclusion. Therefore, Plaintiff's objections on this point are OVERRULED.
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby