JORGE L. ALONSO, District Judge.
In this case, which will reach its thirtieth birthday in a couple of weeks, plaintiffs move to compel production of information. In essence, theirs is a motion to enforce a consent decree entered by Judge Grady on December 20, 1991 and restated on July 15, 1997. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion [600].
In the late 1980's, plaintiffs, who were children removed from their homes and placed in the custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Service ("DCFS"), filed this suit. They alleged that they had been removed from their families and then subjected to further harm and abuse when DCFS failed to place them in safe and stable living situations. The parties reached a settlement, in the form of a consent decree, which was approved and entered by Judge Grady. That decree has been altered over the years, and the parties agree that the restated consent decree is located at Docket 456-2.
The restated consent decree states, in relevant part:
Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at 5-6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 55, 59-62.
In addition, the restated consent decree sets out required staffing levels. For example, the parties agreed that child protective services investigators could be assigned no more than twelve new abuse or neglect investigations each month for nine months of the year and no more than fifteen during the other three months of the year. (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at 28). The parties also included a limit on the number of cases that could be handled by caseworkers working with intact families, i.e., those families from which no child had been removed. Specifically, the parties agreed that each caseworker should be assigned a caseload not to exceed 20 intact families per caseworker. (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at 28).
On November 6, 2017, plaintiffs requested that defendant provide information. Specifically, plaintiffs requested that defendants:
(Docket 600-1 at 21-22).
After several extensions, defendant responded on January 26, 2018. With respect to caseloads for intact-family caseworkers, defendant stated in its response:
(Docket 600-1 at 50). With respect to the other information plaintiffs requested, defendant stated that it was not going to supply the information on the grounds that the restated consent decree does not require it to provide such information.
Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel defendant to provide the information. Plaintiffs assert that the information should be provided pursuant to ¶¶ 4(a), 5(a), 5(b), 8 and 27(a) of the restated consent decree. Because plaintiffs rely on the terms of the restated consent decree as the basis of their motion, they are, in effect, asking the Court to enforce the restated consent decree.
A court has the inherent authority to enforce its own orders. A consent decree is "a court order that embodies the terms agreed upon by the parties as a compromise to litigation." United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2002). A court interprets a consent decree as it would any other contract. Bailey v. Roob, 567 F.3d 930, 940 (7th Cir. 2009); Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d at 934. "Unless there is a substantial claim under federal law, the district judge should not enter or continue to enforce a consent decree affecting the operation of a governmental body." Evans v. City of Chi., 10 F.3d 474, 483 (7th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiffs seek to enforce the consent decree by compelling defendant to produce a significant amount of information about intact families, i.e., families from which no child has been removed.
The restated consent decree allows plaintiffs to obtain information from defendant so that plaintiffs can evaluate whether defendant is complying with the decree. Specifically, paragraph 68 of the restated consent decree states, "Class counsel for plaintiffs shall receive from DCFS sufficient information to permit plaintiffs to evaluate the status of DCFS's compliance with this Decree." (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at ¶ 68). The decree also allows counsel for plaintiffs to "make reasonable requests" for additional reports or information. (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at ¶ 68(b)).
In support of their motion, plaintiffs argue that they should be provided information about intact families, because the "Plaintiff Class includes children who should have been removed from their families upon a first report to the hotline, were left at home with a plan for intact services, and then suffered further injury (or even death) as a result." (Plaintiff's motion [600] at 7). The Court disagrees. The restated consent decree explicitly defines the class as "persons who, on or after the date of commencement of this action, are in the custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and who have been placed somewhere other than with their parents." (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at ¶ 1(e) (emphasis added)). Thus, children in intact families are not members of the class and are not covered by the restated consent decree. The class definition does not provide a hook for plaintiffs to obtain information about services to intact families.
Plaintiffs also state that particular provisions of the restated consent decree entitle them to information about intact families. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that paragraphs 4(a), 5(a), 5(b), 8 and 27(a) entitle them to the information they have requested. The Court disagrees. Paragraphs 4(a) and 5(a) apply only to class members. Paragraph 4(a) states, "Children shall be free from foreseeable and preventable physical harm," while paragraph 5(a) says that "children will be timely and stably placed in safe and appropriate living arrangements." (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at ¶¶ 4(a) & 5(a)). Given that the decree defines children as the members of the class, which does not include the offspring of intact families (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at ¶ 1(e)), paragraphs 4(a) and 5(a) do not apply to intact families. Thus, plaintiffs do not need information about intact families in order to evaluate whether defendant is complying with ¶¶ 4(a) and 5(a).
Nor do the provisions of ¶¶ 5(b) and 8 grant plaintiffs carte blanche to demand information about intact families. Those provisions obligate defendant to make "reasonable efforts" not to remove children from a home. (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at ¶ 5(b) ("reasonable efforts, as determined based on individual circumstances (including consideration of whether no efforts would be reasonable) shall be made to prevent removal of children from their homes and stably to reunite children with their parents") & ¶ 8 ("DCFS shall not remove a child from a parent or continue the removal by another person authorized to take protective custody under state law unless the standard set forth in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, ¶ 2055 is met, and unless DCFS has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child.")). Given that the decree allows plaintiffs access to information in order to evaluate compliance, the Court agrees that plaintiffs could inquire, with respect to particular class members (i.e., individuals who have been removed from parents), whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal of the particular class member before that particular class member was removed. The Court does not, however, agree that those provisions give plaintiffs carte blanche to request any information they might be interested in with respect to intact families. Plaintiffs have not limited their request to information about their own class members and whether defendant made reasonable efforts not to remove those class members from their homes. To allow plaintiffs to obtain all of the information they request about intact families (including the names and locations of children who are not class members but who were involved in intact family services) would expand the scope of the decree.
This does not, however, mean plaintiffs are entitled to no information about intact families. Paragraph 27(a) sets out a maximum caseload of 20 families per caseworker responsible for intact families. (Restated Consent Decree/Docket 456-2 at ¶ 27(a)). Plaintiffs can seek information to evaluate compliance with this provision. Plaintiffs requested information on caseloads, and defendant provided a snapshot of caseloads as of the day before it responded. Defendant also offered to send a report with such caseloads on a monthly basis. Plaintiffs describe the response as "unusable," but they do not explain why the information does not suffice. It sounds sufficient to the Court.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to enforce the consent decree by compelling the production of information is denied. Because the Court is denying the motion to enforce on the merits, it need not consider whether a substantial federal issue still exists in this case. See Evans, 10 F.3d at 480 ("All of these cases illustrate the principle we recognize today: entry and continued enforcement of a consent decree regulating the operation of a governmental body depends on the existence of a substantial claim under federal law. Unless there is such a claim, the consent decree is no more than a contract, whose enforcement cannot be supported by the diversity jurisdiction and that has in court no more force than it would have outside of court. Prospective enforcement therefore is `inequitable' within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5).") (internal citations omitted).
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' motion [600] is denied.