KIMBERLY A. JOLSON, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, James D. Myers, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income Benefits ("SSI"). For the reasons set forth below, it is
Plaintiff filed his application for DIB in January 2013, and his application for SSI in July 2013. Both applications allege that he was disabled beginning December 21, 2012. (Tr. 183-84). After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") held a hearing on December 16, 2014. (Tr. 40-82). On January 16, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application for benefits. (Tr. 18-39). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-5). Plaintiff then filed a case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. That court remanded the case back to the Commissioner on September 12, 2016. (Tr. 570-71).
Another administrative hearing was held on May 18, 2017, (Tr. 472-536), and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on September 18, 2017. (Tr. 445-64) The Appeals Council again denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed the instant case seeking a review of the Appeals Council's decision on May 20, 2019 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the administrative record on July 29, 2019 (Doc. 8). This matter is now ripe for review. (See Docs. 9, 11).
In his decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 21, 2012, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 448). He found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: multiple sclerosis and diagnoses of persistent dysthymic disorder, unspecified personality disorder, amnestic disorder (not otherwise specified), and cognitive disorder (not otherwise specified). (Id.). The ALJ, however, found that none of Plaintiff's impairments, either singly or in combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (Tr. 450).
As for Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), the ALJ opined:
(Tr. 452).
The ALJ summarized the testimony from Plaintiff's hearing:
(Tr. 453).
The ALJ also usefully summarized Plaintiff's medical records and symptoms. First, he considered the records documenting Plaintiff's physical impairments:
(Tr. 454-56).
Second, he considered the records concerning Plaintiff's mental health:
(Tr. 456-57).
Upon review of the above-described evidence, the ALJ concluded that "the objective medical record does not support the degree of impairment alleged by the claimant" and that Plaintiff's "severe physical and mental impairments" are "adequately accommodated" through the RFC. (Tr. 457).
As for the opinion evidence, the ALJ first considered the opinions of the state agency physical consultants, who determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing a range of work between the light and sedentary exertional levels subject to some additional postural and environmental limitations. (Id.). The ALJ gave these opinions little weight because neither consultant examined Plaintiff, and the treatment evidence shows that Plaintiff's "relapsing remitting multiple sclerosis reasonably limits him to sedentary work activities." (Tr. 458).
The ALJ then turned to the state agency mental consultants, who opined that even with Plaintiff's mental symptoms he would be able to understand, remember, and carry out 1 to 3 step tasks in a relatively static environment, relate to others on a superficial basis, and adapt to changes explained in advance. (Tr. 457-58). The ALJ assigned these opinions great weight, explaining that they are "largely supported by the mental examinations. . . consistent with the claimant's lack of treatment as outlined above and are the most consistent with the longitudinal review of the evidence of record with regard to the claimant's mental symptoms." (Tr. 458).
Next, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Sushil Sethi, who opined in April 2013 that Plaintiff's ability to do work-related physical activities is limited. (Id.). The ALJ afforded this opinion little weight, explaining that it is "vague and does not define what the term `limited' means from a functional standpoint," and that as a result, "the limitations are not quantifiable for purposes of establishing function-by-function physical limitations under the Social Security Rules and Regulations." (Id.).
The ALJ then considered the opinion of psychologist David Bousquet, who opined in May 2013 that Plaintiff "would be expected to have some difficulties" in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out instructions in a work setting and that there would "be times when he will have some difficulties" with his abilities to respond appropriately to work place stresses and pressures, but that he is capable of conforming to social expectations in a work setting. (Id.). The ALJ assigned this opinion little weight, explaining that the limitations regarding concentration and response to work place stresses and pressure "are not quantifiable for purposes of establishing nonexertional mental limitations" and further, "do not contain any indication what the claimant is able to do or cannot do." (Id.). And, regarding Bousquet's opinion on Plaintiff's ability to function socially, the ALJ found it is "not supported by a review of the longitudinal record," which supports Plaintiff's ability to occasionally interact with coworkers, supervisors, or the public. (Id.).
Next, the ALJ considered the opinions of licensed psychologist, M. Aileen Mansuetto, who opined that "[i]t is highly unlikely" that Plaintiff "is going to be employable at this point, particularly if the MS diagnosis is accurate," and that Plaintiff has a "moderate limitation" in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple or complex instructions and respond appropriately to changes to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting. (Tr. 459). The ALJ assigned this opinion little weight, explaining, inter alia, that it is internally inconsistent and relies heavily on Plaintiff's subjective reports of symptoms and limitations. (Id.).
Finally, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Thomas Schmitt, who opined in January 2017 that Plaintiff can "never" perform numerous physical activities, including, for example, lifting, carrying, sitting, standing, or walking. (Id.). The ALJ assigned this opinion little weight, explaining that it is "completely out of proportion to the longitudinal review of the evidence" and relies "heavily" on Plaintiff's subjective reports. (Id.).
The Court's review "is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards." Winn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App'x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
"After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ's decision, the determination of the council becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court." Olive v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, "even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff asserts one assignment of error, that the ALJ improperly evaluated the mental and physical health opinion evidence of record. (Doc. 9 at 6-13).
"The Social Security Administration defines three types of medical sources: non-examining sources, non-treating (but examining) sources, and treating sources." Reeves v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App'x 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). "A physician qualifies as a treating source if there is an `ongoing treatment relationship' such that the claimant sees the physician `with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for [the] medical condition.'" Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). If the treating physician's opinion is "`well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record,' then an ALJ `will give it controlling weight.'" Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). And, when an ALJ does not give the treating source's opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must give "`good reasons'" for discounting the opinion. Id. (quoting Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242).
On the other hand, when the opinion comes from a non-treating or non-examining source, it is usually not entitled to controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Rather, the ALJ should consider relevant factors, including supportability, consistency, and specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). There is however, no "reasons-giving requirement" for non-treating source opinions. Martin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App'x 255, 259 (6th Cir. 2016). Rather, the ALJ must provide only "a meaningful explanation regarding the weight given to particular medical source opinions." Mason v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:18 CV 1737, 2019 WL 4305764, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019) (citing SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2).
Here, the Commissioner seems to rely on the stricter standard governing treating source opinions. (See, e.g., Doc. 11 at 5, 11). But, the Undersigned finds, and Plaintiff does not state otherwise, that there are no treating source opinions of record. Rather, the medical opinions come from: examining but non-treating state psychology consultants (Tr. 89-91, 105-06); Dr. Sushil Sethi, a one-time examining medical consultant (Tr. 402-04); David Bousquet, a one-time examining psychological consultant (Tr. 283-90); M. Aileen Mansuetto, a one-time examining psychological consultant (Tr. 760-68); and Dr. Thomas Schmitt, a one-time examining medical consultant (Tr. 746-58).
Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to assign controlling weight to these opinions or provide "good reasons" for discounting them. See Martin, 658 F. App'x at 259. Instead, the ALJ must have provided a "meaningful explanation regarding the[ir] weight[.]" Mason, 2019 WL 4305764, at *7.
Plaintiff makes two arguments regarding the ALJ's treatment of the mental health opinion evidence: (1) that the ALJ failed to incorporate the state psychologists' limitations into the RFC; and (2) that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinion of examining psychologist M. Aileen Mansuetto. (See Doc. 9 at 6-11).
First, Plaintiff contends that, because the ALJ afforded great weight to the opinions of the state agency psychologists, he should have accounted for each of their opined limitations in the RFC, or at the very least, explained why he excluded any limitations. (Doc. 9 at 8). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that, because the state psychologists limited him to only superficial and occasional interactions with the public, the ALJ erred in limiting him to only occasional interactions with the public and excluding the specific limitation of "superficial." (Id.).
Plaintiff's argument fails. The Sixth Circuit has rejected the argument that an ALJ must explain every omitted restriction from a non-treating physician's opinion. In Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, the plaintiff argued that the ALJ failed to adopt certain limitations espoused by a non-examining source and a one-time consultative examiner. See Martin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App'x 255, 259 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit found no reversible error:
Id. at 259; see also Reeves, 618 F. App'x at 275 ("Although the ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Torello's opinion, he was not required to incorporate the entirety of her opinion, especially those findings that are not substantially supported by evidence in the record."); Mason, 2019 WL 4305764, at *10 (finding that the ALJ was not required to adopt all of the non-treating source's limitations).
The same reasoning applies here. The ALJ was not required to explain why he excluded the limitation of only "superficial" interactions with the public. Yet it is clear from his opinion why he did. In reviewing the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has only moderate limitations in interacting with others. (Tr. 451; see also Tr. 458). He explained:
(Tr. 451).
In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to limit Plaintiff to only occasional rather than occasional and superficial interaction with the public.
Turning to Plaintiff's second argument regarding the opinion evidence, he contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of licensed psychologist Mansuetto, (Doc. 9 at 9-10), who opined in January 2017, that "[i]t is highly unlikely that [Plaintiff] is going to be employable at this point, particularly if the MS diagnosis is accurate." (Tr. 764). Mansuetto also completed a medical source statement, finding that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in his ability to understand and remember simple instructions, carry out complex instructions, make judgments on complex work-related decisions, and that he would never be able to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, or coworkers. (Tr. 760-68). Essentially, Plaintiff argues that Mansuetto's exam notes reveal greater limitations than the "check the box" medical source statement, and that the ALJ should have relied more on the detailed exam notes than the administrative form. (Doc. 9 at 9-10).
Up front, because Mansuetto examined Plaintiff only once, "the reasons-giving requirement is inapplicable to [Mansuetto's] opinion." Martin, 658 F. App'x at 259. Rather, as noted, the ALJ was required to provide only "a meaningful explanation regarding the weight given to particular medical source opinions." Mason, 2019 WL 4305764, at *7. The ALJ did that here.
First, the ALJ found that Mansuetto's opinions "contain inconsistencies, which renders them less persuasive." (Tr. 459). He elaborated:
(Id.).
Second, the ALJ noted that Manusettos' opinions "rely heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by the claimant and the totality of the evidence does not support the `unemployable' statement." (Id.). The ALJ explained:
(Id.).
Third, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff's multiple sclerosis "is outside" Mansuetto's area of expertise as a psychologist. (Id.). Finally, the ALJ noted that Mansuetto's opinion that Plaintiff is disabled or unemployable "is not a medical opinion, but is an administrative finding dispositive of a case that requires familiarity with the Regulations and legal standards set forth therein." (Id.).
While Plaintiff cites to numerous notes from his exam with Mansuetto, including, for example, that he "exhibited an unusual presentation during the examination," the ALJ was well within his discretion to discredit Mansuetto's opinion, finding that it was internally inconsistent, based on subjective evidence, concerned matters outside of his specialty, and contained an opinion of disability reserved for the Commissioner. As such, the Undersigned finds that the ALJ provided a "meaningful explanation regarding the weight given to" Mansuetto's opinion, Mason, 2019 WL 4305764, at *7, and Plaintiff has shown no reversible error in this regard.
Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the physical health opinion evidence. (Doc. 9 at 11-13). Specifically, he avers that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of Dr. Sushil Sethi and Dr. Thomas Schmitt. (Id.).
Dr. Sethi opined in an April 2013 medical source statement that Plaintiff's ability to do work-related activities, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, and handling objects traveling is "limited" but that his hearing and speaking are "normal." (Tr. 402-4). The ALJ assigned this opinion little weight, explaining:
(Tr. 458).
Dr. Schmitt, in January 2017, opined that Plaintiff is "never" able to lift, carry, sit, stand, walk, reach in any direction, handle, finger, feel, push/pull, operate foot controls, climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl, along with a myriad of other physical limitations. (Tr. 746-58). The ALJ afforded this opinion little weight for multiple reasons. (Tr. 459-60).
First, the ALJ found it to be "completely out of proportion to the longitudinal review of the evidence." (Tr. 459). Second, he noted that it "appears to rely heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations provided by the claimant and the totality of the evidence does not support the opinion. (Id.). He elaborated:
(Tr. 459-60).
Finally, the ALJ explained that Dr. Schmitt's opinion was not supported by Plaintiff's reported activities of daily living:
(Tr. 460).
Plaintiff resists these conclusions, contending that Dr. Sethi and Dr. Schmitt "are the only opinions of record to have had the opportunity to personally examine and observe [him] and provide an opinion regarding his functional capacity" and that they are "experts in disability evaluation." (Doc. 9 at 12). He also asserts that Dr. Schmitt's evaluation "revealed numerous clinical observations," including, for example, that he has a history of Multiple Sclerosis, severely compromised grip strength and gait disturbance, as well as dizziness and severe weakness in the right and left upper extremities. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff, relying on records from hospital visits and exams, insists that the record "consistently documents ongoing problems with [his] physical capabilities." (Id. at 13).
But there are two critical problems with Plaintiff's argument. First, neither Dr. Sethi nor Dr. Schmitt are treating sources, and consequently, the ALJ was not required to give "good reasons" for discounting their opinions. See Martin, 658 F. App'x at 259. Regardless, the ALJ closely scrutinized the record and thoughtfully compared it with the limitations expressed in Dr. Sethi's and Schmitt's opinions. And, as required, he provided a "meaningful explanation regarding the weight given to" their opinions, Mason, 2019 WL 4305764, at *7, explaining that they were inconsistent with both the record and Plaintiff's reports of daily activities, (Tr. 458-59).
Second, while Plaintiff relies on certain records documenting his physical problems, he is essentially asking the Court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. The law prohibits the Court from doing so. See Reynolds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App'x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Webb, 49 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1995)) ("This court reviews the entire administrative record, but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ."); see also Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that "there is a `zone of choice' within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference").
In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC determination.
Based on the foregoing, it is
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
