REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Defendant Charles Robinson moves to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officers during the execution of a search warrant at his residence. Robinson alleges that his statements are inadmissible both because the officers failed to administer warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and because they were involuntary. On June 14, 2017, the Court held a hearing on Robinson's motion. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501. After considering the testimony at that hearing and resolving the factual discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony,1 the Court finds no basis for the suppression of Robinson's statements.

I. FACTS

On February 21, 2017, this Court issued a search warrant for a residence located in Yamacraw Village, a public housing complex in downtown Savannah, Georgia, after finding probable cause to believe that someone was receiving child pornography via an Internet account registered to that address. In the matter of the search of 814 Yamacraw Village, Savannah, Georgia, MJ417-015, doc. 3-1 (affidavit in support of search warrant application) (attached as an exhibit to defendant's motion to suppress, doc. 21-1). Because the residence was located in a high-crime area of the city, where there had been recent shootings, Suppression Hearing Transcript ("Tr.") at 11, 17, 18, an "entry team" equipped with ballistic vests, shields, and semi-automatic rifles was called upon to secure the residence before the search began. Id. at 17-19. The entry team encountered no resistance from the female lessee of the residence (A. W.), who had just returned to the dwelling after placing her child on a school bus.

As they swept through the residence, one of the four to five members of the entry team encountered defendant Robinson near an upstairs bedroom and ordered him to show his hands and go downstairs. Once downstairs, Robinson was subjected to a brief pat-down to confirm that he was unarmed. He was then directed either to remain in the den (id. at 11) or step outside briefly (id. at 23) (the record is unclear). Within five minutes or so, the entry team secured the residence and departed, leaving members of the FBI/Southeast Georgia Child Exploitation Task Force to conduct their search of the residence. Id. at 9, 11-12, 18.

Shortly thereafter, id. at 38, Task Force Officer (TFO) John Schmitt and FBI Special Agent William Kirkconnell approached Robinson and told him to step into the kitchen, located at the back of the residence, where they could talk. Id. at 12, 39-40. Robinson sat in a chair at the kitchen table next to the unsecured screen door (as the rear door to the residence had been left open). Id. at 12-13. Agent Kirkconnell explained that the agents were executing a federal search warrant, that Robinson was not required to be present during the execution of that warrant, and that he was free to leave the residence. Id. at 13. TFO Schmitt then pointed out that Robinson had unobstructed access to the open back door of the apartment and that he could simply walk out if he so desired. Id. at 13, 40. At no point did the agents block Robinson's access to the back door. Id. at 15, 27. Nor did they touch him or lean over him in some intimidating fashion. Id. at 33 ("We kept our distance. It was normal casual conversation distance."), 39.

The agents spoke with Robinson in the kitchen for some 15 to 30 minutes. Id. at 29. They conducted their interview in "normal conversational tones," id. at 15, and never yelled at or threatened him. Id. at 15, 24. Robinson was cooperative and did not appear to be unduly stressed during the interview. Id. at 23, 37.

After informing Robinson that someone at the residence had been downloading child pornography, the agents asked if he was the person responsible. Id. at 30. Robinson freely admitted that he was. Id. Robinson then explained that he had become interested in child pornography after discovering it on a laptop that he had stolen while working as a baggage handler at the airport. Id at 31. When the agents asked for passwords to the various electronic devices seized during the search, he readily provided them. Id. 24-26, 32.

At the conclusion of the interview the agents informed Robinson that A. W., the female lessee of the residence, wanted him to vacate the premises. The agents allowed Robinson to collect his personal belongings, and he then departed in his own vehicle.

Robinson's version of the events varies in some important particulars, although it was consistent in others. Robinson conceded that some of TFO Schmitt's testimony was accurate, id. at 48, and he admitted that he was never handcuffed, ordered to get on the floor, or yanked about by the agents, id. at 51. He further conceded that the interview occurred while he was seated at the kitchen table next to a screen door that served as an exit-way from the residence. Id. 52, 54. He also acknowledged that he never asked to leave, requested water or bathroom breaks, or stood up and tried to leave. Id. at 53. But, Robinson stated that: (1) the interviewing officers never told him that he was free to leave or that he did not have to talk, id. at 44, 48; (2) one of the officers (Kirkconnell) "yelled" at him several times, id. at 43, (3) he was "shivering" from fear and told the officers he was afraid, id. at 44; (4) "someone" stood between him and the screen door, blocking his exit path, id. at 49 (5) one of the officers (apparently Kirkconnell) twice placed his hand on Robinson's shoulder during the interview,2 id. at 44, 46; and (6) when he initially disclaimed knowledge of any child pornography, the officers claimed to know otherwise and asserted that "the severity" of his treatment depended upon the nature of his cooperation, id. at 46-47.

The Court finds this testimony to be unworthy of belief and instead credits TFO Schmitt's contrary testimony that the agents carefully explained that Robinson had every right to leave the premises during the execution of the search warrant, pointed out the unsecured screen door that was within his arm's reach, and never blocked his access to that door in any manner. The Court further rejects Robinson's assertion that either agent ever "yelled" or raised his voice during the interview, or threatened him with more severe treatment if he refused to cooperate. Finally, the Court does not credit Robinson's claim that he was visibly shaking or overwrought at any time during the interview, or that he expressed any feelings of fear to the agents. TFO Schmitt's testimony was simply more convincing than that offered up by Robinson.

II. ANALYSIS

Robinson wants his statements suppressed because, he contends, they were made while he was in custody and the Government did not comply with the "warning and waiver requirements" of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See doc. 21 at 1, 2-3. He also alleges "that [his] statements . . . were involuntary." Id. at 2. The Government insists that he "was not in custody during his interview, so Miranda warnings were not required. . . ." Doc. 26 at 2. At the conclusion of the hearing, however, Robinson's counsel conceded that the voluntariness of his client's statements was "the more pressing issue."

To suppress his statements based on the lack of a Miranda warning, Robinson bears the burden of demonstrating that he was in custody when he made them. See United States v. Peck, 17 F.Supp.3d 1345, 1353-55 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (citing United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1977)); see also United States v. Palmer, 2017 WL 2423059 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. June 5, 2017). And "custody" in the Miranda context "is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion." Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-09 (2012) (quotes and cites omitted).

Whether a suspect is "in custody," depends upon "whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quotes and cite omitted). Despite the sensitivity of the test to the circumstances of the interrogation, it remains an objective inquiry. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (evaluation of custody is context-sensitive, but objective); see also United States v. Eubank, 2015 WL 3557493 at * 6 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 18, 2015). The circumstances of the interrogation are evaluated from the perspective of "the reasonable innocent person." United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006); Eubank, 2015 WL 3557493 at * 6 ("The test [for custody] is an objective one: taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, would a reasonable person — one innocent of any wrongdoing — have felt that he was not free to terminate the interview and leave." (cites omitted)).

Robinson's interrogation was not custodial. First, it took place in his home — or at least a place where he regularly resided. Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348 (although the location of an interview is not dispositive, "courts are much less likely to find the circumstances custodial when the interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, such as the suspect's home.") (quotes and cite omitted)). Second, the officers informed him he was not under arrest and was free to leave.3 See id. at 1347 ("[T]he fact that an individual is told he is not under arrest and is free to leave is a fact of substantial importance in determining whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave."). Even based on Robinson's version of events there was no restraint on his freedom tantamount to "Miranda custody. "He has not, therefore, shown that he was "in custody" when he made the challenged statements; so Miranda and its progeny provide no basis for suppressing them.

Even absent custody, Robinson's challenged statements may still be inadmissible if they were involuntary. See, e.g., United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Even if [the defendant] was not in custody in the technical sense (and thus Miranda warnings were not required), we would still be required to address the voluntariness of his confession."). A confession is involuntary, and thus inadmissible, "only when the [totality of] the circumstances show that `coercive police activity' overcame the defendant's free will." Arvelo v. Sec'y Fla. Dept. of Corrs., ___ F. App'x ___, 2017 WL 1947909 at * 2 (11th Cir. May 10, 2017) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)).4 "Some form of government coercion is essential to a finding of involuntariness." United States v. Lynn, 547 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1310 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163). As this Court has explained:

Lynn, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.

The instant case is profitably compared to United States v. Bhatt, 160 F.Supp.3d 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2016). There, the Court expressed its "strong concern that the search and interrogation methods used in this case barely fall within the borders of what is legally acceptable, particularly with respect to the voluntariness of the Defendant's statements." Id. at 1361. Law enforcement entered the defendant's house violently, "implementing a `shock and awe' strategy to obtain the maximum information feasible in connection with an investigatory search." Id. The defendant was handcuffed, along with other members of his family, for ten to fifteen minutes, kept in his boxers, and not given the opportunity to dress before or during the interview, which lasted for almost three hours, with only brief respite. Id. at 1361-2. Despite those facts, the Court nevertheless found that the Government had borne its burden to show the defendant's statements were voluntarily made. Id. at 1364-65. If those facts pushed the interview close to, but not over, the voluntariness line, then the facts in this case don't even approach it. See also Eubank 2015 WL 3557493 at * 8-9 (despite "aggressive conduct [including,] repeated accusations that [defendant] was being deceptive, shouted-out questions, the use of curse words, and dramatic displays of pique" the Government met it burden of establishing statements were voluntary).

Even assuming Robinson's testimony was entirely accurate, the only facts supporting his involuntariness claim are that the "entry team" was in tactical gear, he wasn't told that he was free to go, and his assertion of Kirkconnell's assurance that "We already know everything," and that the "severity" of his prosecution would "depend" on whether or not he cooperated.5 The limited appearance of the armed entry team, agents' (alleged) failure to expressly tell Robinson that he was free to leave, and their vague references to law enforcement's superior knowledge and encouragement of cooperation, are simply not enough to make his statements involuntary. See Bhatt, 160 F. 3d at 1363 ("Sufficiently coercive conduct normally involves subjecting the accused to an exhaustingly long interrogation, the application of physical force or the threat to do so, or the making of a promise that induces a confession. [Cit.] Isolated incidents of police deception, [cit.], and discussions of realistic penalties for cooperative and non-cooperative defendants, [cit.], are normally insufficient to preclude free choice." (cites omitted)); id. at 1364 ("Eleventh Circuit law remains clear that the isolated representations of a law enforcement officer who encourages cooperation with the government and indicates the adverse consequences of non-cooperation will not alone be deemed an illegal inducement that overwhelms the defendant's ability to freely and voluntarily make a statement."). The remaining facts, including Robinson's education,6 the limited disruption caused by the entry team (Robinson mistook them for a TV program), the relatively short duration of the interview, and the lack of any suggestion of expressly coercive tactics, all weigh in favor of a voluntariness finding. The Court therefore finds that the Government has borne its burden to show that Robinson made the challenged statements to law enforcement voluntarily.

III. CONCLUSION

Charles Robinson's motion to suppress his statements (doc. 21) should be DENIED. This Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party may file written objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations." Any request for additional time to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the assigned district judge.

After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The district judge will review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v. V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 F. App'x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 F. App'x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.