ORDER

CARL J. BARBIER, District Judge.

Before the Court is Petitioner Jamil Joyner's Objections to the Magistrate's Report & Recommendation (Rec. Doc. 61). Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusions that he is not entitled to equitable tolling and that he failed to establish his "actual innocence" as set forth in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013).

First, Petitioner fails to address the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that equitable tolling does not apply because he did not file a protective federal habeas petition and therefore was not prevented from asserting his rights. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005); Madden v. Thaler, 521 F. App'x 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). As the Magistrate Judge found, "[i]f petitioner's attorneys had followed that procedure, the instant federal application would be timely."1 Petitioner's assertion that he was reasonably diligent because he followed up with the Louisiana Supreme Court about his writ application on November 9, 2015, a month after filing the application and over three weeks after the limitations period had expired on October 14, 2015, is likewise unavailing.2 The delivery problems encountered by Petitioner on the day his writ application was due do not entitle him to equitable tolling. See Johnson v. Quarterman, 483 F.3d 278, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2007).

Petitioner next contends the Magistrate Judge improperly excluded from consideration evidence that supported his actual innocence gateway claim on grounds that the evidence was not "new." While Petitioner maintains that Moore v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2008), "is at odds with" Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006),3 this Court is obligated to follow Fifth Circuit precedent. Additionally, Petitioner misreads Floyd v. Cain, No. 11-2819, 2016 WL 4799093 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016), to suggest that the Court must consider any and all evidence when evaluating an actual innocence gateway claim, regardless of whether it meets the "new evidence" standard. Not so. First, the "petitioner [must] support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. "Evidence does not qualify as `new' under the Schlup actual-innocence standard if `it was always within the reach of [petitioner's] personal knowledge or reasonable investigation.'" Hancock v. Davis, 906 F.3d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Moore, 534 F.3d at 465). Only then will the Court consider this "new" evidence, as well as the "old"—i.e., the evidence presented at trial—to determine whether it is "more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, [that] no reasonable juror would find [the petitioner] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." House, 547 U.S. at 538. Because much of the evidence Petitioner submitted was not "new," he was not entitled to have it considered by the Court in evaluating his actual innocence gateway claim. See Hancock, 906 F.3d at 390. As to the only "new" evidence presented—the Walker affidavit—the Magistrate Judge did not err in concluding that it was unreliable, see House, 547 U.S. at 552, or that it was not sufficiently compelling to support his claim, see id. at 538. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Rec. Doc. 61) are OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the federal application for habeas corpus relief filed by Jamil Joyner is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.