CAROL E. JACKSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of plaintiff's RICO and tortious interference claims (Counts I-V), or, in the alternative, to voluntarily dismiss the remaining counts of the third amended complaint (Counts VI-VIII). Defendants have responded in opposition, and the issues are fully briefed.
Plaintiff Raineri Construction, LLC (Raineri) is a construction contractor. Defendant Carpenters District Council of Greater St. Louis and Vicinity (CDC) is a labor union that represents carpenters and other skilled workers in collective bargaining with construction contractors. The ten individual defendants, Keith Taylor, Scott Byrne, Paul Higgins, Al Bond, Mark Kabuss, Michael Ebert, Christopher Woods, George Wingbermuehle III, Tod Wingbermuehle, and Terry Nelson, are officers or members of the CDC.
Plaintiff alleges that beginning in November 2011 and continuing to date, defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to extort money and inflict substantial damages upon plaintiff by threatening physical violence and property damage, stalking and harassing plaintiff's management and employees, defamation, filing frivolous complaints with the St. Louis City Building Department, the St. Louis County Department of Health, and the U.S. Department of Labor-Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and unlawfully interfering with plaintiff's existing and prospective business relations.
The Court has twice dismissed the alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (RICO) (Counts I-IV) for failure to state a claim. In response, plaintiff has amended its complaint in an effort to remedy the pleading defects in the RICO claims. Following plaintiff's third amended complaint, the Court granted defendants' motion to strike allegations and references pertaining to the dismissed counts as immaterial, impertinent, scandalous or otherwise unrelated to the remaining claims.
In the instant motion, plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the RICO claims on the basis of "the Court's unwarranted refusal to allow [p]laintiff any discovery whatsoever to support its well-pleaded [RICO] allegations" and "recently disclosed predicate acts" cited in defendants' answer to the third amended complaint. [Docs. ## 103, 108]. In the alternative, plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss the remaining claims in the complaint, "so as to conclude this action in the district court and to allow [p]laintiff to pursue an appeal with respect to the Court's dismissal of [p]laintiff's RICO claims." [Doc. #103].
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the standard by which courts are to assess motions to reconsider, and plaintiff does not cite any authority for its motion. Because plaintiff seeks review of a non-final order rather than a final judgment, the Court will construe plaintiff's motion as a Rule 60(b) motion.
Plaintiff has failed to provide a sufficient basis for relief upon any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b). Plaintiff instead premises its motion for reconsideration on the lack of "discovery necessary to process its [RICO] claims," "even though [p]laintiff specifically requested a Rule 16 conference." Pl.'s Reply, at *1 [Doc. #108]. During the pendency of this litigation, plaintiff has filed three amended complaints and the Court has ruled on two fully-briefed motions to dismiss with supplemental memoranda and notices filed by the parties. It is within the discretion of the district court to issue a scheduling order and allow for the commencement of discovery after resolution of a pending motion to dismiss.
Furthermore, the purpose of discovery is not to assist a plaintiff in articulating a plausible claim in drafting the complaint, but rather to allow parties to determine whether evidence exists to support a stated claim. "Discovery should follow the filing of a well-pleaded complaint. It is not a device to enable a plaintiff to make a case when [its] complaint has failed to state a claim."
To state a claim in a private civil RICO action, a plaintiff must satisfy a number of prerequisites and plead a multitude of moving elements. As described by one federal court, "[t]he statute is constructed on the model of a treasure hunt."
In the instant motion, plaintiff states in passing that it seeks leave to amend its third amended complaint "to specifically allege these recently disclosed predicate acts which support [p]laintiff's RICO claims." Pl.'s Mot. ¶ 9 [Doc. #103]. However, it failed to attach a proposed amended complaint to enable the Court to determine whether such an amendment would be futile.
In the alternative, plaintiff moves to voluntarily dismiss its remaining claims in the third amended complaint (Counts VI-VIII). "It is axiomatic that a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) is not one of right but is rather a matter for the discretion of the trial court."
The explanation plaintiff has provided for voluntarily dismissing the remaining claims is "to conclude this action in the district court and to allow [p]laintiff to pursue an appeal with respect to the Court's dismissal of [p]laintiff's RICO claims." Pl.'s Mot. ¶ 10 [Doc. #103]. As the defendants point out, permitting a voluntary dismissal the remaining claims at this stage would only enable plaintiffs to secure an otherwise unavailable interlocutory appeal of the dismissal of the RICO claims, thus violating the long-recognized federal policy against piecemeal appeals.
Moreover, granting a voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims would result in a waste of judicial time and effort, as the parties have vigorously litigated this matter before the Court with substantial resources expended for more than two years. Dismissal also would be prejudicial to defendants, as their motion for judgment on the pleadings directed to one of the remaining claims remains pending. Therefore, the Court will not permit plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the remaining counts of its third amended complaint.
For the reasons set forth above,