OPINION AND ORDER

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Harry Percianoff seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's decision denying him supplemental security income (SSI), and asks this Court to remand the case to the agency. For the reasons below, the Court affirms the Commissioner's decision.

A. Overview of the Case

Plaintiff applied for SSI on March 5, 2012, alleging that he became disabled on March 1, 2003. (R. at 15.) Following a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Mark Naggi denied Plaintiff's claim on November 25, 2013. (R. at 24.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has three severe conditions: chronic heart failure, peripheral artery disease, and anxiety. (R. at 17.) The ALJ stated that he gave Plaintiff "considerable benefit of the doubt" regarding these conditions, although the medical opinions in the record indicated that these conditions did not interfere with Plaintiff's ability to work. (R. at 21-22.) In assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), the ALJ accordingly imposed moderate physical and mental limitations, including working only at the medium exertional level, avoiding unprotected heights, and performing only simple tasks. (R. at 19.) He concluded that Plaintiff could still do his former job as a sales attendant. (R. at 22.) The ALJ also concluded that even if Plaintiff could not do his former job, there were other jobs in the national economy that he could do. (R. at 23.) The ALJ's decision became final when the Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. at 4.)

B. Standard of Review

This Court has authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court will uphold a decision that applies the correct legal standard and is supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). The Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002).

C. Disability Standard

The SSA has established a five-step inquiry to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. A successful claimant must show:

Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2004).

A "no" at any point other than step three means that the claimant is not disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A "yes" leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at every step except step five. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

D. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly assessed Plaintiff's physical RFC, incorrectly assessed Plaintiff's mental RFC, and improperly discounted Plaintiff's credibility.

(1) The ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's physical RFC was supported by substantial evidence

Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ rejected the examining physicians' opinion that Plaintiff's conditions were not severe, and had no other medical evidence, the ALJ was faced with an evidentiary shortfall. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends, the ALJ could not find that Plaintiff was able to perform work at the medium exertional level unless the ALJ had medical evidence supporting that specific finding. But this is not the rule. "[A]n ALJ must consider the entire record, but the ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician's opinion or choose between the opinions any of the claimant's physicians." Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff cites a number of cases for this "evidentiary shortfall" argument, such as Suide v. Astrue, 371 F. App'x. 684 (7th Cir. 2010). But as other courts have observed, "[t]he error in Suide was not that the ALJ did not rely on a doctor's opinion to assess RFC; rather, the error was that the ALJ failed to discuss significant medical evidence in the record." Allen v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-951, 2015 WL 4574774, at *10-11 (S.D. Ill. July 29, 2015). In Plaintiff's case, the ALJ did what the law required: he weighed the totality of evidence, including medical opinions and Plaintiff's testimony. And after finding that neither Plaintiff's testimony nor the medical opinions were perfectly trustworthy, he came to a conclusion that incorporated some aspects of both. Because the ALJ supported his decision with substantial evidence, and built a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, this Court must affirm the ALJ's decision.

(2) The ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's mental RFC was supported by substantial evidence

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was subject to only moderate restrictions on concentration, persistence, and pace. (R. at 19.) As with the physical RFC, Plaintiff points to no evidence that would support a greater restriction than the one the ALJ imposed. This Court is no position to overturn the ALJ's finding merely because the ALJ came to a more favorable conclusion than the psychiatric opinions would have supported.

The ALJ also did not err in omitting social restrictions in Plaintiff's mental RFC. Plaintiff testified that he had difficulties making friends and interacting socially, and spent a lot of time sitting on his porch watching people go by. (R. at 137.) The ALJ weighed this testimony against Plaintiff's lack of difficulties getting along with family or coworkers, and concluded that although Plaintiff did have "mild" social limitations, these limitations did not interfere with his ability to work. (R. at 18.) Without evidence of significant social limitations, the ALJ's conclusion was reasonable.

Plaintiff cites several cases from this jurisdiction in which the court overturned the ALJ's ruling due to an improper mental RFC assessment, but none of them provide a basis for overturning the ALJ in this case. For example, in Wiszowaty v. Astrue, the ALJ entirely ignored social limitations in the RFC despite evidence of such limitations. 861 F.Supp.2d 924, 945 (N.D. Ind. 2012). Likewise in Black v. Colvin, there was significant medical evidence tending to indicate psychiatric problems, yet "the ALJ gave no reasoning and, in fact, drew no conclusion about mental limitations in the RFC." No. 4:13-CV-79-PRC, 2015 WL 1005405, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2015). The cited cases all contrast strongly with this case, in which the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's mental and social limitations at length and came to a conclusion that favored Plaintiff's claim more than the psychiatric evidence alone would support.

Also, because the ALJ found that the Plaintiff could do past relevant work (step four of the disability analysis), the burden of proof was on Plaintiff to demonstrate that his social or mental difficulties would prevent him from doing that work. Plaintiff has not shown that any of his conditions, either separately or together, prevent him from doing his past work as a sales attendant. Therefore, even if there were shortcomings in the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's mental RFC, this Court would be obliged to affirm the ALJ's ultimate finding that Plaintiff is not disabled.

(3) The ALJ was not patently wrong to discount Plaintiff's credibility

ALJ credibility determinations are entitled to deference because the ALJ is "in a special position to hear, see, and assess witnesses." Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). Courts will not overturn such a credibility determination unless it lacks any explanation or support. Id. at 816. A credibility determination will be upheld as long as it is explained in a way that allows the court to determine that the ALJ logically based the determination on specific findings and record evidence. Id.

In this case, the ALJ provided a logical explanation for the credibility determination: the medical evidence contradicted many of Plaintiff's assertions about physical and mental difficulties. (R. at 20, 22.) From this the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff's statements could not be taken as absolute truth. Accordingly, the ALJ's credibility determination was not patently wrong.

E. Conclusion

The Court concludes that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ's credibility determination was not patently wrong. Therefore, the Court affirms the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff supplemental security income.

SO ORDERED.