ORDER AND OPINION

J. MICHELLE CHILDS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Harry Pennington III and Timothy Lorentz (together "Plaintiffs") filed this putative class action against Fluor Corporation, Fluor Enterprises, Inc., Fluor Daniel Maintenance Services, Inc. ("Fluor Daniel"), SCANA Corporation ("SCANA") and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company ("SCE&G") (collectively "Defendants") alleging that the termination of their employment on July 31, 2017, was in violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (the "WARN Act").1 (ECF No. 41.)

This matter is before the court pursuant to a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Fluor Corporation, Fluor Enterprises, Inc., and Fluor Daniel (collectively "Fluor Defendants"). (ECF No. 110.) In their Motion, Fluor Defendants primarily assert that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because "Plaintiffs' counsel made several judicial admissions during the motion hearing on February 14, 2018, which demonstrate that the Fluor Defendants did not violate" the WARN Act. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiffs oppose Fluor Defendants' Motion in its entirety. (ECF No. 116.) For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Fluor Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

I. BACKGROUND RELEVANT TO THE INSTANT MOTION

This case arises out of the decision on July 31, 2017, to stop all construction at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station ("VC Summer") in Jenkinsville, South Carolina. (ECF No. 41 at 2 ¶ 4.) As a result of that decision, Plaintiffs allege that approximately 5,000 employees were laid off who had been working and/or receiving assignments at VC Summer. (Id. at 5 ¶ 23.) Until their respective terminations, Plaintiffs further allege that Pennington worked directly for Fluor Daniel at VC Summer as a Heavy Equipment Operator and Lorenz was employed by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC ("WEC") as a Project Manager. (Id. at 4 ¶¶ 14, 15.) However, at the same time, Plaintiffs allege that they were employees of SCANA and SCE&G (together "SCANA Defendants") for purposes of the WARN Act. (Id. at 2 ¶¶ 1, 2.) To this point, Plaintiffs generally allege that SCANA Defendants were the single employer together with Fluor Defendants and/or WEC of all individuals working at VC Summer. (Id. ¶ 6; see also id. at 3 ¶ 7, 19 ¶ 103 & 22 ¶ 118.)

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that in 2008, SCANA Defendants entered into an agreement with WEC for the purpose of constructing "two AP-10002 nuclear reactors known as VC Summer 2 and 3." (ECF No. 41 at 6 ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs allege that as the general contractor "WEC was generally responsible for the design, manufacture, and procurement of the nuclear reactor, steam turbines, and generators." (Id. at 7 ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs further allege that in or around 2015, Fluor Corporation was brought in as a subcontractor to WEC to "provide staffing for craft (manual labor) employees and [] take primary responsibility for on-site construction" to include "responsibility for the craft, field engineers, and project controls personnel including the costs and scheduling of personnel." (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38.) At the same time, WEC "generally accepted liability for the cost overruns on the Summer Project, by agreeing to build it for a `fixed-price' at SCANA [Defendants]' option," which option was exercised in May 2016 thus "capping [] costs for the Summer Project at close to $14 billion." (Id. ¶¶ 39, 40.)

Plaintiffs allege that "[i]n early 2017, WEC experienced cash shortfalls related to the Summer Project and a deepening liquidity crisis," which eventually led to WEC and its subsidiaries fil[][ing] [] voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the Southern District of New York" on March 29, 2017. (ECF No. 41 at 8 ¶¶ 44, 45.) Plaintiffs allege that as a result of WEC's bankruptcy "SCANA [Defendants] became financially accountable for the ongoing costs and plan of completion" for the VC Summer Project. (ECF No. 71 at 10.) Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that SCANA Defendants took over complete control of the VC Summer Project as demonstrated by the following postbankruptcy conduct:

Plaintiffs allege that after SCANA Defendants gained control of the VC Summer Project, they recognized by "at least March 2017, [that] mass layoffs and shutdowns were almost inevitable at the Summer Project in mid-summer." (ECF No. 41 at 17 ¶ 91.) Subsequently, on July 31, 2017, SCANA Defendants sent WARN Act correspondence to the Director of Business Services for the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce containing the following relevant information:

(ECF No. 9-4 at 2.)

Also on July 31, 2017, Plaintiffs allege that Fluor Defendants and WEC were told by SCE&G "to cease work on the project immediately" resulting in the immediate termination of Plaintiffs' employment. (ECF No. 41 at 17 ¶¶ 95-96.) Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that "SCANA controlled the decision to terminate all the employees on the site without advance notice." (Id. ¶ 95.)

As a result of the foregoing, Pennington filed a putative class action Complaint in this court against Defendants Fluor Corporation, Fluor Enterprises, Inc. and SCANA on August 8, 2017, alleging violation of the WARN Act. (ECF No. 1.) In his Complaint, Pennington sought to represent "all other similarly situated former employees, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), who worked at, reported to, or received assignments from one of Defendants' Facilities and were terminated without cause on or about July 31, 2017, and within 30 days of that date, or were terminated without cause as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass layoffs and/or plant closings ordered by Defendants on or about July 31, 2017, . . . ." (ECF No. 1 at 3-4 ¶ 16.) Pennington further alleged that Fluor Corporation, Fluor Enterprises, Inc. and SCANA knowingly failed to give their employees at least 60 days prior notice of termination of their employment as required by the WARN Act. (ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 3.) On October 25, 2017, Pennington filed an Amended Class Action Complaint, which provided additional WARN Act allegations and added Timothy Lorentz as Plaintiff and Fluor Daniel and SCE&G as Defendants. (ECF No. 41.) Fluor Defendants answered the Amended Complaint and asserted their affirmative defenses on November 20, 2017. (ECF No. 68.)

On December 4, 2017, SCANA Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 69.) On February 14, 2018, the court heard argument from the parties on the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 85.) During the February 14, 2018 motion hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel made the following statements:

Thereafter, on May 30, 2018, Fluor Defendants filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 110.) On June 13, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Fluor's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 116), to which Fluor Defendants filed a Reply in Support of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 118) on June 20, 2018.

II. JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' WARN Act cause of action via 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as it arises under a law of the United States, and also via 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5), which empowers district courts to hear claims alleging violations of the WARN Act.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(c)

Rule 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings is decided under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)."3 Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. IRS, 361 F. App'x 527, 529 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Independence News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009)); see also Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). The key difference between a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and a Rule 12(c) motion is that on a 12(c) motion, the court "consider[s] the answer as well as the complaint" and "documents incorporated by reference in the pleadings." Fitchett v. Cty. of Horry, S.C., C/A No. 4:10-cv-1648-TLW-TER, 2011 WL 4435756, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2011) (citations omitted).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is intended to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint and will operate to dispose of claims "where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noted facts." Cont'l Cleaning Serv. v. UPS, No. 1:98CV1056, 1999 WL 1939249, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 13, 1999) (citing Herbert Abstract v. Touchstone Props., Inc., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990)). "An issue of fact is deemed to be material if the outcome of the case might be altered by the resolution of the issue one way rather than another." Walker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., C/A No. No.: 4:16-cv-01388-RBH, 2017 WL 1020884, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2017) (quoting 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1368 (3d ed. 2011)). "Thus, the plaintiff may not secure a judgment on the pleadings when the answer raises issues of fact that, if proved, would defeat recovery." Id. "Accordingly, `[t]he court must accept all well pleaded factual allegations in the non-moving party's pleadings as true and reject all contravening assertions in the moving party's pleadings as false.'" Catlin Specialty Ins. Grp. v. Lowcountry Oysters of Murrells Inlet, LLC, C/A No. No. 2:17-1528-RMG, 2018 WL 369154, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 2018) (quoting Lewis v. Excel Mech., LLC, No. 2:13-CV-281-PMD, 2013 WL 4585873, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2013)). "[W]hen the plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, the motion should be granted if, `on the undenied facts alleged in the complaint and assuming as true all the material allegations of fact in the answer, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Walker, 2017 WL 1020884, at *1 (quoting Lowden v. Cty. of Clare, 709 F.Supp.2d 540, 546 (E.D. Mich. 2010)).

B. The WARN Act Generally

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has described the WARN Act as follows:

Meson v. GATX Tech. Servs. Corp., 507 F.3d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 2007).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Parties' Arguments

1. Fluor Defendants

In their Motion, Fluor Defendants first argue that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on Plaintiffs' counsel's statements at the February 14, 2018 motion hearing. (See supra at 6; see also ECF No. 110 at 3-4.) More specifically, they argue that Plaintiffs' counsel's statements are party admissions proving that "Fluor Defendants did not order the plant closing [which] relieves [] Fluor Defendants from liability under the WARN Act." (ECF No. 110 at 7.) In support of their argument, Fluor Defendants point out that the WARN Act "imposes liability only on an employer who orders the closing of a plant." (Id. at 8 (quoting Administaff Cos., Inc. v. N.Y. Jt. Bd., Shirt & Leisurewear Div., 337 F.3d 454, 456 (5th Cir. 2003)).) In this regard, Fluor Defendants assert that they "did not make the decision to shut down the V.C. Summer project, and were not aware of SCANA's decision to do so until July 31, 2017, when SCANA announced its decision." (Id.) Therefore, Fluor Defendants urge the court to dismiss them from the action because "they did not order the plant closing, which is required for a finding of liability under the WARN Act." (Id.)

Secondly, Fluor Defendants argue that they should be dismissed from the action because Plaintiffs' counsel's admissions also support the applicability of the "unforeseeable business circumstances" (the "UBC") exception. (See generally ECF No. 110 at 9-13.) Fluor Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' counsel's admissions demonstrate that "SCANA's sudden and unexpected shutdown of the V.C. Summer project left the Fluor Defendants with `zero independence' to provide WARN notices." (Id. at 11.) As a result, "Fluor Defendants are relieved of their responsibility to provide WARN notices or to otherwise pay employees for 60 days following notice." (Id. (citing, e.g., Watson v. Mich. Indus. Holdings, Inc., 311 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding employer was "excused from the WARN Act's notice requirement under the unforeseeable business circumstances exception" where customer decided to stop doing business with employer without prior notice)).)

2. Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs oppose Fluor Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that the statements of Plaintiffs' counsel at the February 14, 2018 motion hearing were "not stipulations averring that Fluor did not order a `plant closing,'" but "are simply inferences Fluor draws from words that do not state the conclusions Fluor wants." (ECF No. 116 at 6, 10.) Plaintiffs further argue that "[a]ll Fluor can do is ask the Court to draw an inference in its favor, i.e., that Fluor did not order a `plant closing' because counsel said SCANA did." (Id. at 10.) However, Plaintiffs assert that the court is not allowed to draw this inference because it "must accept all well pleaded factual allegations in the non-moving party's pleadings as true and reject all contravening assertions in the moving party's pleadings as false." (Id. (quoting Doosan Mach. Tools Am. Corp. v. Mach. Sols., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00876-JMC, 2018 WL 1374066, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2018)).) In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the Amended Complaint alleges that SCANA and Fluor Defendants were a single employer enterprise thereby making any distinction regarding who gave the plant closure order irrelevant. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiffs next oppose Fluor Defendants' application of the UBC exception asserting that a necessary prerequisite to the exception has not been shown, i.e., that Fluor Defendants "delivered a timely WARN notice with the requisite content." (Id. at 11 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3) ("An employer relying on this subsection shall give as much notice as is practicable and at that time shall give a brief statement of the basis for reducing the notification period.")).)

3. Fluor Defendants in Reply

In their Reply brief, Fluor Defendants reiterate that their Motion should be granted because they neither ordered the plant's closing nor "were required to provide `after the fact notice' of the plant closing to avail themselves of the unforeseeable business circumstances defense." (ECF No. 118 at 7-9.)

B. The Court's Review

In their Motion, Fluor Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings based on alleged admissions of Plaintiffs' counsel and the applicability of the UBC exception.

1. Counsel's Statements as Admissions

Fluor Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because "Plaintiffs' counsel made several judicial admissions during the motion hearing on February 14, 2018 [see supra at 6], which demonstrate that the Fluor Defendants did not violate" the WARN Act. (ECF No. 110 at 1.)

"A judicial admission is a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorney makes in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or of facts about which there is no real dispute." Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Colo. 1986) (citing 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2588 n.1 (Chadbourne rev. 1981)). A judicial admission "is conclusive in the case." Everett v. Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., 788 F.3d 132, 141 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Meyer v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 2004)). "Judicial admissions `go to matters of fact which, otherwise, would require evidentiary proof.'" Id. (quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963)). "In addition, judicial admissions `include intentional and unambiguous waivers that release the opposing party from its burden to prove the facts necessary to establish the waived conclusion of law.'" Id. (quoting Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 347 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[A] lawyer's statements may constitute a binding [judicial] admission of a party[]" if the statements are "deliberate, clear, and unambiguous[.]" Minter, 762 F.3d at 347 (quoting Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George's Cty., Md., 608 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)).

Upon conducting a plain reading of Plaintiffs' counsel's statements from the February 14, 2018 motion hearing, the court is not persuaded that they are "deliberate, clear, and unambiguous admissions" by Plaintiffs' counsel that Fluor Defendants failed to order the shutdown of the VC Summer project. Cf. Everett, 788 F.3d at 141. As support, the court observes that several of the statements contain legal thoughts or theories (see ECF No. 91 at 75:12-76:12), which do not generally operate as judicial admissions. Waller, 323 F.2d at 24 ("The doctrine of judicial admissions has never been applied to counsel's statement of his conception of the legal theory of the case. When counsel speaks of legal principles, as he conceives them and which he thinks applicable, he makes no judicial admission and sets up no estoppel which would prevent the court from applying to the facts disclosed by the proof, the proper legal principles as the Court understands them."). The court further observes that the statements factually referencing SCANA Defendants do not evince an intent to deliberately waive the right to present evidence regarding Fluor Defendants' alleged role in the VC Summer shutdown. United States v. Belculfine, 527 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1975) ("Because of their binding consequences, judicial admissions generally arise only from deliberate voluntary waivers that expressly concede for the purposes of trial the truth of an alleged fact."). Moreover, the factual references to SCANA Defendants in Plaintiffs' counsel's statements also do not appear to contradict the allegations of the Amended Complaint wherein Plaintiffs allege that SCANA Defendants were the single employer together with Fluor Defendants and/or WEC of all individuals working at VC Summer. (Compare ECF No. 91 at 63:25-64:14 with ECF No. 41 at 2 ¶ 6; see also id. at 3 ¶ 7, 19 ¶ 103 & 22 ¶ 118.) In view of the preceding observations, the court finds that the above-cited statements of Plaintiffs' counsel do not constitute judicial admissions entitling Fluor Defendants to judgment on the pleadings.

2. Unforeseeable Business Circumstances

Fluor Defendants also contend that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the UBC exception applies to the shutdown of the VC Summer project.

The UBC exception is an affirmative defense that is applicable when a plant closes or mass layoff occurs "before the conclusion of the 60-day period if the closing or mass layoff is caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable as of the time that notice would have been required." 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A). To establish the UBC exception, an "employer must demonstrate (1) that the business circumstances that caused the layoff were not reasonably foreseeable and (2) that those circumstances were the cause of the layoff." In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 866 F.3d 515, 523 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Calloway v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 800 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 2015); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)). However, "[e]ven if an employer establishes that unforeseeable events prevented it from giving notice sixty days in advance, the Act still requires that employers `give as much notice as is practicable' under the circumstances, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3), including, where appropriate, `notice after the fact,' 20 C.F.R. § 639.9." In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 866 F.3d at 523.

Upon the court's review, Fluor Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating the applicability of the UBC exception. First, the court does not perceive any support in the pleadings or documents incorporated in the pleadings for finding that Fluor Defendants provided statutorily compliant notice when they eventually did inform their employees that they were being terminated.4 See, e.g., Sides v. Macon Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc., 725 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) ("[I]t is manifest that a WARN Act employer attempting to circumvent the 60-day notice requirement must still give some notice in accord with 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3)."). Second, the pleadings and their incorporated documents do not clearly identify the unforeseeable business circumstances that caused the shutdown of the VC Summer project.5 Based on the foregoing, Fluor Defendants are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on the UBC exception.

V. CONCLUSION

Upon careful consideration of the parties' pleadings and arguments, the court hereby DENIES the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Fluor Corporation, Fluor Enterprises, Inc., and Fluor Daniel Maintenance Services, Inc. (ECF No. 110.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.