G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Proceeding pro se, Daisy Mobley sues Coty, Inc., "a global beauty company" (doc. 7 at 3); Marc Jacobs International ("MJI"), a fashion design company; and Claire Langlais, a Coty employee, for various torts related to defendants' alleged misappropriation of plaintiff's name and her autobiography's artwork. Doc 1-3. Defendants move to dismiss (doc. 3) for failure to state a claim.
Sometime "in mid 2006," Langlais visited Carriage Jewelers in Savannah, Georgia while in town for the grand opening of the local Marc Jacobs store. Doc. 1-2 at 4. Mobley, a Carriage employee, had displayed in the window copies of her autobiography, "Southern Girl." Id. Intrigued, Langlais purchased the book after Mobley shared with her the story of her "poverty stricken life" and "told [Langlais] all about [her] hopes and dreams and [the] book['s] purpose." Id.
During that conversation, Mobley mentioned her sister, Lola. Doc. 1-2 at 4. Langlais, claiming "that she might write her own book someday," then asked whether the names in "Southern Girl," including Daisy and Lola, "were changed to protect the innocent." Doc. 18 at 3. Mobley told her no, at which point Langlais "repeated [them] several times in her excitement." Doc. 1-2 at 4; see also doc. 18 at 3 ("`Lola . . . Oh, how pretty . . . Lola, [Langlais] said in her excitement. Then as if she struck gold, she repeated "Oh Lola," and asked her companion if he liked that as well.") (ellipses in original). Struck by the oddity of the exclamation, Mobley "made a point of remembering what [Langlais] looked like." Doc. 18 at 5. She also made a point of remembering her outfit that day — it was "black and white with gold accessories" — which, "ironic[ally]," are the same colors as "the `Daisy' [perfume] box." Id. at 16.
Some years later,
Incensed, Mobley filed this action in Chatham County State Court on July 6, 2015. Doc. 1-2 at 4. Not a lawyer, her Complaint lacked a clear statement of the claims she asserted. In response to defendants' motion to dismiss (asserting lack of copyright, and no-trademark-infringement, arguments), she says that "this is not an infringement case, rather a "Wrongful Use of Name and Property . . . Exploitation claim."
"The elements of a fraud action are an intentional false representation by the defendant designed to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, upon which the plaintiff justifiably relies, resulting in damage to the plaintiff." Perry Golf Course Dev., LLC v. Hous. Auth. of City of Atlanta, 294 Ga.App. 387, 396 (2008). Langlais, Mobley contends, committed fraud by asking "Plaintiff about names in Plaintiff's book (Southern Girl), and whether they were changed to protect the innocent." Doc. 18 at 3. Although she told Mobley she intended to one day write her own book, Langlais allegedly knew she never would and instead intended to "deceptively befriend the Plaintiff and [take] possession of the Plaintiff [and her] sister's name[s]." Id.
The only possible representation, defendants contend, is Langlais' assertion that she might one day write her own book. Doc. 21 at 4. Because that concerns future events, it cannot, in their eyes, undergird a fraud claim. Id. Regardless, Mobley cannot show materiality or reliance, since, say defendants, Langlais knew the names "Daisy" and "Lola" from having glanced at "Southern Girl" before approaching Mobley to discuss the book. Id.
It's true, as a general proposition, that statements concerning future events cannot give rise to a fraud claim. See Marler v. Dancing Water Lakes, Inc., 167 Ga.App. 99, 100 (1983). But if the future event is one "which the party making the representation knows will never occur," liability can attach. Id. Nevertheless, Mobley's claim fails because nothing about anything Langlais said is material to any action Mobley took, has taken, or will take.
"[I]n determining materiality, the question is not whether the information relied upon was `important' in some abstract sense; the question must be determined within the context of a specific decision." McKesson Corp. v. Green, 299 Ga.App. 91, 94 (2009). Here, however, Mobley points to no decision on her part that Langlais' alleged misrepresentation could have affected, much less did. She complains only that defendants profited from their Daisy and Lola perfume lines. Even if Langlais disingenuously questioned plaintiff about her name, doing so did not precipitate any decision by Mobley. Hence, her fraud claim fails.
One "of several different torts relating to the invasion of one's privacy," the tort of misappropriation "consists of the following elements:" (1) the appropriation of another's name (or likeness); (2) without their consent; (3) "for the financial gain of the appropriator." Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 292 Ga. 748, 752 (2013). Because "the interest protected in an appropriation case is in the plaintiff's exclusive use of his or her name," no requirement exists "in Georgia law that the plaintiff must have any inherent or preexisting commercial value in his or her name." Id.
Id.
Still, misappropriation protects "the proprietary interest one has in the exclusive use" of a name. Shiho Seki v. Groupon, Inc., 333 Ga.App. 319, 325 (2015). Put differently, the misappropriated name must specifically identify the plaintiff, not someone else. See id. (misappropriation of a pen name actionable if "the pseudonym has become widely known to the public as closely identified with the plaintiff") (citing Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 856, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1985)); cf. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that, even though neither his name nor picture were used, Johnny Carson's common law right to publicity was invaded through defendant's use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" for advertising purposes).
Defendants' offending perfumes use the names "Daisy" and "Lola," neither of which has any real tie to Mobley or her sister. It is beyond peradventure that many people use those names, none of whom can lay claim to them simply because it's their name. Contrast that with a person who owns a well-known chain of ice cream stores named "Daisy Dream." Assuming the stores opened before the perfume, the owner of the ice cream "Daisy Dream" arguably has a misappropriation claim, much like Johnny Carson did against the portable toilet company that filched a signature phrase from his ubiquitous television show. See Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d at 835.
Put differently, there is nothing exclusive or proprietary about Mobley's use of those names. She wrote a book, but never copyrighted it (hence, she has no protectable interest in "Southern Girl," much less the names Daisy or Lola), see doc. 18 at 21, and never claims to use her name as a trade name such that any member of the public would "closely identif[y]" it with plaintiff. See Shiho Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 326. "Daisy" is not closely identified with plaintiff no matter that she wrote a book containing the name. Her misappropriation claim, therefore, fails.
Although she pled ample facts, Mobley fails to state any claim for relief. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 6) should be
Even if Mobley had not disclaimed "infringement claims," no trademark or copyright claim could survive. First, Mobley admits she has never registered a copyright which alone kills that claim. See doc. 18 at 21; Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Cont'l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[A]n owner's cause of action for infringement of that copyright is unenforceable until compliance with the formalities of registration, including payment of fees and deposit of copies of the work, is shown."). And any trademark claim perishes because, assuming Mobley can establish that she owns a valid and protectable mark, defendants' marks are neither similar to Mobley's book's artwork (see doc. 7 at 12), nor likely to cause confusion with "Southern Girl." See Light for Life, Inc. v. Our Firm Found. for Koreans, Inc., 2015 WL 631138 at *5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2015) ("The analysis of . . . federal and state trademark-related claims is materially the same. To prevail on these claims, a party must prove that (1) it owns a valid and protectable mark, and (2) the opposing party's use of an identical or similar mark is likely to cause confusion.").
Instead, the court finds itself at a much earlier stage of proceedings with a litigant who is unquestionably not well-versed in legal matters. And while even pro se litigants must abide by procedural rules, see Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007), their pleadings, as noted above, are entitled to a liberal construction. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.") (internal quotes and cites omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."). It is through that lens that the Court construes Mobley's response to defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion to amend her complaint, which the Court
Doing so imposes no prejudice on defendants. They replied to Mobley's response and have had multiple other opportunities to address her after-the-fact amendments. What's more, considering Mobley's response as an amendment demonstrates fidelity to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8's demand that facts trump legal conclusions when considering whether a plaintiff states a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'") (emphasis added); id. ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.") (emphasis added). Mobley pled ample facts in her original complaint and, when read in conjunction with her response, adequately ties those facts to theories of recovery. That's not to say she states a claim, but she does enough such that refusal to consider her response would advance no goal mandated by the Federal Rules or the rules of this Court.
Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotes omitted). For the same reasons that her misappropriation claim fails, then, Mobley's right of publicity in her name (none) remains intact. Her motion to amend her complaint to specifically add that claim (doc. 27), then, is
Mobley also states that "defendants took away the Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Rights." Doc. 18 at 24 (emphasis omitted). That too fails since only state action can violate the Constitution and defendants unquestionably were not state actors. See Gibson v. New York, 569 F. App'x 810, 814 (11th Cir. 2014) ("As a matter of substantive constitutional law . . . rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.").