ORDER
JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.
BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiffs' Notice of Filing Proposed Final Judgment (Dkt. 161) and Defendant's Objection, which proposes two alternative final judgments (Dkt. 162). Upon consideration, Defendant's objection to Plaintiffs' proposed final judgment is sustained. Final judgment will be entered consistent with this Order.
The City contends that the jury's award of property related damages on Count I for loss of use and enjoyment of the property and the difference in value of the property before and after the City's interference are duplicative of the taking award on Count II. I agree. Plaintiffs' contention that the property related damages are not duplicative is inconsistent with their prior position, as well as their final argument to the jury.
On Plaintiffs' 4th Amendment claim (Count I), the verdict form includes three elements of damages: (1) mental and emotional distress and personal humiliation (questions 2 and 3); (2) the loss of use and enjoyment of the property1 (question 4(a)); and (3) the difference in value of the property before and after the City's interference (question 4(b)). On Katherine Chmielewski's inverse condemnation claim (Count II), the jury was asked to determine the amount of just compensation for the property taken (Dkt. 118).2 On Count I, the jury awarded $200,000 for loss of use and enjoyment of the property and $400,000 for the difference in value before and after the City's interference. On Count II, the jury awarded $1,489,700 as just compensation for the property taken (Dkt. 118).
Plaintiffs have consistently taken the position that any damages awarded on Count I for loss of use and enjoyment and the difference in value of their property before and after the City's interference would essentially be duplicative of any damages awarded on Count II for the taking of the beach parcel.
During the charge conference, for example, Plaintiffs' counsel explained his theory of damages for loss of use of the "pathway" to the beach, relying on the appraiser's testimony of value (Dkt. 129 at 107-108).3 The City expressed concern that those damages would overlap with the damages sought in the inverse condemnation claim (Id. at 110). In response to the Court's inquiry, Plaintiffs' counsel implicitly acknowledged that the property related damages on Count I would be duplicated if they were successful on their taking claim:
"I think that's the way I resolved it is similar to the way the Court came down, and trying to find a correlation to the loss of use of a specific area on the assumption that we don't have a taking of the property as a whole."
(Id. at 108) (emphasis added).4
During closing argument, Plaintiffs' counsel essentially took the same position, explaining to the jury that damages on the two claims overlapped "in some ways," and even suggesting that any duplication in damages awarded would be "straighten[ed]" out:
All right. So I think the taking claim is very straightforward. But let me talk about the Fourth Amendment claim because that's a particularly — while it has some overtones or overlays of the claim, it is a different claim. And I'd like to talk a minute about the damages there.
I want to talk for a moment about the damages under the Fourth Amendment claim because I think there is some elements of damages that are overlapping in some ways, but they are separate claims, and if there is any problems, we'll straighten that out in due course."
(Dkt. 129 at 168) (emphasis added).
And his argument to the jury on damages underscores the "problems" he predicted with respect to duplication of damages.5 As for damages for loss of use and enjoyment of the property in Count I, Plaintiffs' counsel relied on "a number that is akin to what the appraiser testified to was the diminished value of the house." (Dkt. 129 at 171-74). In quantifying damages for the difference in value of the property before and after the City's interference under Count I, he identified that property as the "pathway in front of the house" and "sand area" (Id. at 174-75). However, both of those areas are within the "beach parcel" claimed to have been taken in Count II. And he urged the jury to consider the difference in value of that property by using the square footage and value provided by the appraiser (Id. at 176-77).
Finally, and significantly, in their Motion for Entry of Judgment on the Jury's Verdict, Plaintiffs requested judgment in an amount reduced by either 4(b) or both 4(a) and 4(b), conceding that the $400,000 award for diminished value in Count I was "effectively . . . the severance damages, that was part of the jury's [just] compensation award" in Count II, and implicitly acknowledging that the $200,000 award for loss of use and enjoyment was likewise duplicative. (Dkt. 122 at 14-15).
Recently, however, and inexplicably, Plaintiffs have reversed their position and contend that there is no duplication, asserting that "[t]he diminished value award under Count I is not the equivalent of severance damages under Count II as may have been perceived without benefit of transcript" (Dkt. 161 at 2). Regardless, the City persuasively argues that the jury's finding of a complete taking under Count II renders the property related damages awarded in Count I duplicative (Dkt. 162 at 2).
The jury was instructed to determine just compensation on Count II by determining the value of the property taken (the beach parcel) and loss to the remainder property (diminished value of the home) (Jury Instructions, Dkt. 117 at 16). It therefore follows, as the City correctly contends, that the property related damages awarded in questions 4(a) and (b) of the Verdict form on Count I are necessarily duplicative of the jury's just compensation award in Count II. (Dkt. 162 at 2-3) ("Damages for the value of the taken beach parcel necessarily includes compensation for the loss of use and enjoyment of the beach parcel, and compensation for the severance damages to the home parcel is compensation for the difference in value of the home parcel before and after the City's actions").
Plaintiffs' Count I damages will therefore be reduced by $600,000 (questions 4a and 4b damages) as duplicative of the Count II damages.6 See St. Luke's Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1203 (11th Cir. 2009) ("`[t]he courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.'") (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); White v. United States, 507 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1975) ("It is clear that no duplicating recovery of damages for the same injury may be had."); Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Ground Improvement Techniques, Inc., 532 F.3d 1063, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Where, however, the jury verdict cannot be explained by evidence in the record and duplication is apparent, "the court, either sua sponte or on motion of a party, should reduce the judgment by the amount of the duplication," and thereby prevent double recovery.") (citation omitted); Garshman Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 176 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999) (where the verdict form is not precise enough to allow the jury to consider the possibility of duplicative damages, the trial court has the authority to determine whether the jury's damages findings were duplicative).7
Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT favor of Plaintiffs Paul Chmielewski, as personal representative of the Estate of Chester J. Chmielewski and Katherine A. Chmielewski and against Defendant City of St. Pete Beach. Damages shall be awarded as follows, for which let execution issue:
1. As to Count I:
a. To Chester J. Chmielewski, by and through Paul Chmielewski as Personal Representative of his estate, the amount of $50,000 plus post-judgment interest determined by the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961;
b. To Katherine A. Chmielewski, the amount of $75,000 plus post-judgment interest determined by the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
2. As to Count II:
a. To Katherine A. Chmielewski, the amount of $1,489,700 as just compensation, plus pre-judgment interest through August 24, 2016 of $638,530.87 for a total of $2,128,230.87, plus post-judgment interest determined by the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.8
The Court reserves jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE the file.
DONE AND ORDERED.
