EDMOND E. CHANG, District Judge.
Plaintiff Deandre Crawford is a prisoner at Stateville Correctional Center. Since 2013, Crawford has suffered from severe abdominal and testicular pain, and he alleges that he has not received adequate medical treatment for those conditions.
In deciding Crawford's motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Crawford, because he is the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Crawford is imprisoned in Stateville Correctional Center. DSOF ¶ 1.
In addition to regular MD sick call, Stateville physicians saw patients with certain chronic conditions—hypertension, diabetes, asthma, and seizures—at daily "chronic care clinics." DSOF Exh. C, Davis Dep. 21:8-11, 26:19-27:11. Inmates sometimes complained about other conditions at the chronic care clinics, but they were discouraged from doing so. Id. 28:21-29:12, 128:1-23. Inmates who raised non-emergency concerns during a chronic care clinic were told to use the ordinary sick-call procedure to seek treatment. Id. 29:2-12.
On March 30, 2013, a CMT received a note from Crawford stating that Crawford was experiencing testicular and abdominal pain and requesting to be placed on sick call for evaluation. DSOF ¶ 26. Crawford's medical records state that he was referred to MD sick call for evaluation and treatment. Id. But Crawford was not promptly seen at sick call; instead, it took about three months (until late June 2013) for Crawford to get treatment. See id. ¶ 37. The parties dispute the reasons for the delay. See Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 27-30. The Defendants point out that Crawford missed several other medical and mental health appointments during the time gap. R. 151, Def. Mem. at 1; DSOF ¶¶ 27-30. But Crawford responds that there is no evidence about why he missed these other appointments, and avers that he would not have refused to go to sick call. See Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶¶27-31.; see also PSOF Tab 1, Crawford Aff. ¶ 2.
After several missed appointments, Crawford presented to Dr. Davis at the chronic care clinics for hypertension and seizure on May 14, 2013. DSOF ¶ 31. Crawford says that he complained to Davis about his abdominal and testicular pain at this appointment. PSOF ¶ 65, Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 31. Davis, however, did not note any complaints about abdominal or testicular pain in Crawford's medical records, and did not provide any treatment for those conditions. DSOF ¶ 31, DSOF Exh. F at 24-28 (sealed).
Crawford finally got treatment for his abdominal and testicular pain in late June 2013, when he saw physician's assistant La Tanya Williams. DSOF ¶ 37. At this appointment, Williams diagnosed Crawford with an enlarged prostate, ordered various tests, and prescribed Hytrin, a drug often used to treat the symptoms of an enlarged prostate. Id; Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 37. Williams followed up with Crawford around six weeks later. DSOF ¶ 39, DSOF Exh. F at 34 (sealed). She noted that Crawford's symptoms were only slightly improved and increased his Hytrin dose. Id.
On August 17, 2013, Crawford saw Davis at the seizure chronic clinic. Once again, Crawford asserts that he complained of testicular and abdominal pain to Davis, but Davis did not record those complaints. DSOF ¶ 41; PSOF ¶ 65. There is no record of Davis providing treatment to Crawford for abdominal or testicular pain during this encounter. DSOF Exh. F at 37-38 (sealed).
From late August to sometime in September 2013, Stateville entered an extended lockdown. PSOF ¶ 66.
Even when Crawford did see a physician, he did not get treatment for the abdominal and testicular pain. On January 24, 2014, Crawford saw Davis at the seizure and hypertension clinics. DSOF ¶ 46. Crawford complained to Davis about the pain, but Davis did not record these complaints or provide any treatment. PSOF ¶ 65; DSOF ¶ 46; DSOF Exh. F at 46-49 (sealed); PSOF Tab 3, 1/26/14 Grievance. Two days later, Crawford filed a grievance complaining about the continuing lack of treatment for the abdominal and testicular pain and stating that Davis had refused to acknowledge the issue. PSOF Tab 3, 1/26/14 Grievance.
Despite his requests for help, Crawford still did not receive treatment for his pain. He continued to complain about the ongoing abdominal and scrotal pain at nurse sick call over the next five months, see DSOF ¶ 48, 51; PSOF ¶ 71, but apparently got no help for the conditions. At one of these appointments, Crawford reported "grabbing, squeezing pain [through] my whole body." DSOF Exh. F at 55 (sealed); PSOF ¶ 70. The nurse noted that Crawford should follow up at urgent care "as scheduled," but there is no evidence that he was seen at urgent care. PSOF ¶ 70. The Defendants point out that Crawford missed several medical appointments during this time period, but again, it is not clear why. See Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 50, 52, 55, 57.
At long last, on May 13, 2014, Crawford saw physician's assistant Williams for his scrotal pain. DSOF ¶ 58. Williams diagnosed Crawford with epididymitis, which is an inflammation of the coiled tube (epididymis) at the back of the testicle. PSOF ¶ 72. Williams prescribed Cipro, an antibiotic. Id. When Crawford followed up with Williams in June 2014, he reported that the pain had improved. Id. ¶ 73. Williams continued Cipro and prescribed Naproxen. DSOF ¶ 59. Williams ordered a follow-up in six weeks. Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 59.
In July 2014, Crawford saw a Wexford physician's assistant and reported abdominal pain that radiated to his rectum. PSOF ¶ 74. Noting Crawford's "longstanding abdominal pain," the physician's assistant referred Crawford to Stateville's medical director for evaluation. Id. The notation "8/19/14" was made in Crawford's medical records next to the referral plan. Id. Crawford saw Stateville's then-medical director, Dr. Obaisi, on August 19, 2014. Id. ¶ 75. There is no evidence that Obaisi treated Crawford for abdominal or testicular pain during this appointment, but also no evidence that Crawford complained to Obaisi of abdominal or testicular pain. Id.; see DSOF Exh. F at 84 (sealed).
It does not appear that Crawford complained of abdominal or testicular pain for the next several months (though he was seen by multiple providers, including physicians, for other issues during that time). See DSOF Exh. F at 85-95. Then, on January 10, 2015, Crawford presented at nurse sick call with abdominal pain that radiated to his testicles and rectum. PSOF ¶ 76. The nurse noted that an appointment with a physician was already scheduled for January 28, 2015. Id. Sure enough, on January 28, Crawford was seen by Obaisi for his abdominal pain. Id. ¶ 77. Obaisi diagnosed Crawford with prostatitis, and prescribed Bactrim, an antibiotic. Id., DSOF Exh. F at 97 (sealed). After that, Crawford did not complain of abdominal pain for about a year. See PSOF ¶ 78.
Summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating summary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011), and must consider only evidence that can "be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the adverse party must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
The Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide humane conditions of confinement, including adequate medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment (which is incorporated against state officials through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause). Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976). To determine whether the Eighth Amendment has been violated, the Court asks whether the plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and if so, whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2016).
As a threshold matter, there is ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Crawford had an objectively serious medical need at all times relevant to this case. A "serious" medical need is one that a physician has diagnosed as needing treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009).
Viewing the evidence in Crawford's favor, a reasonable factfinder could readily find that Crawford suffered from severe pain over a period of several years. In a grievance filed in 2014, Crawford stated that "[t]he pain was so great that I had to stay in the fetal position for two days. This has been an ongoing issue since '12." PSOF Tab 3, 4/11/14 Grievance. At one appointment, Crawford rated his pain as "10/10" on the pain scale and described the sensation as "like someone is squeezing it." DSOF Exh. F at 43 (sealed). At other times, he rated his pain as a 7 or 8 out of 10, and reported "grabbing, squeezing pain [through] my whole body." PSOF ¶ 70; DSOF Exh. F at 55, 59 (sealed). Even a layperson could conclude that this kind of severe pain, recurring over a period of several years, required treatment. See, e.g., Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371-73 (7th Cir. 1997).
What's more, even if Crawford's need for treatment was not self-evident, two different Stateville medical professionals diagnosed Crawford with three different medical conditions: benign prostatic hyperplasia (in layman's terms, an enlarged prostate), epididymitis, and prostatitis. See DSOF ¶ 37; PSOF ¶ 72, 77. After each diagnosis, these medical professionals provided treatment—which itself suggests that these were conditions that "a physician has diagnosed as needing treatment."
The next question is whether the two defendants—Dr. Davis and her then-employer, Wexford Health Sources—were deliberately indifferent to Crawford's serious medical need. A plaintiff need not prove that a defendant intended harm or believed that harm would occur to succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference. Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. But deliberate indifference is more than negligence or even the civil form of recklessness. Id. "[A] plaintiff must provide evidence that an official actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm." Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Crawford saw Davis three times during Davis's brief tenure at Stateville: once in May 2013, again in August 2013, and lastly in January 2014. DSOF ¶¶ 31, 41, 46. Each encounter took place at Stateville's chronic care clinics, which are designed to address specific chronic health conditions. Id. But inmates did sometimes complain of unrelated health problems at the chronic care clinics. DSOF Exh C, Davis Dep. 28:21-29:12. And even if Stateville's policy instructed prisoners not to raise unrelated medication conditions during clinic appointments, completely ignoring a serious medical need presented at the chronic clinic could still amount to deliberate indifference. The fact that Crawford voiced his complaints at the chronic clinics does not necessarily dispose of the deliberate indifference claim against Davis (although of course a jury could find otherwise).
The bigger stumbling block for Crawford (though it is still not fatal) is that there is some uncertainty about when exactly he told Davis about his testicular and abdominal pain. Crawford's testimony on the subject is ambiguous—he states that he complained of pain to Davis, but does not make clear whether he complained more than once, or at which appointment he complained. See DSOF Exh. B, Crawford Dep. 66:9-21, 106:12-15, 109:22-110:2, 157:7-23, 161:7-10. Despite the ambiguity, based on his deposition testimony, Crawford asserts in his Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts that he complained to Davis during each of his encounters with her. See PSOF ¶ 65.
Reading the record in the light most favorable to Crawford and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, a jury could find that Crawford complained to Davis during all three appointments. First, there is contemporaneous evidence that he complained of pain during the January 2014 appointment. Crawford filed a grievance dated two days after that appointment stating that he had told Davis about his pain and that she refused to treat him. PSOF Tab 3, 1/26/14 Grievance. This contemporaneous evidence supports Crawford's assertion that he reported pain to Davis in January 2014. Second, there is also a reasonable inference that Crawford mentioned his pain during the August 2013 appointment. Although Crawford did not explicitly testify as to the date in his deposition, he stated during a line of questioning about the August 2013 appointment that he told Davis he was having pain. See DSOF Exh. C, Davis Dep. 105:17-106:12, 109:22-110:2. In the context of the line of questioning, it is fair to infer that Crawford was testifying that he reported the pain to Davis during the August 2013 appointment.
The record evidence is shakiest on the May 2013 appointment, but a jury could conclude that Crawford complained to Davis at that appointment as well. Crawford's medical records show that Crawford had been experiencing testicular and abdominal pain since January 2013. See DSOF Exh. F at 30 (sealed). Crawford put in a sick-call request to be seen for that pain in late March 2013—around six weeks before his May 2013 encounter with Davis. See DSOF ¶¶ 26, 31. Given the longevity of the pain and Crawford's relatively recent sick-call request, it is likely that the testicular and abdominal pain would have been very much on Crawford's mind in May 2013. What's more, Crawford's appointment with Davis was his first opportunity to see a doctor since submitting the sick-call request in March.
It is also reasonable to infer that Davis was aware that Crawford had a serious medical need. True, Crawford's deposition testimony on this point is not detailed—he testified that he remembers telling her "about the pain I was having," DSOF Exh. B, Crawford Dep. 66:14-16—but the lines of questioning were all about the abdominal and testicular pain, so the lack of specificity is not fatal. It is fair to infer, in the context of all the other evidence, that Crawford conveyed the severity of his abdominal and testicular pain to Davis. Even at his first appointment with Davis, Crawford had been suffering untreated pain for around five months. See DSOF Exh. F at 30 (sealed); DSOF ¶ 31. There is simply no reason that Crawford would not have conveyed the duration and severity of his pain to Davis—or so a jury could find. So on these facts, a jury could conclude that Davis knew that Crawford had an objectively serious medical need.
A jury could also find that Davis was deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need. Davis did not record Crawford's complaints of pain during any of the three appointments (assuming, of course, that he actually did complain). See DSOF ¶¶ 31, 41, 46. There is no evidence that Davis provided any treatment for the pain or took any steps to ensure that Crawford would receive treatment (such as scheduling a follow-up visit). See DSOF Exh. F at 24-28, 37-38, 46-49 (sealed). Indeed, the Defendants do not even try to argue that Davis treated Crawford for the testicular and abdominal pain, choosing to hang their hat on the argument that Crawford did not tell Davis that he was in pain at all. See Def. Mem. at 6-7. Taking the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Crawford, Davis was informed about Crawford's severe pain on three separate occasions during a period of less than a year and did absolutely nothing to help him. A jury could conclude that Davis's inaction manifested deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2017) (jury could find deliberate indifference when inmate informed doctor about painful medical condition and doctor did not recommend any treatment).
Of course, this analysis takes all facts in Crawford's favor, as dictated by the summary judgment standard. The evidence takes on a different light at trial, where Crawford will have the burden of proof and the jury will be free to make credibility determinations. But for now, Crawford's claim against Davis passes muster.
Next up are Crawford's claims against Wexford. As an initial matter, Wexford argues that it cannot be liable because Crawford has not established a viable deliberate indifference claim against Davis. R. 177, Def. Reply at 5-6. That argument fails because Crawford does have a viable claim against Davis, as discussed above. But it is worth noting that even if Davis had prevailed on her motion for summary judgment, this is one of the rare cases where Wexford could still be liable even in the absence of individual liability. See Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 304 (7th Cir. 2010). In Thomas, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that a municipal entity can only be liable if its individual employees are liable: "a municipality can be held liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would create an inconsistent verdict." Id. at 306 (emphasis in original). This rule means that municipalities (and government contractors like Wexford) cannot dodge liability by obscuring which individual employees were responsible for a constitutional violation, or by diffusing responsibility so widely that no individual employee could ever be held responsible. In this case, there is no inconsistency problem with finding Wexford liable and Davis not liable, so Wexford could be liable even if Davis is not.
As a private corporation acting under color of law, Wexford can be held responsible for constitutional violations under the standard laid out in Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Shields v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 790 (7th Cir. 2014).
Crawford alleges that Wexford engaged in three practices that led to unconstitutional delays in his treatment. First, he asserts that Wexford allowed MD sick call backlogs to accumulate. R. 166, Pl. Resp. at 7. Second, he argues that Wexford failed to track and process inmate grievances. Id. Third, he argues that Wexford failed to administer sick call in accordance with Illinois Department of Corrections guidelines. Id. According to Crawford, these practices caused three periods of unjustifiable delay in his medical treatment. Id. The Court will discuss each period of delay in turn.
First, Crawford asserts that Wexford unconstitutionally delayed his medical care from March 30, 2013 (when he submitted a sick-call request on the testicular and abdominal pain) until late June 2013 (when he finally was treated by Williams). See Pl. Resp. at 15. When Crawford complained of pain in March 2013, his complaint was read and recorded by a Wexford CMT. DSOF ¶ 26; DSOF Exh. F at 21 (sealed). The CMT planned to refer Crawford to MD sick call for an evaluation, but, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Crawford, that did not happen. See DSOF ¶¶ 26-32; Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 26-32. Instead, it took almost three months and more complaints from Crawford to get treatment.
A reasonable jury could also find that Wexford's practices caused the delay. Crawford has collected evidence demonstrating a substantial backlog of inmates waiting for MD sick call during the time that he was waiting for medical attention. Stateville medical-service records show that in May and June 2013, over 200 inmates had to wait three or more days to be seen at MD sick call. R. 169, PSOF Tab 11 at 003118 (sealed). It is not surprising that MD call would be so backed up, because Stateville was operating at half the capacity allotted for physicians for almost a year before Dr. Davis's arrival in April 2013. Specifically, Stateville was supposed to have two full-time, on-site physicians: a medical director and a staff physician. But before April 2013, Wexford left the staff physician position unfilled for around one year. PSOF ¶ 101.
Other Wexford records confirm that Wexford was having systemic problems managing a timely sick call. In an internal audit for the first quarter of 2013, Wexford gave itself scores of "0" for the following metrics: "Sick call requests are picked up daily [or] another method present that allows inmates to request service daily"; "Complaint is triaged within 24 hours of receipt"; and "Is seen by a [qualified health practitioner] within 24 hours (72 on weekends) of triage." R. 169, PSOF ¶ 91 (sealed); PSOF Tab 14 at 3171 (sealed).
Of course, Wexford's failure to meet its own goals or to comply with IDOC regulations does not itself establish a constitutional violation. Wexford and IDOC guidelines are not necessarily congruent with the constitutional standard of care. See, e.g., Glisson v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2017). But the evidence does tend to show that Wexford regularly failed to conduct sick call in a timely manner, that inmates routinely experienced long wait times before receiving care, and that Wexford did not have an effective process for tracking sick call requests and ensuring follow-up. The danger posed by these practices is evident even to someone without medical training: long wait times between requests for medical attention and treatment create an obvious risk of prolonging painful medical conditions, allowing existing medical conditions to worsen, and failing to diagnose serious medical conditions. Indeed, the fact that Wexford and IDOC had goals for quick processing of sick call requests demonstrates that Wexford was aware of the importance of handling requests for treatment in a prompt and organized manner. And Wexford's own internal audits and evaluations are circumstantial evidence that Wexford policymakers were aware of the significant problems with sick call (and the accompanying risk of serious harm to sick inmates). In short, there is evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Wexford's sick-call practices posed a serious risk of harm to inmates, and that Wexford policymakers knew about this risk and failed to address it. A jury could reasonably infer that these systemic failures caused Crawford's problems with getting care during this first period of delay. So the claim against Wexford for the March 2013-June 2013 delay survives.
The next period of delay began in August 2013, when Crawford complained to Davis about his testicular and abdominal pain. See Pl. Resp. at 4. This delay was even more egregious (or so a reasonable jury could find) than the first: it took about nine months from Crawford's initial complaint for him to get treatment, despite at least 20 separate complaints by Crawford. See PSOF ¶¶ 68, 71; DSOF ¶¶ 43, 45, 46, 48, 51. This prolonged denial of treatment in the face of Crawford's repeated requests for assistance over the better part of a year could easily be found to exhibit deliberate indifference.
As with the first period of delay, there is ample evidence that Wexford's sick-call practices caused the delayed treatment. Wexford continued to have alarming backlogs for MD sick call from September 2013 through May 2014. See PSOF Tab 11 at 3118 (sealed). In September 2013, the backlog for MD sick call was an abundant (to say the least) 245 inmates. Id. For the rest of 2013 and the first two months of 2014, the backlog hovered at around a still-dismal 200 inmates. Id. Things improved slightly by March and April of 2014, but the backlog was still high: over 100 inmates waited more than three days for MD sick call in each of those months. Id. In May 2014—the month that Crawford finally received treatment—the backlog was better, but not by much: 84 inmates waited three days or more for MD sick call. Id at 3123.
What's more, Wexford's Corrective Action Plans tell a story of delay and dysfunction in sick-call processing during this time period. For example, the November 2013 Corrective Action Plan noted that "[sick-call requests] are not being filed in the chart," that the "[l]og is not being completed," and that "[w]ithout the slip and log there is no way to track timeliness." PSOF Tab 15 at 3161 (sealed). The same reports noted "CMT vacancies," which was a serious concern because CMTs were responsible for collecting, recording, and triaging inmate sick call requests. Id. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Wexford's practices of allowing lengthy sick-call backlogs and failing to process or track sick-call requests presented obvious risks that Wexford policymakers knew about and failed to address. A jury could also reasonably infer that these practices caused the nine-month delay between Crawford's initial request for help and his eventual treatment.
Last up is Crawford's claim that he was denied medical care for his abdominal and testicular pain between June 2014 and January 2015. Here again, Crawford argues that Wexford's practices of allowing MD sick call backlogs to accumulate and failing to properly administer MD sick call caused his treatment to be delayed. See Pl. Resp. at 16. Unlike the other two periods of delay, however, this claim fails. The record evidence shows that Crawford was not denied access to MD sick call during this time period; indeed, he saw an MD or a physician's assistant at least three times during the asserted delay period. On the evidence as presented, a factfinder could not reasonably conclude that Wexford practices harmed Crawford by denying him access to MD sick call.
As a starting point, it is not clear that the start of the third period of delay should be dated from June 2014. In June 2014, Crawford actually received treatment for his epididymitis: he was seen for a follow-up by PA Williams, who noted that his pain had improved and renewed his antibiotic prescription. DSOF ¶ 59. Crawford did not complain of pain again until mid-July, when he was seen by another Wexford PA. PSOF ¶ 74. The PA noted Crawford's long history of abdominal pain and referred Crawford to Stateville's medical director. Id. That appointment was planned for August 19, 2014, and it took place as scheduled. PSOF ¶ 75. Obaisi did not treat Crawford for abdominal or testicular pain at that appointment, but there is also no evidence (not even from Crawford himself) that Crawford told Obaisi that he was still suffering from those conditions. See PSOF ¶ 75; DSOF Exh. F at 84 (sealed); DSOF Exh. B, Crawford Dep. 159:2-11.
There is no record of Crawford complaining of abdominal or testicular pain for the next several months. See DSOF Exh. F at 85-94 (sealed). Crawford had another appointment with an MD in November 2014 for an unrelated health problem, and there is no evidence that he complained of abdominal or testicular pain at that appointment. Id. at 94 (sealed). In fact, the MD note for that date states that Crawford had "[no] testicular masses or tenderness." DSOF Exh F. at 94. After that, it appears that another couple of months passed before Crawford complained of testicular and abdominal pain again. See id. 94-96 (sealed). This time, his treatment was relatively prompt: Crawford voiced a complaint at nurse sick call on January 10, 2015, and the nurse noted that Crawford was already scheduled to see a physician on January 28, 2015. Id. at 96 (sealed). The appointment took place as scheduled, and Obaisi treated Crawford for his pain. Id. at 97 (sealed).
That sequence of events refutes Crawford's assertion that Wexford's practices surrounding MD sick call caused unreasonable delay in his care. For this final period, it appears that when Crawford asked to be seen by a doctor, and he was. Of course, Crawford might argue that Obaisi should have treated his testicular and abdominal pain at the August appointment, because that is the reason that Crawford was scheduled to see Obaisi in the first place (and the complaints of pain were noted in Crawford's medical records). But Crawford does not articulate a theory that would make Obaisi's alleged failure to read the medical records (if that is what happened) into a constitutional violation attributable to Wexford. This is not to say that there is no conceivable theory that would make Wexford responsible for repeated and widespread failures of its physicians to review medical records. But there is just no evidence in this case to tie that failure of care to a Wexford policy or practice. Crawford's only theory is that Wexford backlogs and sick-call practices prevented him from accessing MD sick call from June 2014 to January 2015. But for this last delay period, the evidence shows that that is not the case.
Punitive damages are available under Section 1983 when a defendant was "motivated by evil motive or intent" or manifested "reckless or callous indifference" to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Although it is possible to conceive of a difference, the Seventh Circuit has held that the reckless-indifference standard for punitive damages is the same as the deliberate-indifference standard on liability. See Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 930 (7th Cir. 2004), Wright v. Miller, 561 F. App'x 551, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2014); Turner v. Pollard, 564 F. App'x 234, 239 (7th Cir. 2014). So, on this record, a jury could reasonably award punitive damages against Davis and Wexford.
For the reasons discussed, summary judgment is denied as to Crawford's claims against Davis. Also, the claims against Wexford survive, but in a narrower version: Crawford can only pursue claims against Wexford arising out of his delayed treatment between March 2013 to June 2013, and then again from August 2013 to May 2014. Now that the summary judgment motion has been decided, the parties shall resume settlement negotiations. If the parties want a settlement referral to the magistrate judge, then they may contact the courtroom deputy at any time. Otherwise, the case will set for trial at the next status hearing. The status hearing of August 20 is reset to August 22, 2018, at 8:45 a.m.
