Filed: Oct. 04, 2010
Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2010
Summary: HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice. Appellant Daryl Kitchen 1 was convicted of malice murder, attempted armed robbery, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Robert Earl Stevens. Finding no error in the denial of Kitchen's motion for new trial, 2 we affirm. Kitchen contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the malice murder charge because the State failed to prove ma
Summary: HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice. Appellant Daryl Kitchen 1 was convicted of malice murder, attempted armed robbery, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Robert Earl Stevens. Finding no error in the denial of Kitchen's motion for new trial, 2 we affirm. Kitchen contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the malice murder charge because the State failed to prove mal..
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HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.
Appellant Daryl Kitchen1 was convicted of malice murder, attempted armed robbery, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Robert Earl Stevens. Finding no error in the denial of Kitchen's motion for new trial,2 we affirm.
Kitchen contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the malice murder charge because the State failed to prove malice aforethought.3 In the same vein, Kitchen challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the malice murder conviction, specifically the element of intent. Construed most strongly in support of the verdict, the evidence shows that Kitchen and two male accomplices planned to rob the victim. Kitchen obtained a gun and the three men entered the victim's home. While the accomplices were searching the back part of the house, Kitchen pointed the loaded gun at the victim and cocked it. The victim came toward Kitchen, and the two moved out of the house onto its screened porch, where the gun discharged. The victim was struck in the face from a distance of approximately one foot and died at the scene.
"[I]n Georgia, the crime of malice murder is committed when the evidence shows either an express or, in the alternative, an implied intent to commit an unlawful homicide. This meaning of malice murder is consistent with the general rule that crimes which are defined so as to require that the defendant intentionally cause a forbidden bad result are usually interpreted to cover one who knows that his conduct is substantially certain to cause the result, whether or not he desires the result to occur...." [Cit.]
Stahl v. State, 284 Ga. 316, 319, 669 S.E.2d 655 (2008). Here, Kitchen testified that he had a loaded, cocked gun pointed at the victim while within close range of him. The jury was not required to accept Kitchen's claim that the gun discharged accidentally when the victim hit it with his arm, or to credit Kitchen's denial of intent. See id. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Kitchen was guilty of malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Kitchen's motion for a directed verdict. Yat v. State, 279 Ga. 611(1), 619 S.E.2d 637 (2005) (standard of review for denial of motion for directed verdict is same as that used for sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., Jackson v. Virginia, supra).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
