W. Homer Drake, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge.
The above-styled adversary case comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter the "Motion"), filed by Deborah Delanie Robinson (hereinafter the "Debtor"). This motion arises with respect to a complaint, filed by Marrian Stinson (hereinafter "Stinson"), seeking nondischargeability as to a particular debt under Section 523 and seeking a denial of a general discharge pursuant to Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (applicable to bankruptcy under FED. R. BANKR. P. 7056), this Court will grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank, N.A., 701 F.3d 896, 899 (11th Cir.2012). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a proceeding under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute of fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The moving party has the burden of establishing the right of summary judgment, Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); Clark v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 1370, 1372 (11th Cir.1982), and the Court will read the opposing party's pleadings liberally. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v.
On October 9, 2007, the Debtor's spouse executed a written loan agreement with Stinson for past monies owed in the amount of $3,700, plus interest at a rate of 21%, payable at $250 per month, beginning on the date the agreement was signed. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. A. On November 18, 2007, the Debtor sought a loan of $300 from Stinson, which Stinson authorized only after the parties reached an understanding that the Debtor would agree to repay the debt owed by her spouse, as well as the $300, with proceeds from an IRA account the Debtor expected to cash out in January of the following year. See Pl.'s Resp. 1-2.; see also Pl.'s Compl. 2 ("[The Debtor] verbally stated over the phone that she will pay off the balance of the loan with her IRA account that she was to draw by January 10, 2008.").
On November 27, 2007, the Debtor met with Stinson. Id. At the meeting, the Debtor paid $1,000 to Stinson, satisfying the new debt of $300 and reducing the old debt to the amount of $3,415.
On October 3, 2012, the Debtor sought relief in bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Code. A Plan was confirmed on January 10, 2013. On June 17, 2013, the Debtor amended her schedules to include a potential debt owed to Stinson, but characterized the debt as disputed. Stinson filed a proof of claim ten days later. The Chapter 13 Trustee initially objected to Stinson's claim on August 14, 2014, subsequently amended his objection on November 27, 2013, but ultimately withdrew his objection on January 31, 2014, permitting Stinson to participate in any pro rata distribution to creditors. However, the case was converted to Chapter 7 on May 6, 2014.
On May 6, 2014, coinciding with the conversion to Chapter 7, a notice was sent to all creditors setting June 12, 2014, as the date for the meeting of creditors and informing creditors that the deadline for objecting to the Debtor's discharge or the discharge of a particular debt was August 11, 2014. On July 17, Stinson moved for an extension of that deadline. The Court held a hearing on August 22, 2014, and, on August 25, 2014, issued an Order granting
On October 21, 2014, Stinson commenced her adversary proceeding. Her complaint objects to the dischargeability of the assumed debt under Section 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) and to the Debtor's discharge under Section 727 of the Code.
In order to establish a prima facie case under 523(a) of the Code, a creditor must first demonstrate an enforceable debt under applicable state law. See In re Miller, 292 B.R. 409, 412 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) ("Absent an enforceable prepetition debt, there is no debt to except from discharge."); see also id. ("Generally, the existence and validity of a debt is determined by reference to nonbankruptcy law."). As a matter of law, the timeliness of a claim is fundamentally vital to Stinson's establishing an enforceable debt. See Hot Shot Kids Inc. v. Pervis (In re Pervis), 497 B.R. 612, 625 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2013) (Hagenau, B.J.).
Georgia's statute of limitations for breach of a simple contract in writing is six years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. However, where a simple contract has not been reduced wholly to writing and is instead based on the breach of an expressed oral contract, the limitations period is only four years.
For calculating applicability, the limitations period begins to run when "the plaintiff could first have maintained her action to a successful result." Walker v. Gwinnet Hosp. Sys., Inc., 263 Ga.App. 554, 556, 588 S.E.2d 441 (Ga.Ct.App.2003). In other words, the limitations period began to run when the Debtor breached the contract by missing her first (and only) payment. Id. By Stinson's own admission, the date agreed upon for repayment under the oral contract was January 14, 2008.
Rule 4004(a) requires that in a Chapter 7 case, a complaint objecting to a debtor's discharge under Section 727(a) must be filed no later than sixty days after the first date set for the Section 341 meeting of creditors. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). "The deadlines provided for in the Rules `are to be interpreted strictly....'" In re Convington, 2013 WL 3778844, at *2 (Bankr.N.D.Ga. May 15, 2013) (Diehl, B.J.).
By the express terms of the Court's August 25, 2014 Order, the deadline for filing a complaint objecting to discharge was extended only as to counts brought under Section 523 of the Code. See Ct.'s Order, Dkt. No. 63 (Aug. 25, 2014). Accordingly, the deadline for bringing an objection to discharge under Section 727 was August 11, 2014. Under the circumstances in this case, therefore, Stinson's Section 727 counts are barred as late, entitling the Debtor to judgment as a matter of law.
After reviewing the pleadings in this matter, and considering all allegations of fact in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court concludes that the Debtor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all counts advanced in Stinson's complaint. Accordingly, it is hereby
The Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Order on the Debtor, the Debtor's counsel, Stinson, and the Chapter 7 Trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 523(d). Given the nature of Stinson's pro se status, the Court finds that Stinson's complaint was substantially justified in that it had a "reasonable basis both in law and in fact" and that it would be unjust to penalize her for having only a lay person's knowledge of the law. See In re King, 258 B.R. 786, 798 (Bankr.D.Mont.2001) (following similar rationale).