GILBERT C. SISON, Magistrate Judge.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Steven Murphy ("Murphy"), an inmate incarnated at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), filed this complaint against Travis Allen, James Mount, Bonnie May and Cheryl Brown for deprivations of his constitutional rights that occurred while he was a detainee at the Jefferson County Justice Center ("Jefferson County"). Murphy alleges that he was denied medical treatment for his fractured foot and ankle while he was a pretrial detainee at Jefferson County. Pending before the Court is Defendants Allen, Mount and May's motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administration remedies (Docs. 44, 45 & 57). Plaintiff, by and through court appointed counsel, opposes the motion (Doc. 54).
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison by United States Senior District Judge J. Phil Gilbert pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and Local Rule 72.1(a).
Jefferson County has a Detainee Handbook. Upon entering the jail, each detainee is provided a copy of the Detainee Handbook. Each detainee is required to sign a "Receipt of Property and Personal Use Items" indicating that he/she received the handbook. Murphy signed the receipt on July 1, 2015.
On April 16, 2018, Murphy filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that on May 22, 2016, while confined at Jefferson County, he was involved in a physical altercation with another detainee in which he suffered a fractured foot and ankle and the other detainee sustained an injury to his eye and face (Doc. 1). The complaint further alleges that on May 24, 2016, Murphy met with Nurse Cheryl Brown. Nurse Brown scheduled an x-ray, which showed that Murphy had "several fracture[d] bones in his foot and ankle." Nurse Brown gave Murphy an ace bandage, pain medication and ice. Murphy was also scheduled for an appointment with an orthopedic specialist. It was unclear whether surgery would be necessary to repair Murphy's foot and ankle injuries as Murphy never found out.
On June 2, 2016, Mount and May canceled the appointment. Murphy contends that he "wrote Captain Mount through several grievances in regards with [his] appointment being cancelled." Murphy further contends that his attorney "wrote Captain Mount and Travis Allen about [his] appointment being cancelled and in doing so Captain Mount wrote [his] Attorney back telling him [Murphy] would be rescheduled another appointment which [Murphy] never got." Because Murphy was denied timely and adequate medical treatment for his fractured foot and ankle, the injuries healed improperly.
The record reflects that Murphy was detained at Jefferson County from July 1, 2015 to December 8, 2016. Murphy's Residential Request Report shows that Murphy used the kiosk system from July 8, 2015 to December 7, 2016. Inmates used the kiosk system to order items from the commissary and to file requests and grievances. During this time frame, Murphy submitted 36 commissary pack requests, 110 emergency grievances, 8 jail grievances, 38 jail requests, 20 medical grievances and 88 medical requests.
On June 1, 2016, Murphy sent a medical grievance stating: "I want to bring to your attention that my ankle got broke on May 22 and its been to [sic] weeks and I have not seen a fot [sic] doctor yet and now my ankle is healing wrong and am having sharp pain in my bone going up to my knee and since then I have been in seg having to walk up and down the stairs." On June 2, 2016, Captain Mount and May cancelled the appointment to see an outside doctor. That same date, Murphy submitted a medical grievance stating: "I want it on file that I have been denied my appointment because I told them not to shackle my ankles and they took me right back to my cell in seg may 3, 2016." This medical grievance was sent directly to health care. Nurse Brown received the medical grievance and told Murphy that he should "talk to Captain Mount."
On May 23, 2018, Judge Gilbert found that Murphy's claim for denial of adequate medical care against Allen, Mount, May and Brown survived 28 U.S.C. § 1915A review (Doc. 6). In response to the complaint, Defendants Allen, Mount and May filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Murphy failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. As the motion for summary judgment is ripe, the Court addresses the merits of the motion.
Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part, that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006)(noting that `[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion"). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id.
Moreover, "[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require." Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to utilize a prison's grievance process, "the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner's claim can be indefinitely unexhausted." Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. The purpose of exhaustion is to give prison officials an opportunity to address the inmate's claims internally, prior to federal litigation. See Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006)
Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that "debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies" are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense, the Court established the following procedure:
Id. at 742.
As to the grievance procedure, the Jefferson County the Detainee Handbook provides as follows:
Defendants maintain that Murphy did not exhaust his administrative remedies as he did not submit an emergency grievance or a jail grievance regarding the allegations against them in his complaint. Defendants argue that Murphy knew how to grieve and knew how to use the system implemented by Jefferson County as evidenced by the 110 emergency grievances, 8 jail grievances, 38 jail requests, 20 medical grievances and 88 medical requests he electronically submitted by kiosk. As such, Defendants claim that he should have grieved about his foot and ankle injuries either by emergency grievances or by jail grievances rather than by medical grievances. Murphy counters, among other things, that he alerted Jefferson County of his complaints and that he followed the instructions in the Detainee Handbook by filing grievances through the kiosk complaining that his medical appointment was canceled due to his refusal to be shackled.
The record reflects that on June 1, 2016, Murphy filed a medical grievance stating that his foot was broken and that he had not been permitted to see a foot doctor.
The Defendants argue that Murphy failed to exhaust his remedies properly because he filed medical grievances, as opposed to emergency or jail grievances. According to the Defendants, medical grievances only went to medical personnel. Because Allen, Mount and May are not mentioned in the June 1
Even though the June 1
5). Mount and May also made the decision to cancel Murphy's medical appointment with a specialist on June 2, 2016, because he refused to be shackled. Thus, both Mount and May knew of Murphy's need for a specialist because an appointment had been scheduled. The evidence adduced at the hearing also indicated that Murphy's feet were swollen at the time, which is the reason why Murphy refused to be shackled. As such, Mount and May clearly knew that Murphy was still having problems with his feet almost two weeks after the May 22
While the Defendants may have had a good reason for cancelling Murphy's appointment, the immediate question before the Court is whether the jail was on notice of Murphy's problems. Murphy filed a grievance on June 1
For the foregoing reasons, it is
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objection thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004). Any objections to the Report shall be filed on or before JJuly 8, 2019.