THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

MELANSON, Judge.

Jonathan T. Franks appeals from the district court's dismissal of his application for postconviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Franks was arrested and charged with numerous felonies for multiple incidents involving his girlfriend. The first incident occurred in July 2005 when Franks was charged with aggravated assault, second degree kidnapping, being a persistent violator, and using a deadly weapon. The second incident occurred in November 2005 when Franks was charged with second degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, domestic battery, first degree kidnapping, attempted strangulation, trafficking in methamphetamine, being a persistent violator, and a felony domestic battery enhancement. While Franks was in jail on the November charges, he called the victim numerous times, asking that she change her story and tell the police and prosecutor that he did not commit the crimes. These calls were recorded and, as a result, Franks was charged with an additional twenty-nine counts of felony intimidation of a witness.

At the preliminary hearing on the November charges, the victim testified that Franks had beaten her with a telephone, a belt, and his fists; bound her with duct tape; and held her against her will in their home while he cooked methamphetamine. She also testified that, when she thought Franks was in the shower, she fled from the home. She stated that Franks chased her in his vehicle; pulled her by her hair into his truck; and drove her to a grocery store, where he planned to purchase chewing tobacco. In the grocery store parking lot, the victim testified that, when she tried to escape, Franks strangled her with his hands until she lost consciousness. When the victim regained consciousness, she kicked out the passenger-side window, grabbed a bag of methamphetamine from the truck's door on her way out, and ran inside the grocery store. The victim testified that she approached a store employee for help. Franks entered the store and shouted at the victim to tell the employee that he was not the person who caused her injuries.

On the day of the pretrial hearing, just days prior to trial on the November charges, Franks' trial counsel approached him with a plea offer from the state and strongly encouraged Franks to take the deal. The offer required that Franks plead guilty to second degree kidnapping, attempted trafficking in methamphetamine, and aggravated battery for the November incident, and two counts of intimidating a witness for the phone calls made to the victim from the jail. In exchange, the state offered to dismiss all of the July charges, the remaining November charges, and the remaining twenty-seven intimidation charges. The state also offered to recommend that the sentences run concurrently.

Franks accepted the deal after discussing it with his trial counsel. Prior to entering his pleas, Franks informed the district court that he needed a few hours to pray and think about the consequences of his pleas. After a recess, court reconvened and Franks pled guilty to all five felony charges at the pretrial hearing.1 The district court sentenced Franks to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of confinement of twelve years, for second degree kidnapping; a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of twelve years, for attempted trafficking in methamphetamine; a unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of twelve years, for aggravated battery; and five years fixed for each count of intimidating a witness. The district court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. Franks filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied. Franks filed a direct appeal, asserting that his sentences were excessive, which this Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v. Franks, Docket Nos. 33802 and 33803 (Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2007).

Franks filed an application for post-conviction relief, asserting that his guilty pleas were coerced, that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct, and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court summarily dismissed Franks' claims involving the involuntary guilty pleas and the prosecutorial misconduct. However, the district court granted an evidentiary hearing on Franks' claim that trial counsel provided ineffective advice and preparation regarding Franks' decision to plead guilty.

After the hearing, the district court dismissed Franks' application, concluding, among other things, that Franks' testimony at the hearing was not credible and trial counsel's performance was objectively reasonable. Franks appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). We exercise free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). On appeal, when faced with mixed questions of law and fact, this Court defers to facts found upon substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of law to those facts. Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54, 764 P.2d 129, 131 (Ct. App. 1988).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the postconviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Where, as here, the defendant was convicted upon a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the claimant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006). Both the deficiency and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness standard are mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).

III.

ANALYSIS

Franks asserts that his plea agreement was not truly beneficial because the charges against him were very weak and he would have been acquitted. Specifically, Franks argues that, because the victim's version of events could have been impeached, it was not objectively reasonable for his counsel to advise him to plead guilty. We interpret this argument to mean that Franks' counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty when there was a possibility that he would have been acquitted based on the available impeachment evidence and witness testimony supporting Franks' version of events. Finally, Franks contends that, although some of the charges which were dismissed were subject to a life sentence, the sentences he received were the functional equivalent of a life sentence.

At the evidentiary hearing on Franks' post-conviction claim, Franks presented evidence that the victim had admitted to lying to police in a previous domestic violence case against Franks in 2002. In that case, the victim recanted her statements to police that Franks abused her and testified that she had injured herself. Also at the evidentiary hearing, Franks presented the testimony of two witnesses. One witness testified that he saw Franks and the victim in Franks' truck near the grocery store and that the victim was hitting her head on the dashboard herself and was not being struck or restrained by Franks. The second witness testified that he was at Franks' home on the day that the victim alleged that Franks bound her with duct tape while Franks cooked methamphetamine. This witness testified that the victim was at the home that day, that she was not injured or tied up, and that Franks was not cooking methamphetamine. Franks argues that, had he gone to trial, this evidence would have been used to impeach the victim and would have resulted in an acquittal on all charges in the November case. Further, Franks contends that the testimony of the grocery store employee and the photographs of the victim's injuries would only demonstrate that the victim was injured, not that Franks was the cause of those injuries.

The state presented numerous exhibits at the evidentiary hearing depicting the recorded phone calls between Franks and the victim, photographs of the victim's extensive injuries, police reports, and a transcript of the victim's preliminary hearing testimony regarding the November incident. Trial counsel testified that he was familiar with the victim's 2002 testimony and would have used it at trial to impeach the victim's credibility. However, trial counsel also testified that, based on his experience and the significant evidence against Franks, including his repeated phone calls to the victim, he felt it was in Franks' best interest to plead guilty. An investigator for Franks' trial counsel testified that she tried to locate the witness who saw Franks and the victim in Franks' truck near the grocery store, but was unable to do so prior to trial. The investigator also testified that she interviewed the witness who stated that he saw the victim at Franks' home without injuries. The investigator determined, after a discussion with trial counsel, that the witness's testimony would be unhelpful to the defense.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found that the outcome of Franks' trial on the November charges would have most likely turned on the victim's credibility. However, the district court also found that the evidence to be presented at trial would have likely corroborated the victim's story. For instance, a police report indicated that broken glass was found on the ground in the grocery store parking lot where the victim indicated she kicked out Franks' passenger-side window to escape. In addition, the police recovered evidence from Franks' home indicating that he had been cooking methamphetamine. The district court also found that Franks' testimony at the hearing was not credible and that the photographs of the victim's injuries and testimony by the grocery store employee were consistent with the victim's version of events. The district court determined that Franks received a significant benefit in exchange for his guilty pleas when numerous felony charges were reduced or dismissed, including the possibility for life sentences for first degree kidnapping and trafficking in methamphetamine. Based on the above conclusions, the district court determined that trial counsel's advice for Franks to plead guilty was objectively reasonable and dismissed Franks' application.

The United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of counsel's advice prior to a defendant's decision to plead guilty, has stated:

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970).

The evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing supported the district court's conclusion that trial counsel's performance in this case was not deficient. Contrary to Franks' assertion, the district court considered the impeachment evidence available to trial counsel, reasonably concluded that the state's evidence corroborated the victim's version of events, and found that Franks' testimony was not credible.

Franks also asserts on appeal that his age rendered his sentences to be the functional equivalent of a life sentence, thereby removing any benefit for dismissing the first degree kidnapping and trafficking charges. The sentences imposed provide Franks the possibility of parole at the age of fifty-two, and a sentence satisfaction date at the age of sixty-five. This is a benefit to Franks considering the possible life sentences he was facing for first degree kidnapping and trafficking in methamphetamine and is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence. In addition, over thirty felony counts were dismissed in three different cases as a result of Franks' guilty pleas. Franks' argument that he received no benefit from his guilty pleas is without merit.

Based on the evidence the state planned to present at trial and the significant benefit to Franks for pleading guilty, the district court properly determined that trial counsel's advice for Franks to plead guilty was objectively reasonable and therefore not deficient. While Franks disagrees with the district court's objective evaluation of trial counsel's performance in this case, Franks has failed to demonstrate error. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that trial counsel's performance was not deficient, we need not address whether trial counsel's performance was prejudicial to Franks under the second prong of Strickland.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Franks has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by determining that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel for advising Franks to plead guilty. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of Franks' application for post-conviction relief is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.

Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.