JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, Chief District Judge.
On September 29, 2012, Plaintiff Marsha R. Brown was driving her 2007 Mini Cooper on a highway when her vehicle went off the road, rolled into a ditch, and landed on its roof. As a result, Ms. Brown sustained a cervical fracture, which left her partially quadriplegic. Ms. Brown filed the underlying cause of action for negligence against Defendant BMW NA of North America ("
In 2008, Mr. Scott was the plaintiff's counsel for Green v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:08-CV-0163-LJM-TAB, 2010 WL 1726620, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 2010), an automotive products liability case. The plaintiff in Green was rendered quadriplegic after he struck the end of a guardrail and rolled down an embankment while driving his 1999 Ford Explorer Sport on the highway. Id. The issue in that case was "the extent to which the seat belt system . . . could reasonably be expected to protect the occupants in a rollover." Id. Mr. Scott wanted to introduce evidence of the demonstrations that he performed on Ford Explorers that he claimed demonstrated that an alternative design to the restraint system could have avoided the plaintiff's injuries. Id. The district court described Mr. Scott's demonstrations as follows:
Id. The defendant moved to either disqualify Ms. Scott or exclude the demonstrations. Id. at *6. The district court ultimately found the evidence was inadmissible to demonstrate replications of the accident because they were not sufficiently similar to the accident. Id. at *2.
Thereafter, Mr. Scott and several others, including Gary Whitman, co-authored a paper entitled "Rollover testing with volunteer live human subject" (the "
Ms. Brown filed this cause of action alleging that on September 29, 2012, she was driving her 2007 Mini Cooper in Martin County, Indiana, when it went off the road, rolled into a ditch, and landed on its roof. [
BMW NA has now filed a motion asking the Court to exclude evidence that relates to the demonstrations that Mr. Scott conducted in preparation for Green and the subsequent Paper detailing those demonstrations. [
BMW NA argues that Mr. Scott's Paper and any other evidence related to the rollover demonstrations should be excluded because 1) they are unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 since Mr. Scott, who is not an engineer, designed and carried out the demonstrations, and 2) they are irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
BMV NA argues that the demonstrations and the Paper are not reliable because they are based on "methodologies, data, and design decisions made by [Mr. Scott, who] is not an engineer and is not an expert in the field of automotive safety, and conducted by him for the specific purpose of litigation." [
In response, Ms. Brown does not respond to BMW NA's position. Rather, she argues that the Paper is a learned treatise that has been relied upon by experts, and that BMW NA moved to exclude the demonstrations and Paper because Dr. Robert Banks, a biomechanical expert, testified that the Paper was "unethical and immoral." [
In reply, BMW NA points out that Ms. Brown fails to respond to its arguments, and reiterates that the demonstrations and the Paper are not reliable because Ms. Brown's accident is completely different from the accident that Mr. Scott attempted to recreate in Green. [
The factors the Court must consider in determining the admissibility of expert testimony are governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993). "Expert testimony is admissible when the testimony is reliable and would assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue in a case." Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-91). The proponent of the expert bears the burden of demonstrating that the expert's testimony is admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. Lewis, 561 F.3d at 705; Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee's note (2000 Amendments) ("[T]he admissibility of all expert testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a). Under that Rule, the proponent has the burden of establishing that the pertinent admissibility requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence."). The Court has "great discretion" regarding the manner in which it evaluates the applicable factors. Lewis, 561 F.3d at 704.
Under Daubert and Rule 702, courts use "a three-step analysis: the witness must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; the expert's reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony must be scientifically reliable; and the testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Ervin v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 492 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Daubert and Rule 702). In determining reliability, Daubert "sets forth the following non-exhaustive list of guideposts: (1) whether the scientific theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; or (3) whether the theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community." Ervin, 492 F.3d at 904 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
Before addressing whether the evidence is reliable, the Court will first discuss Ms. Brown's argument that the Paper qualifies as a learned treatise. A learned treatise is an exception to the hearsay rule and may be read into evidence at trial if it "is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination" and "the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission or testimony, by another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice." Fed. R. Evid. 803(18). Ms. Brown concedes that Mr. Scott will not be called to testify, [see
Following the standard set forth above, the Court will address whether Mr. Scott, who led the rollover demonstrations, is a qualified expert. Ms. Brown explains that "Mr. Scott put in so much work leading up to the testing that he could qualify to testify as an expert . . . under FRE 702," [
In any event, the rollover demonstrations are also not scientifically reliable. Ms. Brown does not explain whether the methodologies and principles from the demonstrations have been tested, subjected to peer review and publication, or generally accepted in the scientific community. Ms. Brown explains that three separate publications
BMW NA claims that the demonstrations and the Paper are irrelevant because Mr. Scott attempted to recreate certain conditions of the accident in Green, which are wholly dissimilar to the conditions of Ms. Brown's accident. [
In response, Ms. Brown again does not respond to BMW NA's position and does not raise any other arguments than what has already been stated above.
In reply, BMW NA reiterates that the demonstrations and the Paper are unreliable because Ms. Brown's accident is completely different from the accident that Mr. Scott attempted to recreate in Green. [
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, all relevant evidence is admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it is without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401. "Evidence of other accidents in products liability cases is relevant to show notice to the defendant of the danger, to show existence of the danger, and to show the cause of the accident." Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). "However, . . . the proponent must show that the other accidents occurred under substantially similar circumstances." Id. (original emphasis) (citations omitted).
Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence is not reliable, Ms. Brown has also failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that the rollover demonstrations and the Paper are relevant. The rollover demonstrations were done by Mr. Scott for the purpose of supporting the facts and issues in Green, not Ms. Brown's case. Notably, the district court in Green excluded the rollover demonstrations. It found that the demonstrations were not sufficiently similar and explained that Mr. Scott "sought to some degree of exactitude to replicate [the] accident," but that he was unable to in part because he was could not "get the exemplar Explorers to roll over from a running start," but instead "commenced the rollover stationary position using a forklift," and that the demonstrations "do not account for the sheer velocity at which [the plaintiff's] 1999 Explorer was traveling . . . ." Green, 2010 WL 1726620, at *2.
The Court likewise finds the demonstrations and the Paper not relevant to the facts and issues of this case. Aside from the modifications that were made to the Ford Explorer, Ms. Brown's Mini Cooper differs greatly from the modified Ford Explorers used in the demonstrations. As pointed out by BMW NA, these differences include the size, mass, occupant lay out and dimension, seat belt components and geometry, and seating positions of each vehicle. Moreover, Ms. Brown's Mini Cooper veered off the highway to the right, rolled over, and landed on its roof, whereas the modified Ford Explorers were placed at the top of embankments, and rolled down with the help of a forklift. Because significant differences exist between the rollover demonstrations and Ms. Brown's accident, introducing this evidence to a jury would only cause confusion and delay. See Natchtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1269 (noting that "`when a claim is made for the showing of [similar] accidents, an element of a trial on collateral issues, sometimes termed a trial within a trial, is introduced with the real possibility of undue delay.'"). For the reasons stated above, the Court
For the reasons detailed above, the Court