Filed: Oct. 06, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 13-3275-cr United States v. Levine et al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUM
Summary: 13-3275-cr United States v. Levine et al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMM..
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13-3275-cr
United States v. Levine et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 6th day of October, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD,*
10 District Judge.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14 Appellee
15
16 -v.- 13-3275
17
18 LULZIM KUPA,
19 Defendant-Appellant.
20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
21
*
The Honorable Geoffrey W. Crawford, United States
District Judge for the District of Vermont, sitting by
designation.
1
1 FOR APPELLANT: JAMES R. FROCCARO JR., LAW
2 OFFICE OF JAMES R. FROCCARO,
3 Port Washington, New York.
4
5 FOR APPELLEE: ROBERT T. POLEMENI (with David
6 C. James on the brief) for Kelly
7 T. Currie, United States
8 Attorney for the Eastern
9 District of New York, Brooklyn,
10 New York.
11
12 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
13 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gleeson, J.).
14
15 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
16 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
17 AFFIRMED.
18
19 Lulzim Kupa appeals from the judgment of the United
20 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
21 (Gleeson, J.), sentencing Kupa to a 132-month term of
22 imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
23 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
24 presented for review.
25
26 On appeal, Kupa asserts a single claim of ineffective
27 assistance of counsel. This Circuit has a “baseline
28 aversion to resolving ineffectiveness claims on direct
29 review.” United States v. Morris,
350 F.3d 32, 39 (2d Cir.
30 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
31 See Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003)
32 (“[I]n most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is
33 preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of
34 ineffective assistance.”).
35
36 Here, however, it is not difficult to adjudicate Kupa’s
37 claim on appeal. It is clear from the record that Kupa’s
38 claim fails on the merits because Kupa cannot prevail on the
39 performance prong of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668
40 (1984), especially because “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s
41 performance must be highly deferential.”
Id. at 689.
42 Kupa’s only argument is that counsel failed to argue that
43 Kupa should not be deemed a career offender. But counsel
44 did so argue: “I, as I indicated, wholeheartedly agree . . .
45 that he’s not a career offender.” A. 128; see also A. 131-
46 33. Indeed, the government accused Kupa’s counsel of
47 breaching the plea agreement precisely because he made this
2
1 argument. Government Appendix 29 (“[T]he government claims
2 that we have breached the plea agreement by arguing that
3 defendant is not a career offender.”).
4
5 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
6 Kupa’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the
7 district court.
8
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
11
3