ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Simmons Bank ("Simmons")'s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 46.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 47, 48, 56.) After careful consideration, the motion is
Plaintiff brings this putative class action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for unjust enrichment. This case arises out of allegations that Simmons charged overdraft fees on transactions which did not overdraw Plaintiffs' accounts. Plaintiffs had or have checking accounts with Simmons and opted into Simmons' standard overdraft practices. Pursuant to the terms and conditions (Doc. 39-1) (the "Deposit Agreement") and the fee schedule (Doc. 39-2), Simmons charged a $35 per item overdraft fee for transactions that overdrew an account. At the heart of this case, is how Simmons calculated a consumer's balance in determining when a customer's account was overdrawn.
Federal pleading rules provide that a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this requirement is "to `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Each allegation in a pleading must "be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). "No technical form" is required for pleadings and the Court construes pleadings "so as to do justice[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
Rule 8's pleading standard must be read in conjunction with Rule 12(b)(6), which tests a pleading's legal sufficiency. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim is facially plausible where the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Wilson v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Serv., 850 F.3d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While a complaint does not need to include detailed factual allegations, the complaint must allege more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully to survive a motion to dismiss. Wilson, 850 F.3d at 371 (citation omitted). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the well-pled allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Osahar v. U.S. Postal Service, 263 Fed. Appx. 753, 864 (8th Cir. 2008).
In arguing that all claims should be dismissed, Simmons contends that Plaintiffs failed to plead compliance with the notice and cure provision of the Deposit Agreement and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim on each of their three claims. The Court will address each of Simmons' arguments in turn.
Simmons first argues Plaintiffs failed to plead compliance with the notice and cure provision of the Deposit Agreement. (Doc. 47, p. 6.) Such provision occurs on pages 10 and 11 of the 58-page Deposit Agreement and reads as follows:
(Doc. 39-1) (emphasis in original). Page 31 of the Deposit Agreement also contains a section entitled ERROR RESOLUTION NOTICE, which states in relevant part:
(Id. at 31) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs allege that they complained to the bank about the overdraft fees being charged. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 20, 24.) Plaintiffs also argue in their response that the notice and cure provision is inapplicable to the overdraft fees imposed by Simmons. Plaintiffs reason that the provision applies only to errors, not the intentional imposition of fees by Simmons. Plaintiffs also reason the language in the Deposit Agreement applies to conduct by third parties, such as fraud, not the acts of Simmons itself. See Smith v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:18-CV-464, 2019 WL 1746367, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CV-464, 2019 WL 4050946 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2019) (noting "case law suggests: (1) the notice provision does not clearly and unambiguously apply to the bank fees at issue; (2) to interpret the notice provision to apply to bank fees could be viewed as hypertechnical and unconscionable; (3) the short 30-day time limit may be unreasonable as applied to Fifth Third's imposition of fees; and/or (4) any violation could be viewed as "harmless" in the context of adhesion contracts in the banking industry.") Simmons, on the other hand, argues that the plain language of the contract provides that a failure to timely report errors "precludes [plaintiff] from asserting a claim against [Simmons]." Simmons also argues that Plaintiffs' complaints to the bank do not satisfy the Deposit Agreement's requirement to provide notice at a designated phone number or address. Based on the authority cited, Defendant has not persuaded the Court how the notice and cure provision unequivocally precludes Plaintiff's claims. Rather, the parties' arguments on this question are dependent on the interpretation and application of the Deposit Agreement. Tannehill v. Simmons Bank, No. 3:19-cv-140-DPM, 2019 WL 7176777, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2019). While there may or may not be ambiguity, at this juncture, the Court is unable to find that Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law. Id. Therefore, Simmons Motion to Dismiss will be denied on this ground.
Simmons' next three arguments pertain to Plaintiffs' individual claims. Under Arkansas law
Under Arkansas law, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a separate claim. Tannehill, 2019 WL 7176777, at *1 (citing Mountain Home Flight Service, Inc. v. Baxter Cty., Ark., 758 F.3d 1038, 1043 (8th Cir. 2014)). However, where a plaintiff has alleged additional breaches to the contract, separate from allegations of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, courts have permitted plaintiffs' claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to survive. E.g., Id.; ICM of Am., Inc. v. Leica Geosystems, Inc., No: 4:16CV00160 SWW, 2016 WL 4014604, at *4 (E.D. Ark. July 26, 2016); Hanjy v. Arvest Bank, 94 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1028 (E.D. Ark. 2015). In this case, Plaintiffs have pled their claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a separate count. While Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a stand alone claim, the Court in Tannehill allowed the claim to proceed where the claim was pleaded in an almost identical manner as the one in this case. 2019 WL 7176777, at *1. While the allegations of the violation of the implied covenant are not a separate claim, they survive as part of the breach of contract claim. Id. Therefore, Simmons' Motion to Dismiss will be denied on this ground.
Pursuant to Arkansas law, "[w]here the parties have an enforceable contract that fully addresses a subject, they must proceed on that contract in resolving their differences." QHG of Springdale v. Archer, 373 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). "But where the contract fails on some basis, or does not fully address a subject . . . then the parties' contract is no bar to an unjust-enrichment claim for restitution. Id. (citation omitted). In accord with several other cases, at this juncture, the Court finds it cannot definitively determine whether the contract addresses every issue in this case. E.g., Tannehill, 2019 WL 7176777, at *1; Hanjy, 94 F. Supp.3d at 1034-35. If the contract does not address every issue, then Plaintiffs may have a valid claim for unjust enrichment. Therefore, Simmons' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment will be denied.
Accordingly, and after careful consideration, Simmons' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 46) is