PER CURIAM:
This case arises from James Harding's claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., against Behringer Harvard District Reit, LLC (BHDR), which owns an apartment complex called the District Universal Boulevard Apartments (the District) in Orlando, Florida. Harding alleged that by failing to remedy certain flaws in the design and construction of the District,
Section 3604 of the FHA deals with discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, and § 3604(f) deals with discrimination against people with handicaps in particular. Subsection (f) is divided into nine subparts, the first three of which are relevant to this appeal. The first two subparts make certain types of discrimination unlawful:
Subpart (3) then delineates three types of conduct included in the definition of discrimination for the purposes of subsection (f). The first two examples, (f)(3)(A) and (f)(3)(B), deal with an owner's refusal to allow a handicapped person to make reasonable modifications and an owner's refusal to make reasonable accommodations, respectively, while the third, (f)(3)(C), deals with discrimination in a dwelling's design or construction:
Orlando Apartments, LLC owned and built the District in 2009.
In his first cause of action, Harding asserted a claim against Orlando Apartments for designing and constructing the District in a discriminatory manner, citing the design-and-construction guidelines. In his second cause of action, Harding asserted claims against BHDR under § 3604(f)(1)-(2), alleging that BHDR "continued to allow the [design-and-construction violations] to exist." Harding contended that by failing to remedy the violations, BHDR discriminated against people with handicaps in violation of the FHA. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment to BHDR on this claim, and Harding appealed.
"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards used by the district court." Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir.2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
This case requires us to determine whether the FHA's design-and-construction guidelines provide a standard for determining whether discrimination under subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) exists outside of the design and construction contexts. We hold that the guidelines do not. Despite the fact that BHDR was not involved in the design or construction of the District, all of Harding's claims that BHDR violated subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) are alleged through the lens of the design-and-construction guidelines in subsection (f)(3). Harding alleged a series of inaccessible conditions resulting from Orlando Apartments' initial failure to comply with the guidelines and argued that BHDR's failure to remedy those conditions constitutes an independent act of discrimination prohibited by the FHA. Harding's underlying premise is that § 3604(f)(3)(C) not only requires designers and builders to adhere to certain standards of accessibility but also imposes an ongoing duty on subsequent owners to ensure that a dwelling conforms to those standards. As the FHA's plain text demonstrates, this premise is erroneous.
The design-and-construction guidelines are prefaced with the phrase "in connection with the design and construction" of a covered dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (emphasis added). This phrase plainly sets a significant limitation on the guidelines' application, and there are substantial justifications for this limitation. For instance, accessible designs that are easy to implement at the design-and-construction phase may be excessively costly and difficult to add once a dwelling has been built. Reading the design-and-construction limitation out of the guidelines would therefore result in requirements that are potentially far more burdensome than Congress intended. In
Congress could easily have written the design-and-construction guidelines to establish a general standard of discrimination applicable to all owners of covered dwellings, but instead it included a clear, significant limitation. We cannot read this limitation out of the guidelines. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2125, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) ("It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore conclude that Harding cannot state a claim under the FHA against BHDR, which was not involved in the design or construction of the District, by reference to § 3604(f)(3)(C).
The FHA's plain text dictates the foregoing conclusion, and we need not look any further. Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) ("We begin our construction of [a statute] where courts should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision."). Nonetheless, we note that the FHA's legislative history, as well as administrative guidance provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
The FHA's legislative history reflects Congress's understanding that the design-and-construction guidelines would not be applied in other contexts. In the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives recommending passage of the provisions at issue in this appeal (the House Report), the Committee emphasized the comparative ease of incorporating accessible features into a dwelling at the design-and-construction stage. H.R.Rep. No. 100-711, at 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2188 ("The Committee believes that these basic features of adaptability are essential for equal access ... as well as being easy to incorporate in housing design and construction." (emphasis added)); id. ("When reinforcements are installed as a part of new construction, there is no aesthetic change to the bathroom and it is of minimal expense. Having to add reinforcements later, however, can be a major structural undertaking with associated expense."); id. at 18, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179 (noting that designing dwellings with accessible features would allow occupants with handicaps to "install[] grab bars ... without major renovation or structural change"); id. (describing the statute's "modest requirements" and noting it does "not add significant additional costs" and "does not require ... the renovation of existing units"). The House Report therefore demonstrates Congress's intent to mitigate the burdens of compliance with the guidelines by applying them only during design and construction when they can be implemented more easily and with less expense. Adopting Harding's more expansive reading would undermine Congress's purpose in limiting § 3604(f)(3)(C) to design and construction and transform the FHA's "modest requirements" into something far more onerous.
Harding cannot escape the clear import of the FHA's legislative history by pointing
HUD's guidance similarly supports our interpretation of the design-and-construction guidelines. HUD was asked about the applicability of the design-and-construction guidelines to subsequent purchasers and responded with a letter indicating that, subject to exceptions not at issue in the instant case, subsequent owners are not appropriate defendants for claims based on the design-and-construction guidelines. HUD has also published a frequently-asked-questions page with a similar question and response. In both cases, HUD's interpretation of the design-and-construction guidelines is consistent with our own. Harding concedes as much but disagrees with the amount of deference to which HUD's guidance is entitled on the design-and-construction issue. We decline to address these arguments because our independent reading of the statute leads to the same conclusion HUD reached. Thus, whether we defer to and rely on HUD's guidance is of no consequence; our decision would be the same in either case. Suffice it to say that HUD's interpretation of the design-and-construction guidelines could only strengthen our conclusion.
Because the guidelines have no bearing outside of the design and construction contexts, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to BHDR. When, as in the instant case, a plaintiff attempts to establish a subsequent owner's discrimination purely by reference to conditions that do not comply with the design-and-construction guidelines, his claims must fail.
In this appeal, Harding raises concerns to which we are not unsympathetic; namely, the difficulties people with handicaps can encounter in trying to find suitable,
