LARRY J. McKINNEY, District Judge.
Before the Court is Petitioner William C. Gray's motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons explained below, Mr. Gray's motion for relief is
Mr. Gray was convicted in No. 2:02-cr-00018-LJM-CMM-13 of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. Mr. Gray has previously challenged this conviction via 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
On December 27, 2006, Mr. Gray filed an action for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which reached an adjudication on the merits in No. 1:06-cv-01840-LJM-WTL. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's denial of relief. See Gray v. United States, 341 Fed. Appx. 193, 194 (7th Cir. 2009).
When there has already been a decision on the merits in a federal habeas action, to obtain another round of federal collateral review a petitioner requires permission from the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See Potts v. United States, 210 F.3d 770, 770 (7th Cir. 2000). This statute, § 2244(b)(3), "creates a `gatekeeping' mechanism for the consideration of second or successive [habeas] applications in the district court." Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996); see Benefiel v. Davis, 403 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lloyd, 398 F.3d 978, 979-80 (7th Cir. 2005). A subsequent motion is "second or successive" within the meaning of the statute when the same underlying conviction is challenged. See Dahler v. United States, 259 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2001).
The present action represents another attempt to collaterally challenge the conviction in No. 2:02-cr-00018-LJM-CMM-13, however, it is presented without authorization to proceed from the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the action must be
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court finds that Mr. Gray has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find it "debatable whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court therefore