K. GARY SEBELIUS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 67); Defendant Marketplace Loan Grantor Trust, Series 2016-LD1's Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 54); and Defendants Equifax Information Services LLC and Equifax Inc.'s Motion to Strike First Amended Verified Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Verified Complaint (ECF No. 61). For the reasons stated below, the motion to amend is granted. Marketplace Loan Grantor Trust's motion to strike is denied as moot. Equifax Information Services LLC and Equifax Inc.'s motion is denied as to the request to strike plaintiff's amended complaint. The district judge will resolve the portion of the motion that seeks dismissal.
Plaintiff Anthony J. Hampton, pro se, filed this case on July 13, 2018. The complaint asserts claims against Defendants Discover Bank, Marketplace Loan Grantor Trust (MLGT) for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. and claims against Defendants Barclays Bank Delaware, Discover Bank, Loan Depot, LLC, Equifax, Inc., Equifax Information Services, LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and TransUnion, LLC for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. Beginning on August 8, 2018, defendants began filing motions to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff lacked standing to assert certain claims or that plaintiff's complaint did not state a claim for relief, or both.
On October 23, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion to amend, which essentially seeks belated permission to have filed his amended complaint. Plaintiff's amended complaint changes the name of Loan Depot, LLC to Loandepot.com, LLC. Multiple paragraphs clarify which claims plaintiff asserts against which defendant, and plaintiff adds two new paragraphs of factual allegations.
The motions to strike argue that the court should strike the amended complaint because plaintiff filed it without first obtaining leave of the court. Because plaintiff subsequently moved for leave to amend, the court's analysis will focus on whether to grant leave to amend rather than whether the amended pleading should be stricken because it was filed without leave. The court recognizes that the pro se plaintiff cites Rule 15(c) as the basis for his motion. This subsection governs the relation back of amendments. Because the court must liberally construe pro se litigants' filings,
When leave of the court is required to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), the court may refuse leave "only [upon] a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment."
"A proposed amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal."
MLGT argues that plaintiff's proposed amended complaint is futile because it does not address the two issues raised in MLGT's motion to dismiss—that plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims against MLGT and that plaintiff's claims against MLGT fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. In short, MLGT contends that plaintiff's claims are futile for the same reasons stated in MLGT's pending motion to dismiss.
This court has previously addressed the argument that allowing an amended complaint would be futile because the amended pleading contains the same defects as the original pleading. In both cases, the court rejected this argument.
This is the case here. Plaintiff's proposed amendments are mostly technical and do not involve new claims or new parties. Applying the same logic set forth above, MLGT has not demonstrated how the proposed amendments to plaintiff's complaint would render his claims futile. Because of this, plaintiff's motion to amend is granted. The court permits plaintiff's amended complaint (ECF No. 48). MLGT's motion to strike and the Equifax defendants' request to strike are denied as moot. MLGT and Experian have fourteen (14) days from the date of this order to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff's amended complaint.
Accordingly,