MEMORANDUM RULING

REBECCA F. DOHERTY, District Judge.

Pending before this Court are two cross motions for summary judgment, as follows: (1) Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PHI, Inc. ("PHI") [Doc. 71]; and (2) Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Office & Professional Employees International Union ("OPEIU") and its Local Union 108 ("Local 108") (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Unions") [Doc. 72]. In its motion, PHI moves for summary judgment on its sole claim against the Unions in the main demand and on Claim I of the Unions' Counterclaim against PHI. Specifically, PHI argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as follows:

In their motion, the Unions seeks summary judgment on Count I of its Counterclaim against PHI — which asks for a declaratory judgment as to the rights and obligations of the parties under the arbitration ruling and a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering PHI to arbitrate the merits of the January 5, 2006 Grievance — and on the "claims" raised by PHI in the main demand, dismissing PHI's demands. Both parties have filed responsive briefs [Docs. 74 & 75], and the matter is now ripe for review.

For the following reasons, PHI's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 71] is DENIED, and the Unions' motion for summary judgment [Doc. 72] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED FN PART, the motion is granted only to the extent this Court concludes the arbitration ruling at issue should be "upheld," and the January 5, 2006 Grievance returned to the normal arbitration process in light of this Court's ruling.2

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The following facts are undisputed:

Thus, based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the instant lawsuit arises out of two grievances filed by the Unions against PHI, to wit:

January 5, 2006 Grievance

During the December 2005 negotiations, the subject of contract pilots came up "because of rumors" that PHI was hiring contract pilots, which the Unions believed violated the CBA if, in fact, the contact pilots were domestic (and not international) pilots. The issue was specifically raised during the December 14, 2005 negotiating session; at that time, PHI asserted it was, indeed, hiring domestic contract pilots. The Unions contend they requested specific information in an attempt to discover whether or not these hirings violated the CBA. According to the Unions, PHI initially refused to provide any of the requested information, but, at the end of the bargaining session, provided the Unions with a letter concerning the contract pilot issue. The Unions argue — and PHI does not appear to dispute — this letter did not provide the Unions "with much" of the information they were requesting, including the names of the contract pilots, where they were working, and whether they were domestic or international pilots.

The Unions argue that after the December 14, 2005 negotiating session, Local 108 President Steve Ragin returned to work in his next scheduled shift and continued to investigate the rumors of contract pilot hires, but did not immediately file a grievance, because he remained uncertain about the status of the domestic contract pilot hires. However, at some point, Mr. Ragin was informed about a specific pilot named Scott Tinnesand, who had been hired by PHI as a domestic contract pilot and who did not intend to fly internationally. At that point, the Unions believed a verifiable violation of the CBA had occurred, and the Unions filed their contract pilot grievance on January 5, 2006.

The January 5, 2006 grievance — Number 010506-001 — was properly processed through the steps of the Grievance Procedure and was denied at each step by PHI. The Unions appealed the denial of the January 5, 2006 grievance to the Joint Systems Board of Adjustment, which deadlocked. At a meeting on February 22, 2007, the issue of whether a neutral arbitrator had been selected to resolve the January 5, 2006 Grievance was raised. PHI opposed arbitration, arguing the January 5, 2006 grievance was untimely at that point, because the Unions had not requested a neutral within 10 days of the deadlock. However, the parties agreed to submit the question of whether the January 5, 2006 grievance was timely — and thus, "arbitrable" — to Arbitrator John B. Barnard for a binding ruling. With respect to proceeding in the foregoing manner, the parties have entered into a Stipulation, in which the parties stipulate "issues of procedural arbitrability are for the arbitrator to decide in cases arising out of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")", citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555-59, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964) and Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-85, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002).3

On September 5, 2007, Arbitrator Barnard conducted a hearing on the January 5, 2006 Grievance, and on December 15, 2007, issued a ruling in the Unions' favor, concluding the January 5, 2006 grievance was "timely and thus arbitrable."

June 6, 2007 Grievance

On June 6, 2007, the Unions filed a grievance alleging PHI's continued retention of subcontract pilots violated the terms and conditions of the CBA as to both the method by which PHI subcontracted out helicopter work as well as the time period in which PHI subcontracted out helicopter work. On June 15, 2007, the Unions and PHI signed a Letter of Understanding agreeing to hold in abeyance the June 6, 2007 grievance until the receipt of Arbitrator Barnard's decision on the January 5, 2006 grievance.

After receipt of Arbitrator's Barnard's December 15, 2007 decision on the January 5, 2006 Grievance, the Unions requested that PHI assign a grievance number to the June 6, 2007 grievance and process the grievance. On January 4, 2008, PHI refused to process the June 6, 2007 grievance, arguing the grievance is time-barred and not arbitrable.

The Instant Lawsuit

PHI filed the instant lawsuit on January 3, 2008, seeking to vacate Arbitrator Barnard's December 15, 2007 ruling that the January 5, 2006 Grievance is "timely and thus arbitrable" on grounds the decision is invalid and unenforceable under Section 3, First (q) of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153(q), because the decision fails to conform, or confine itself to, matters within the scope of the System Board's jurisdiction. On January 30, 2008, the Unions answered PHI's complaint, alleging the decision of Arbitrator Barnard is correct and his ruling should be upheld, and asserting the following counterclaims:

In its motion for summary judgment, PHI moves for summary judgment in its favor on its sole claim against the Unions in the main demand, and against the Unions on Count I of the Unions' counterclaims against PHI.4 In their motion, the Unions seeks summary judgment in the Union's favor on Count I of the Unions' counterclaims, as well as summary judgment against PHI as to "the claims" raised by PHI in the main demand. Therefore, the instant motions present cross motions for summary judgment on PHI's claims in the main demand and Count I of the Unions' counterclaims against PHI. The motions do not address Count II of the Unions' counterclaims against PHI.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in the parties favor as to all or any part thereof." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(b). Summary judgement is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c).

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)

As summarized by the Fifth Circuit in Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir.1994):

The Supreme Court has instructed:

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 884, 888-89, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)(emphasis added)).

The Fifth Circuit has further elaborated:

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Finally, in evaluating evidence to determine whether a factual dispute exists, "credibility determinations are not part of the summary judgment analysis." Id. To the contrary, "in reviewing all the evidence, the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, and should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party, as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached." Roberts v. Cardinal Services, 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir.2001).

B. The Standard for Judicial Review of Adjustment Board/Arbitrator Awards

The parties agree on the standard to be employed by this Court in reviewing the December 15, 2007 decision of Arbitrator Barnard. The dispute over PHI's use of contract pilots is a dispute over a grievance that involves the interpretation and application of the CBA between PHI and the Unions. As such, the dispute concerning PHI's use of contract pilots is classified as a "minor dispute" under the RLA. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 481 F.3d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir.2007). Minor disputes must be resolved through compulsory and binding arbitration before the SBA. Id. at 231. See also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 550 F.3d 418, 423 (5th Cir. 2008) (minor disputes involving the interpretation of terms in an existing CBA must be resolved through binding arbitration before the NRAB or another adjustment board), citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303-04, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989). These arbitration remedies "were intended by Congress to be the complete and final means for settling minor disputes." BNSF, 550 F.3d at 423, citing Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 373 U.S. 33, 39, 83 S.Ct. 1059, 10 L.Ed.2d 172 (1963); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94, 99 S.Ct. 399, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978) ("Congress considered it essential to keep these so-called `minor' disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the courts. The effectiveness of the Adjustment Board in fulfilling its task depends on the finality of its determinations."). Accordingly, "the federal courts do not sit as super arbitration tribunals in suits brought to enforce awards of the Adjustment Board. They may not substitute their judgments for those of the Board divisions." (emphasis added) Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1970); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) ("Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts."). (emphasis added)

Consequently, "[j]udicial review of [SBA] decisions arising from the terms of a[CBA] is narrowly limited, and courts should afford great deference to arbitration awards."5 Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 555 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir.2009), citing Resolution Performance Prods., LLC v. Paper Allied Indus. Chem. & Energy Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-1201, 480 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir.2007) (discussing non-RLA CBAs). The standard for this review is "among the narrowest known to the law," (emphasis added) E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, Local 533, 580 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir.1978), and flows from the RLA's "preference for the settlement of disputes in accordance with contractually agreed-upon arbitration procedures." Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 323, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972), cited in Continental Airlines, 555 F.3d at 405.

The district court should defer to an SBA decision based on any reasonable ground presented by the parties, even if not relied upon by the SBA in its decision. Continental Airlines, 555 F.3d at 405-06, citing Resolution Performance, 480 F.3d at 767 n. 20 (emphasis added). Additionally, a court may decline to defer to a decision of the SBA only if (1) the SBA failed to comply with the RLA, (2) there is evidence of fraud or corruption in the SBA, or (3) the order by the SBA did not "confine itself to matters within the scope of [the SBA's] jurisdiction." Continental Airlines, 555 F.3d at 406, citing Mitchell, 481 F.3d at 231. Absent one of those exclusive grounds, or a judicially created exception for public policy concerns,6 this Court must defer to the arbitrator's decision.

The United States Supreme Court summarized the law applicable to federal court review of labor arbitration awards in Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, stating:

532 U.S. 504, 509-10, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).

Tims, in light of this highly deferential standard, the applicable law requires that even where a court would have interpreted the contract differently, it must still affirm the award. So great is the level of deference that a court may not review the merits of an award, but rather, must accept the facts found by the arbitrator and the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract and applicable law. W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983); Manville Forest Products Corp. v. Paperworkers Union, 831 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir.1987). As the Court stated in W.R. Grace:

461 U.S. at 764, 103 S.Ct. 2177 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). Courts have held an award draws its "essence" from the collective bargaining agreement so long as it is "rationally inferable" in "some logical way" from that agreement. Manville Forest Products Corp., 831 F.2d at 74. (emphasis added)

Thus, in general, a court reviewing an arbitral decision does "not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts." United Paperworkers Intern. Union AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). The courts are bound to interpret the arbitrator's award and the contract broadly so as to uphold the award. Manville Forest Products Corp., 831 F.2d at 74 (emphasis added).

1. PHI's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 71]

In its motion, PHI does not contend there is evidence of fraud or corruption in the SBA, but argues the arbitrator's decision should be overturned on the first two grounds of 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (q), that is, (1) the arbitrator failed to comply with the RLA, and (2) the arbitrator failed to conform himself to matters within the scope of his jurisdiction.

a. The 7-day time limit on a party's right to file a grievance

PHI argues Arbitrator Barnard's ruling must be vacated, because Barnard failed to comply with the RLA when he gave no effect to a seven-day time limit on a party's right to file a grievance.

The specific provision at issue is Article 36 of the CBA, which provides in relevant part:

PHI argues the Unions had a "definitive acknowledgment" of PHI's use of contract pilots on December 14, 2005, when, on that date, Mr. Bohelski of the Unions asked Mr. Rovinelli of PHI if PHI was, in fact, hiring eight contract pilots per month and Mr. Rovinelli responded in the affirmative. At that point, the Unions asked for additional information about the pilots, including their names, hire dates, work locations and rates of pay, to which PHI responded it did not intend to provide such information. Based on the foregoing, PHI argues the Unions had actual knowledge of the contract pilot issue on December 14, 2005, and therefore had within seven days of that date to file a grievance. PHI argues the Unions failed to do so, and the January 5, 2006 Grievance is, therefore, untimely.8

In his ruling, Arbitrator Barnard notes that at the December 14, 2005 bargaining session, the issue of contract pilots was broached. The arbitrator's ruling contains the following exchange between Paul Bohelski for the Unions and Peter Kiefer, an attorney for PHI, with respect to the issue:

In his ruling, Arbitrator Barnard asserts:

Thus, Arbitrator Barnard found the issue of contract pilots was still "wide open" on December 14-15, 2005, and it was not until Mr. Ragin spoke to Scott Tinnesand that he uncovered what Mr. Ragin referred to in Ms testimony as "the smoking gun." Arbitrator Barnard notes the Unions then immediately filed their grievance on January 5, 2006. In making his ruling, Arbitrator Barnard asserts:

To this Court, PHI argues the arbitrator imposed an obligation on PHI to engage in discovery that the RLA does not require. PHI further argues the breach of the CBA alleged by the Unions is that PHI impermissibly hired contract pilots, not that PHI impermissibly hired, for example, contract pilot A on November 5; contract pilot B on November 8; and contract pilot C on November 10.

The law is well-settled this Court, except perhaps in rare exceptions, not involved here, must accept the facts as found by the arbitrator in making his decision, and courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509-10, 121 S.Ct. 1724. In the instant case, after considering the evidence presented by the parties, Arbitrator Barnard made findings of fact, namely, that the issue of contract pilots was "wide open" at the December 14-15, 2005 bargaining sessions, said sessions having provided "no basis for a specific grievance," and that it was not until Mr. Ragin spoke to Scott Tinnesand that he learned that PHI was, actually, hiring contract pilots in possible violation of the CBA. Based on these fact findings, Arbitrator Barnard concluded the January 5, 2006 Grievance was filed within seven days of the Unions discovering a possible violation with Scott Tinnesand. Although this Court might disagree with Arbitrator Bernard's factual finding and interpretation, this Court does not have the authority to substitute its opinion of the facts for the arbitrator's factual findings, or its opinion for the arbitrator's conclusion when the "arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within his authority" ... even if this Court were "convinced he [the arbitrator] committed serious error." Thus, Arbitrator Bernard's finding that the January 5, 2006 Grievance was timely, inasmuch as that conclusion is based on the facts as determined by the arbitrator and interpretation of those facts, must stand. Accordingly, this Court must conclude, pursuant to applicable jurisprudence, the arbitrator did not fail to comply with the RLA or fail to conform himself to matters within the scope of his jurisdiction in concluding the Unions' January 5, 2006 Grievance was timely filed, and PHI's contention, although seductive, is not grounded within applicable jurisprudence.

b. The 10-day time limit on a party's right to seek arbitration

PHI, also, argues Arbitrator Barnard's ruling must be vacated, because Barnard failed to comply with the RLA when he gave no effect to what PHI argues is an express ten-day time limit on a party's right to seek arbitration. The specific provision at issue is Article 37, Section 5 of the CBA, which states in relevant part:

The January 5, 2006 Grievance was denied by PHI and ultimately was presented to a four-person System Board of Adjustment, which deadlocked on June 15, 2006. PHI makes the same argument to this Court that it made to the arbitrator: The Unions had ten days after the Board deadlocked within which to request the selection of neutral arbitrators for further proceedings. Because the Unions did not request a panel of neutral arbitrations until February 2007, approximately eight months after the June 15, 2006 deadlock, the Unions' request for a panel of neutral arbitrators was untimely. In the instant motion, PHI argues Arbitrator Barnard's ruling must be vacated, because the arbitrator's "fundamental misreading" of the CBA caused the arbitrator to "render a plainly irrational decision." In doing so, PHI argues the arbitrator "exceeded his jurisdiction under the Agreement; he violated the RLA; and he produced an award that must be vacated." PHI argues:

Thus, PHI argues the choice to request a panel of neutrals was permissive, but the time period within which to do so was mandatory. PHI argues the arbitrator's conclusion that the word "may" in Article 37 denotes a "volitional requirement, not a mandatory requirement" is irrational, and in so ruling, the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his jurisdiction, because he plainly rewrote the terms of the CBA by reading out the 10-day time limit.

Again, the Court is mindful its review of Arbitrator Barnard's ruling is "among the narrowest known to the law," E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, Local 533, 580 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir.1978), and flows from the RLA's "preference for the settlement of disputes in accordance with contractually agreed-upon arbitration procedures." Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 323, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972), cited in Continental Airlines, 555 F.3d at 405. This Court, also, notes the provision of the CBA between PHI and the Unions, which states the decisions of an arbitrator are final and binding on the parties. Within this very limited prism, the Court reviews the decision of Arbitrator Barnard.

In his ruling, Arbitrator Barnard observed the past practice of the parties was for the Unions to request a panel of neutrals within 10 days of a Board deadlock if the Unions wanted to take a matter to arbitration. However, Arbitrator Barnard noted in this particular case, PHI admitted the Unions were not advised that no neutral had been selected during the June 2006 Board meeting, as had occurred in the past at every other Board meeting since the inception of the CBA between the parties. Arbitrator Barnard noted the absence of such comments "was reasonable since the parties were continuing to discuss the contract pilot issue during the negotiations."13 Thus, the arbitrator considered the past practice of the parties in attempting to interpret the CBA, but the past practice of the parties was not particularly helpful in this case, as the parties did not follow their past practices in this particular instance.

Arbitrator Barnard then focused his attention on the express language of the CBA itself, stating "[t]he language [of Article 37] itself provides that in the event the Board cannot agree on a neutral member, within 10 calendar days thereafter, either party may request that the AAA submit a list of neutrals. Section 5 provides a volitional requirement, not a mandatory requirement."14 In so concluding, Arbitrator Barnard noted a "subtle difference" in the wording of Article 37 and Article 36 of the CBA addressing grievances, explaining Article 36 "uses the term shall in advancing a grievance through the various steps," but under Article 37, "the word shall is omitted and the word may is contained in requesting a neutral."15 Arbitrator Barnard also noted Article 36, Section 5 states, "Any grievance not presented and processed in the manner, and within the time limits set forth above (the grievance procedure) shall be waived....." but that there is no such wording contained in Article 37.16

Arbitrator Barnard noted his conclusion that the word "may" in Article 37 is permissive rather than mandatory is consistent with the understanding of both Paul Bohelski, Chief Negotiator for the Unions, and Richard Rovinelli, Director of Human Resources for PHI. Specifically, during Arbitrator Barnard's hearing on the issue of whether the Unions' failure to request a panel of neutrals within 10 days was an arbitrable issue, Mr. Bohelski testified:

Additionally, Mr. Rovinelli testified:

Considering the foregoing, Arbitrator Barnard ruled as follows:

As discussed, the pending grievance in this case is timely and thus arbitrable.19

The law is clear that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contracts] and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." The SBA "may look beyond the written contract when interpreting a collective bargaining agreement if the instrument is ambiguous or silent upon a precise question." Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., 555 F.3d 399, 406-07 (5th Cir.2009).

In the instant case, Arbitrator Barnard considered the precise arguments before the Court today, that is, the interpretation of the word "may" in Article 37 of the CBA. In interpreting Article 37, the arbitrator considered the express language of Article 37 and compared it to other language existing within the CBA, specifically, the language contained within Article 36,20 as well as the common usage of the word "may" contained within a dictionary. Thus, Arbitrator Barnard "settled the dispute between the parties with respect to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement by interpreting the express language of the contract;" in other words, Arbitrator Barnard did not dispense with the language of the CBA and dispense his own "notions of industrial justice." Rather, Arbitrator Barnard compared and contrasted the language of two provisions of the CBA — Articles 36 and 37 — in interpreting the language at issue. Based on his interpretation of the language contained within the foregoing sections of the CBA, and well as the accepted and common usage of the word "may," Arbitrator Barnard concluded a failure to comply with any time limit in Article 37 does not result in waiver of the right to request a panel of neutrals. In so finding, the arbitrator concluded the January 5, 2006 Grievance is timely.

Under established law, even if this Court were convinced Arbitrator Barnard committed serious error in making this determination — which this Court does not, nor need it, address — such error would not be sufficient to overturn his decision. As the Supreme Court stated in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960):

Thus, this Court may only vacate the ruling of Arbitrator Barnard if it concludes the arbitrator's ruling is not "rationally inferable" in "some logical way" from the CBA. Again, even if the Court were to disagree with the arbitrator, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for the arbitrator's. Thus, the Court cannot conclude PHI's argument must prevail, in this case. Here, Arbitrator Barnard properly considered the language of the CBA as well as the common usage of terms within the CBA, and his interpretation of the language contained within Article 37 cannot be said not to be "rationally inferable" in "any logical way" from the CBA. Cognizant that "[j]udicial review of [SBA] decisions arising from the terms of a[CBA] is narrowly limited," that "courts should afford great deference to arbitration awards," and that the standard of review employed by this Court in considering the decision of Arbitrator Barnard is "among the narrowest known to the law," this Court must conclude it has no authority to vacate the arbitrator's decision that the January 5, 2006 is "timely and thus arbitrable."

Considering the foregoing, it is ORDERED that PHI's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 71] is DENIED in its entirety.

2. The Unions' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 72]

In their motion, the Unions seek judgment "on [their] Counterclaim, Count I, and on the claims raised by Plaintiff, PHI, Inc." on grounds the arbitral ruling of John Barnard should be enforced by this Court.

In Count I of their Counterclaim, the Unions seek the following relief:

The parties do not dispute the Unions' argument that this Court possesses the jurisdiction to issue the relief requested by the Unions, either in the form of a declaratory judgment or preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief. Furthermore, the Unions' position is consistent with applicable jurisprudence. See, e.g., New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, I.L.A., Local Union #1418, 389 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir.1968) (".... it has become commonplace for federal courts to enforce arbitration awards by mandatory injunction where matters other than strikes, work stoppages of [sic] picketing are involved[;]" "[o]nce arbitration [is] completed, the matter "becomes" ripe for specific performance and [falls] outside the scope of Norris-LaGuardia."), citing Minute Maid Co. v. Citrus, Cannery, Food Processing and Allied Workers, Drives, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union # 444, 331 F.2d 280, 281 (5th Cir.1964); Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees' Union Local 255, 328 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.1964).

Under the unique facts of this case, however, i.e. where the parties, by stipulation, agreed to submit an individual threshold question(s) to the arbitrator, here primarily, whether the matter was/is arbitrable,22 and when, for the reasons noted above, this Court has concluded under the legal standards for a district court's consideration of a labor arbitration award, that this Court does not have the authority to vacate Arbitrator Barnard's December 15, 2007 Award in favor of the Unions, which held that the Unions' January 5, 2006 Grievance with respect to PHI's hiring of contract pilots is "timely and thus arbitrable," a different result might be demanded. Specifically, in respect to the specific relief requested by the Unions, this Court has concern the Union over-reaches. In its request for relief, the Unions seek an injunction "ordering that PHI arbitrate the merits of [the January 5, 2006 Grievance]," not that the arbitrator's ruling that the claim is arbitrable be validated and upheld.

While this Court has concluded it has no grounds to vacate the arbitration ruling, neither have the Unions carried their burden to show that they are entitled to an injunction ordering PHI to arbitrate the merits of the grievance. While the foregoing may well be the next step in the process, this case involves a unique situation wherein the arbitrator did not rule on the merits of any particular grievance, or order one or the other party to engage in the arbitration process, rather than, for instance, choose to settle or resolve the matter in some other fashion, rather, the arbitration considered and ruled on two procedural, threshold issues which had been raised as bars to the arbitration process. Therefore, the arbitrator did not grant any substantive relief with respect to the January 5, 2006 Grievance. Thus, the only relief for this Court to "uphold" under these circumstances is to affirm the arbitrator's ruling that the January 5, 2006 Grievance was "timely and thus arbitrable" and allow the parties to return to the normal course of negotiation and perhaps arbitration as laid out by Congress. While the next step in the process may well be to arbitrate the merits of the grievance, neither party has precisely indicated when or how the SBA process might work in this unique factual situation and whether arbitration itself, is or might be mandatory or permissive, and, thus, this Court will not herein substitute itself for the operation of that process, whatever it might be, by ordering PHI to do something outside and beyond the very narrow threshold and procedural issues submitted to and decided by the arbitrator. What the next procedural step might be in a situation such as this is a matter for the CBA and arbitration process to define — not this Court. Considering the foregoing, the Unions's motion is GRANTED only to the extent this Court "upholds" Arbitrator Barnard's December 15, 2007 ruling that the January 5, 2006 Grievance is "timely and thus arbitrable," and DENIED as to the broad relief requested by the Unions, and this Court returns this matter to the parties to continue toward resolution by those processes delineated by the CBA and the existing congressional procedures, to proceed toward full resolution in that manner or manners.

III. Conclusion

Considering the foregoing, this Court concludes it has no authority to vacate the arbitrator's December 15, 2007 ruling that the Unions' January 5, 2006 grievance was "timely and thus arbitrable." Considering the foregoing, PHI's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 71] is DENIED in its entirety, however, this Court finds the Unions overreach as to the relief requested, thus, the Unions' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 72] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED to the extent this Court "upholds" Arbitrator Barnard's December 15, 2007 ruling that the January 5, 2006 Grievance is "timely and thus arbitrable," and DENIED as to the broad relief sought, and this Court returns this matter to the enumerated resolution processes to proceed in a manner that is consistent with this finding.