WILLIAM T. MOORE, Jr., District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Multiplicious Counts. (Doc. 280.) In this motion, Defendant argues that counts one and two of the second superseding indictment—conspiracy to commit murder for hire and conspiracy to commit murder, respectively—are multiplicious and should be charged as only one conspiracy. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is
An indictment contains multiplicious counts where a single offense is charged in more than one count.
In this case, counts one and two of the second superseding indictment each require the Government to prove slightly different facts. Conspiracy to commit murder for hire requires that the Government prove Defendant conspired (1) to use or cause another to use any facility of interstate or foreign commerce; (2) the intention that murder be committed; and (3) the existence of a promise or agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value as consideration for committing the murder. Conspiracy to commit murder only requires the Government to prove Defendant conspired to cause the death of the victim with (1) malice aforethought and (2) premeditated intent. Comparing these two counts, it is clear that conspiracy to commit murder for hire requires proof of elements in addition to those required for conspiracy to commit murder.
Unsurprisingly, these two counts are charged under separate conspiracy statutes. Conspiracy to commit murder for hire is charged under a general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, which prohibits two or more individuals from conspiring to commit any offense against the United States. Conspiracy to commit murder, however, is charged under a specific conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1117, which expressly prohibits two or more individuals from conspiring to commit murder. Given the separate code sections underlying counts one and two of the second superseding indictment, these counts are not multiplicious. Accordingly, Defendant's motion must be denied
SO ORDERED.