Filed: Dec. 23, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-2430 Singh v. Lynch BIA Christensen, IJ A200 943 204 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 14-2430 Singh v. Lynch BIA Christensen, IJ A200 943 204 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE ..
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14-2430
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A200 943 204
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 23rd day of December, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 RALPH K. WINTER,
8 DENNIS JACOBS,
9 GERARD E. LYNCH,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 GURPREET SINGH, AKA SINGH
14 GURPREET,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 14-2430
18 NAC
19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Amy Nussbaum Gell, New York, New
25 York.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
28 Assistant Attorney General; Linda S.
29 Wernery, Assistant Director;
30 Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney,
1 Office of Immigration Litigation,
2 United States Department of Justice,
3 Washington, D.C.
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
7 DENIED.
8 Petitioner Gurpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
9 seeks review of a June 20, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming
10 a May 17, 2013 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
11 Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
12 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
13 Gurpreet Singh, No. A200 943 204 (B.I.A. June 20, 2014), aff’g
14 No. A200 943 204 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 17, 2013). We assume
15 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
16 procedural history in this case.
17 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
18 the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.”
19 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
20 2006). The applicable standards of review are well
21 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
22 Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
2
1 For asylum applications, like Singh’s, governed by the REAL
2 ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
3 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an asylum
4 applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
5 plausibility of his or her account, and inconsistencies in his
6 or her statements, “without regard to whether” they go “to the
7 heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
8 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167
9 (2d Cir. 2008). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
10 determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,
11 it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an
12 adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
13 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
14 credibility determination, which was based mainly on Singh’s
15 implausible testimony. The agency reasonably found it
16 implausible that Singh could be a party activist with a pro-Sikh
17 political party, without knowing the party’s chief goal, or that
18 elections occurred shortly after he began his alleged activism.
19 We uphold an IJ’s implausibility findings unless we have a
20 “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
21 committed,” Ming Xia Chen v. BIA,
435 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.
3
1 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), as long as the finding
2 is “tethered to record evidence,” Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509
3 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007).
4 The agency’s implausibility finding is supported by
5 Singh’s inconsistent testimony about alleged persecution
6 related to his activism. His application stated that he was
7 beaten by Congress Party “hooligans.” However, he initially
8 testified that he was at a rally when unknown assailants beat
9 him for undisclosed reasons, and then immediately testified
10 that his assailants told him to join the Congress Party. His
11 claim of political activism is undermined by his changing
12 accounts of the incident and the motivation for it, and by his
13 ignorance of the goals of his party and the fact that elections
14 had occurred.
15 Singh was given opportunities to explain the implausible
16 features of his testimony. Although he had never heard of
17 Khalistan (the independent state whose formation is the central
18 goal of his political party), he said that people in India do
19 not talk about Khalistan for fear that they will be persecuted.
20 As to not knowing about the 2009 elections, he stated that he
21 was a simple party worker who provided free food service for
4
1 the impoverished. Neither explanation is so compelling that
2 a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to accept it,
3 particularly as it contradicts his assertions in his
4 application that he was one of a small group of activists who
5 promoted the party. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81
6 (2d Cir. 2005).
7 Further, the IJ reasonably found that Singh’s
8 corroborating evidence was insufficient to rehabilitate his
9 testimony. Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.
10 2007). While Singh stated that he had learned of Khalistan by
11 attending a Sikh temple in the United States, he produced no
12 evidence from his fellow congregants. Further, he submitted
13 no evidence from his family describing the 2004, 2009, and 2010
14 incidents. And, the IJ permissibly afforded scant evidentiary
15 weight to the documentary evidence that he did submit because
16 the authors of letters from his village leader and the political
17 party were unavailable for cross-examination, and his doctor’s
18 letter was not contemporaneous with the treatment it described.
19 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d
20 Cir. 2006).
5
1 Considering the foregoing, the IJ’s adverse credibility
2 determination is supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C.
3 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. This finding
4 was sufficient to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
5 relief, as all three claims were based upon the same factual
6 predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.
7 2006).
8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
9 DENIED.
10 FOR THE COURT:
11 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6
