RUDY LOZANO, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a Petition under 28 U.S.C. Paragraph 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a person in State Custody Seeking Review of a Prison Disciplinary Sanction, filed by Freeman Irby, a pro se prisoner, on January 29, 2016. Here, Irby challenges a disciplinary determination made by a hearing officer at the Indiana State Prison ("ISP") under case number ISP 15-09-0152. For the reasons set forth below, the court
On September 14, 2015, Internal Affairs Investigator Christopher Dustin prepared a conduct report charging Irby with Offense B-212 battery. The conduct report stated:
ECF 7-1.
Irby was originally found guilty of this charge on September 28, 2015. ECF 7-11. But, during the administrative appeal process, the charge was vacated and case remanded for a new hearing in order for Investigator Dustin to provide some clarification of the conduct report. Id.
The original conduct report was used on rehearing. Id. On October 20, 2015, Irby was notified of the charge of battery and served with a copy of the conduct report and the screening report. ECF 7-3. The screening report reflects that he pled not guilty and requested a lay advocate. He requested a witness statement from Officer Crowe, a camera review of the incident, along with all medical records, pictures and physician's notes. Id.
On October 21, 2015, Investigator Dustin wrote a letter to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO") clarifying the conduct report:
ECF 7-2.
A statement from Officer Crowe had been obtained and presented at the original hearing; it was included in the confidential report and another one was not obtained. ECF 7-3; ECF 7-6; ECF 11 at p. 15. The DHO conducted a video review, and prepared a summary:
ECF 7-7. Irby's medical records were also obtained. ECF 11; ECF 7-8.
On October 26, 2015, the DHO held a disciplinary rehearing. ECF 7-5. At the hearing, Irby provided a statement:
Id.
At the hearing, Irby alleged that he had sent a request for statements from two other officers through prison mail a few days before the hearing. Id. The DHO denied those two requests because he never received them and also because the witnesses were not relevant. After the hearing, the DHO found Irby guilty of battery, in violation of B-212. She based her finding on the internal affairs investigation, the video and video summary, the incident report, the medical reports, the witness statements, the medical costs, and the seriousness of the infraction. ECF 7-5. Irby appealed to the Superintendent and Final Reviewing Authority, but those appeals were denied. ECF 7-9; ECF 7-10.
Here, Irby raises five claims in his petition: (1) he did not receive his restrictive housing report within 24 hours; (2) the DHO violated his due process rights by denying he witness requests; (3) the DHO was not impartial; (4) his due process rights were violated because he was not able to view all of the evidence; and (5) there is no evidence that he injured Offender Simmons.
When prisoners lose earned time credits in a prison disciplinary hearing, they are entitled to certain protections under the Due Process Clause: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by a fact finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be "some evidence" to support the hearing officer's decision. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
First, Irby claims to be entitled to habeas relief because he was placed on restrictive housing on September 11, 2015, but did not receive his housing status report within 24 hours. While Wolff requires written notice of the charges 24 hours before the hearing, there is no such requirement that an inmate be given a restrictive housing report within 24 hours of being placed in restrictive housing. And, while Irby claims that the prison's internal rules or policies were violated, this would not entitle Irby to federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (habeas relief is only available for a violation of the U.S. Constitution or other federal laws); Hester v. McBride, 966 F.Supp. 765, 775 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (violation of prison policy in disciplinary proceeding could not support grant of habeas relief, since federal habeas court "does not sit to correct any errors of state law"). Moreover, this claim addresses his conditions of confinement — restrictive housing—not the fact or length of his custody. Thus, this claim can not be remedied in a habeas petition pursuant to section 2554. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973).
Second, Irby complains that his witness requests were denied. Irby requested Officer Crowe be at the rehearing. However, that request was denied because Officer Cowe's statement was included in the original hearing and was in the confidential case file. Though Irby wanted to cross-examine Officer Cowe at the rehearing, an inmate in a prison disciplinary hearing has no right to confront or cross-examine witnesses. Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556 ("Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply"). Thus, this does not warrant habeas relief.
Irby was also denied requested statements from the IDU Sergeant and Officer Taylor. The DHO denied that request because she was unaware of the requests before the hearing. It is true that untimely day of hearing evidentiary hearing requests can be denied. Sweeney, 113 F.3d at 720; Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 346-47. However, even if Irby requested those statements in a timely manner, neither officer was present at the time of the incident. So, their testimony would be irrelevant as to whether Irby committed battery. A hearing officer may deny witness or evidence requests that threaten institutional goals or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, a hearing officer's improper exclusion of evidence will be deemed harmless unless there is some indication from the record that the evidence "might have aided [the prisoner's] defense." Id. at 666. Irby does not identify anything from these officers that would prove to be exculpatory or that might have aided his defense. Thus, even if the hearing officer improperly excluded these witnesses, it would have been a harmless error. Thus, he is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
Third, Irby complains that he was denied an impartial hearing officer. In the prison disciplinary context, adjudicators are "entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity," and "the constitutional standard for improper bias is high." Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666. Due process prohibits a prison official who was personally and substantially involved in the underlying incident from acting as a decision-maker in the case. Id. However, due process is not violated simply because the hearing officer knew the inmate, presided over a prior disciplinary case, or had some limited involvement in the event underlying the charge. Id.
Here, Irby believes that the hearing officer was generally biased, but there is no indication that she was involved in any way in the events underlying the charge. He appears to believe the hearing officer was impartial because the officer made adverse rulings against him. But adverse rulings alone do not establish impermissible bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994). Thus, this ground does not entitle him to habeas relief.
Fourth, Irby generally complains that he was not able to view all of the evidence. However, the fact that Irby did not receive the full contents of the confidential case file or view that actual video does not mean that his due process rights were violated. Indeed, the DHO is entitled to review confidential reports without disclosing them to the inmate to further institutional safety and security. Henderson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994); Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985). Upon review of the confidential case file, the Court agrees that the materials should not be disclosed to Irby for safety and security reasons. Nor is Irby entitled to view Simmons' medical records, as those are irrelevant.
Fifth, Irby claims there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of battery. In reviewing a disciplinary determination for sufficiency of the evidence, "courts are not required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board's decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis." McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). "[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985). A court will overturn the hearing officer's decision only if "no reasonable adjudicator could have found [the prisoner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented." Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077. Additionally, a hearing officer is permitted to rely on circumstantial evidence to establish guilt. See Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992).
Offense B-212 battery is defined as "committing a battery upon another person without a weapon or inflicting bodily injury." ECF 7 at 12. (Citing the Adult Disciplinary Process for Offenses within the Indiana Department of Corrections). In this case, it is clear that the record contains "some evidence" to support the hearing officer's determination that Irby was guilty of battery. The conduct report is some evidence that Irby battered another inmate. McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (conduct report alone provided some evidence to support disciplinary determination). This is also corroborated by other evidence. The confidential case file outlines the investigation and includes Offender Simmons' statement. ECF 11. The video review establishes that a black inmate identified as Irby was observed punching a white inmate. Again, there is more than sufficient evidence to have found him guilty of battery.
Not only is there sufficient evidence to find Irby guilty of the charged offense, but there has been no showing that he was deprived any due process along the way. Based on the record, there is sufficient evidence to find Irby guilty of battery, and he has not made a showing that his due process rights have been violated.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court
