Dillard, Presiding Judge.

Following a stipulated bench trial, Kirby McKibben was convicted of driving under the influence (per se), driving under the influence (less-safe), driving without headlights, and failure to maintain lane.1 McKibben appeals from his convictions by challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless blood test. Specifically, McKibben argues that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to the blood test under the standard set forth recently by our Supreme Court in Williams v. State.2 But because the trial court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in finding that McKibben consented to the blood test, we affirm.

On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence "most favorably to affirming the trial court's factual findings and judgment."3 Indeed, the trial court's decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.4 And here, the parties appear to agree on all the relevant facts and evidence. Consequently, we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo, "examining the entire record and making an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness."5

So viewed, the evidence presented at the hearing on McKibben's motion to suppress establishes that Holly Springs police dispatch received a call about a possibly intoxicated driver in a maroon Scion, and information indicating the vehicle's direction of travel. These particulars were then broadcast over the police radio and, shortly thereafter, a Holly Springs sergeant observed a vehicle matching the description "swerving from left to right ... [and] crossing one time over the center divider[.]" After initiating a traffic stop, the sergeant approached the driver, McKibben, and immediately smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle. The sergeant also noticed that McKibben's eyes were glazed and his speech was "thick-tongued." According to the sergeant, McKibben's body reeked of an alcoholic beverage and he appeared off balance when exiting the vehicle. Nevertheless, McKibben adamantly denied consuming alcohol and declined to take any field-sobriety evaluations.

McKibben's denials notwithstanding, the sergeant placed him under arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence. McKibben was also read the implied-consent notice for suspects 21 or over from a prepared card, which stated as follows:

McKibben replied "yes," but did not ask any questions about the implied-consent notice or his rights, did not request an attorney, and never indicated an unwillingness to have the blood sample taken. The sergeant testified that (1) neither he nor McKibben ever raised their voices during this encounter, (2) their conversation was polite, and (3) he did not threaten McKibben or make him any promises in exchange for giving consent.

Thereafter, the sergeant transported McKibben to a fire station less than one mile away. Once they arrived at the station, McKibben's handcuffs were removed and he submitted to a blood draw by a qualified firefighter. According to the sergeant, McKibben understood what was going on, appeared intelligent and well-spoken, and "was very cooperative throughout the entire encounter." The blood test ultimately showed that McKibben's blood-alcohol level was above the legal limit.7

McKibben later moved to suppress the results of his blood test, arguing that his acquiescence to the request for a blood draw, following a reading of the implied-consent notice, did not constitute actual consent. The trial court disagreed. Specifically, the court concluded that, in light of Williams v. State,8 and based on "a totality of the circumstances," McKibben voluntarily consented to having his blood drawn.9 In doing so, the court noted that McKibben agreed to take the test after having been read his implied-consent notification; his blood was taken within one hour of the arrest and therefore was not the result of a prolonged detention; the sergeant did not threaten or intimidate McKibben, nor did he promise McKibben anything; the sergeant did not withhold food or drink or refuse McKibben use of the restroom; the sergeant removed McKibben's handcuffs to allow the firefighter to withdraw the blood; and McKibben willingly interacted with the firefighter collecting his blood sample and never indicated that the blood draw was not freely and voluntarily given.

On appeal, McKibben challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Although McKibben acknowledges that he was read the implied-consent notice, acquiesced to the blood draw, and submitted to the test without resistence, he nevertheless contends that, under Williams, this is insufficient to show actual consent and render the search constitutionally valid. McKibben further argues that the implied-consent notice fails to inform defendants that they may refuse to comply and that the test results could be used against them in a criminal prosecution, thus negating any voluntary consent.10 We disagree as to each of these contentions.

Historically, we considered a defendant's affirmative response to the reading of the implied-consent notice as "sufficient to allow a search of his or her bodily fluids without further inquiry into the validity of the defendant's consent."11 However, in Williams, our Supreme Court "rejected this per se rule automatically equating an affirmative response to the implied consent notice with actual consent to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."12 Now, we are charged instead with conducting "a case-by-case analysis, considering the totality of the circumstances."13

Thus, McKibben is correct that, under Williams, the results of a warrantless blood test are subject to suppression unless the State establishes that the suspect freely and voluntarily consented to the test.14 And a suspect's mere acquiescence under the implied-consent notice is not enough to render the search constitutionally valid.15 That said, we have previously cautioned that Williams should not be read as imposing "a per se rule that the State must always show more than consent under the implied consent statute."16 Rather, we take our Supreme Court at its word when it instructed trial courts to "review the totality of the circumstances in determining consent."17 Accordingly, an affirmative response to the question posed by the implied-consent language "may be sufficient for a trial court to find actual consent, absent reason to believe the response was involuntary."18 To put it plainly, in determining the demarcation line between actual consent and coercion, context is crucial. Thus, in order to ascertain whether a suspect freely and voluntarily consented to the test, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding his consent, including (but not limited to) whether there was any threat or coercion by the officer; whether the suspect was unable to give valid consent due to (for example) his youth or lack of education; and whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer's request.19

In this case, as in Kendrick, the evidence simply does not show that "the officers used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the consent."20 Nor does McKibben argue that youth, lack of education, or low intelligence somehow negated the voluntariness of his consent.21 Rather, McKibben argues that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to the blood test because (1) the language of the implied-consent notice made him feel as though he had no choice but to acquiesce and (2) he was not informed that his blood-test result could be used against him in a criminal prosecution. But we have already rejected these arguments in other cases.22 Indeed, as we have previously explained, while knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, "the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent."23

Here, the record shows that McKibben gave an affirmative answer to the question posed by the implied-consent language, and he never attempted to change that answer during the time that elapsed prior to testing. McKibben also did not appear to be impaired to the extent that he did not understand what was being asked, he did not express any objection to the test, and the officer did not force him to take the test. Thus, upon this particular record, "and considering all of the facts before us, and affording appropriate deference to the trial court that heard the testimony first-hand,"24 we affirm the trial court's denial of McKibben's motion to suppress.

Judgment affirmed.

Reese and Bethel, JJ., concur.