ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS, Chief Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Tanya Mayle brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (ECF No. 10), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 15), Plaintiff's Reply (ECF No. 16), and the administrative record (ECF No. 16). For the reasons that follow, it is
On September 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed applications for both supplemental security income and for child's disability insurance benefits, alleging that she had been disabled since September 24, 1980. (R. at 275-67.) Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. at 183-91, 195-99.) Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge. (R. at 201-03.) Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Timothy G. Keller held a hearing on December 5, 3017, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. (R. at 115-32.) On April 9, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 43-56.) On October 24, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision. (R. at 1-4.) Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action.
On December 30, 2015, Steven Meyer, Ph.D., a psychologist, examined Plaintiff at the request of the Social Security Administration. (R. at 407.) In assessing her mental status, Dr. Meyer noted that Plaintiff's grooming was clean and neat with well-organized thought processes. (R. at 409.) Plaintiff presented as childlike, shy, withdrawn, and anxious. (Id.) Plaintiff's affect was constricted and her prevailing mood was moderately dysphoric and anxious. (Id.) Plaintiff was alert and oriented to person, place, time and situation and had no difficulty understanding simple or moderately complex instructions. (Id.)
Dr. Meyer diagnosed Plaintiff with agoraphobia and personality disorder and assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of 60. (R. at 410.) Dr. Meyer opined that Plaintiff has the cognitive capacity to understand, remember, and carryout simple and moderately complex routine instructions and tasks, with oral and hands-on assistance and supervision as needed. (Id.) Dr. Meyer further opined that Plaintiff would likely be able to perform adequately in a setting without strict production requirements. (R. at 411.) Dr. Meyer also opined that if collateral information from other sources is consistent with her presentation today, Plaintiff would not be able to manage the social demands of a competitive work setting. (Id.) Dr. Meyer noted that Plaintiff's functioning appeared in the borderline range on the day of the examination, but opined that it was unlikely that she would sustain that in a fast-paced or changing setting. (Id.) According to Dr. Meyer, "[i]f her presentation and self-report are consistent with information from other sources, it is not expected that she would be able to withstand the stress of a competitive work setting or the demands to function and make changes independently without increased symptoms and deterioration." (Id.)
Nicholaas Dubbeling, Ph.D., conducted psychological evaluations of Plaintiff on October 2, 2017, and November 10, 2017, and administered the WAIS-IV test on the latter date. (R. at 643-47.) Upon examination, Dr. Dubbeling noted that Plaintiff was fairly alert, oriented times four, and her speech was fluent and slightly slow with normal articulation. (R. at 644.) Plaintiff was unable to follow proverbs. (Id.) Her remote memory was intact but short-term memory included only one of four words. (Id.) Arithmetic was fair. (Id.) Dr. Dubbeling disagreed with Dr. Meyer, stating that Dr. Meyer's diagnosis of agoraphobia was not accurate. (R. at 646.) Dr. Dubbeling also stated that Dr. Meyer overestimated Plaintiff's intellectual functioning but "totally agree[s]" with Dr. Meyer that "[i]f collateral information from other sources is consistent with her presentation today, she would not be able to withstand the stress of a competitive work setting or the demands to function and make changes independently without increased symptoms and deterioration." (Id.) Dr. Dubbeling opined that Plaintiff's "ability for competitive employment [] is even worse than he [Dr. Meyer] documented. In my opinion, with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty she is not a suitable candidate for competitive employment." (Id.) Dr. Dubbeling went on to assign Plaintiff a GAF score of 30 and diagnosed her with persistent depressive disorder with early onset, social anxiety disorder, mild intellectual disability of unknown etiology. (R. at 647.) He noted that Plaintiff felt anxious in social situations, was dependent upon her aging parents, and was not independent in most areas of daily living. (Id.)
In a report dated November 27, 2017, Dr. Dubbeling opined that Plaintiff was "seriously limited" in the following abilities and aptitudes: remember work-like procedures; understand and remember very short and simple instructions; carry out very short and simple instructions; ask simple questions or request assistance; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions. (R. at 648.) Dr. Dubbeling also opined that Plaintiff was "unable to meet competitive standards" in the following abilities and aptitudes: maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; make simple work-related decisions; perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Id.) Dr. Dubbeling further opined that Plaintiff had "no useful ability to function" in the following abilities and aptitudes: maintain attention for two hour segment; work in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted; and complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms. (Id.)
In the same report, Dr. Dubbeling opined that Plaintiff was "unable to meet competitive standards" in her abilities to understand and remember detailed instructions and to carry out detailed instructions and that she had no useful ability to function in her abilities to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others and to deal with stress of semiskilled work. (R. at 649.) In explaining these limitations, Dr. Dubbeling stated that Plaintiff has no capacity to engage in semiskilled and skilled labor due to mild intellectual disability in combination with social anxiety and depressive disorder. (Id.)
Dr. Dubbeling also opined that Plaintiff was unable to meet competitive standards in her ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and had no useful ability to function in her abilities to interact appropriately with the general public; to travel to unfamiliar place; and to use public transportation. (Id.) In explaining these limitations, Dr. Dubbeling stated that they were primarily due to Plaintiff's mild intellectual disability, "which precludes her from competitive employment." (Id.) In responding to the question whether there were any additional reasons why Plaintiff would have difficulty working at a regular job on a sustained basis, Dr. Dubbeling opined that, "generally speaking, . . . she has no capacity for competitive employment of any nature, unskilled or skilled labor." (Id.) Dr. Dubbeling went on to opine that Plaintiff would be absent from work more than four days per month. (Id.)
On January 13, 2016, Kristen Haskins, Psy.D., state-agency psychologist, reviewed Plaintiff's medical record. (R. at 139-43, 152-56.) Dr. Haskins determined that Plaintiff had the medically determinable impairments of anxiety and personality disorders. (R. at 139-40, 152.) Dr. Haskins found that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to understand and remember detailed instructions. (R. at 141-42, 154.) Dr. Haskins estimated that Plaintiff had average to borderline intellectual functions and that she was able to follow conversation as well as remember and understand to carry out simple to moderately complex instructions in a work setting. (R. at 142, 154.) Dr. Haskins also determined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (R. at 142, 155.) Dr. Haskins explained this limitation as follows:
(R. at 142, 155.) Dr. Haskins went on to opine that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in her ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, explaining as follows:
(R. at 143, 155.) According to Dr. Haskins, Plaintiff "would need major changes to a set work routine explained in advance and slowly implemented to allow claimant time to the new expectations[.]" (R. at 143, 156.) Finally, Dr. Haskins explained Plaintiff's mental residual functional capacity ("RFC") as follows:
(R. at 143, 156.)
On March 23, 2016, Patricia Kirwin, Ph.D., reviewed the medical record upon reconsideration. (R. at 165-66, 168-70, 177-78.) Dr. Kirwin agreed with many of the limitations found by Dr. Haskins. (Id.) Dr. Kirwin agreed with Dr. Haskins that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods and added that Plaintiff was "able to perform 1-3 step tasks w/no high pace or high production quotas." (R. at 169.) As to her mental RFC, Dr. Kirwin also added the following: "On recon, Clmt reported that she has not had any changes to her conditions. She said that there has not been any worsening and that they are the same. Clmt reported that she has the same limitations @ Claims communication created 2/23/16." (R. at 170.)
On April 9, 2018, the ALJ issued his decision. (R. at 43-56.) At step one of the sequential evaluation process,
At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairment: anxiety disorder. (Id.)
At step three of the sequential process, the ALJ concluded that that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 46.) At step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC as follows:
(R. at 47-48.) In reaching this determination, the ALJ accorded "some weight" to the opinions of the state agency psychologists, Drs. Haskins and Kirwin. (R. at 52.) The ALJ generally agreed with and found that Plaintiff was capable of simple, repetitive tasks, but found no support in the record for a required separate work area, additional supervisions, additional flexibility regarding shifts or breaks, or noted advanced explanation of and adjustment time for changes in work routine. (Id.) The ALJ also accorded "some weight" to the opinion of Dr. Meyer. (Id.) While the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff has the cognitive capacity to understand, remember and carryout simple and moderately complex, routine instructions and tasks in a setting without strict production requirements, he found the remaining portions of Dr. Meyer's opinions were not supported. (R. at 53.) The ALJ assigned "little weight," however, to Dr. Dubbeling's opinion. (Id.)
Relying on the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. at 54.) He therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. at 55-56.)
When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court "must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it `is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.'" Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ."). Under this standard, "substantial evidence is defined as `more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must "`take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight'" of the Commissioner's decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, "if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding `even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ's decision meets the substantial evidence standard, "`a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.'" Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff advances one contention of error. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by not incorporating relevant mental limitations in his RFC determination, resulting in a deficient RFC that does not adequately address Plaintiff's limitations. In so arguing, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the mental health opinion evidence of record.
In evaluating a claimant's case, the ALJ must consider all medical opinions that she receives. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). Medical opinions include any "statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2). Here, Drs. Dubbeling and Meyer are nontreating sources. See Smith v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 875 (6th Cir. 2007) ("A `nontreating source' (but examining source) has examined the [plaintiff] `but does not have, or did not have, an ongoing treatment relationship with' her.") (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.) Although an examining source's opinion is generally is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining source, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1), an ALJ may reject an opinion if it is inconsistent with the record evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4); Gant v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 372 F. App'x 582, 585 (6th Cir. 2010).
Finally, the Commissioner reserves the power to decide certain issues, such as a claimant's residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Although the ALJ will consider opinions of treating physicians "on the nature and severity of your impairment(s)," opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are generally not entitled to special significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ considered Dr. Dubbeling's opinion regarding Plaintiff's intellectual functioning and impairments, but assigned it "little weight[,]" reasoning as follows:
(R. at 53.) Plaintiff complains that the ALJ "completely failed to provide any explanation to support his decision" to discount Dr. Dubbeling's opinion as conclusory, noting that Dr. Dubbeling personally examined Plaintiff on two occasions, reviewed and evaluated consultative opinions, including agreeing with Dr. Meyer's opinion that Plaintiff would not be a suitable candidate for competitive employment. (ECF No. 10 at 11-12.)
Plaintiff's argument is not well taken. As a preliminary matter, the ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Dubbeling's finding that Plaintiff had an intellectual disability where none of Plaintiff's relevant IQ scores fell within the sub-70 range, which is generally associated with significantly sub average general intellectual functioning. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05; cf. Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-12759, 2015 WL 899207, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2015) ("Even assuming plaintiff's valid IQ scores below 70, the undersigned notes that a low IQ score, in itself, is not evidence of "subaverage intellectual functioning or deficits in his adaptive functioning during [plaintiff's] developmental period.'") (quoting Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 381 F. App'x 488, 491-92 (6th Cir. 2010)).
In addition, the ALJ explained that he found Dr. Dubbeling's commentary about Plaintiff's ability to work conclusory because Dr. Dubbeling provided little explanation of the evidence underlying this opinion. (R. at 53.) A review of Dr. Dubbeling's commentary supports the ALJ's assessment, including that Dr. Dubbeling failed to specify clinical evidence to support his findings. (R. at 646.) Regardless, the ALJ properly went on to find that Dr. Dubbeling's opinion that Plaintiff "is not a suitable candidate for competitive employment" intrudes on an issue reserved for the Commissioner. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ is not required to give this opinion any particular weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (1996) ("Medical sources often offer opinions about whether an individual... is `disabled' or `unable to work[.]'. . . Because these are administrative findings that may determine whether an individual is disabled, they are reserved to the Commissioner."); Bass, 499 F.3d at 511 (holding that the ALJ properly rejected a treating source's opinion that the claimant was disabled because such a determination was reserved to the Commissioner); Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:18CV622, 2019 WL 764792, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2019) (finding that because "the issue of disability is a legal, not a medical issue" and reserved to the Commissioner, "opinions on the ultimate issue of disability, regardless of their source, are not entitled to any particular weight or deference") (citations omitted).
Plaintiff nevertheless insists that the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. Dubbeling's opinion (and the opinions of Dr. Meyer and the state agency psychologists) because "the opinions share striking similarities with respect to specific functional limitations." (ECF No. 10 at 12.) However, "if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding `even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'" Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in his consideration of Dr. Dubbeling's opinion.
The ALJ considered Dr. Meyer's opinion and assigned it "some weight[,]" reasoning as follows:
(R. at 52-53.) Plaintiff complains that the ALJ found that the record did not support Dr. Meyer's functional limitations, arguing that the mental health records contain consistent findings supporting his opinions. (ECF No. 10 at 9-10.)
The Sixth Circuit has held that a doctor's conclusion may be properly rejected when it is "inconsistent with the substantial evidence in the record indicating otherwise." Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 391 (6th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has also held that it "generally defers to an ALJ's decision to give more weight to the opinion of one physician than another where, as here, the ALJ's decision is supported by evidence that the rejected opinion is inconsistent with the other medical evidence in the record." Cox v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 295 F. App'x 27, 35 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's detailed analysis of Dr. Meyer's opinion. For example, the ALJ noted that Dr. Meyer himself qualified his opinion when stating "that if collateral information from other sources is consistent with her presentation today." (R. at 53.) The ALJ's consideration of the record and discussion provides substantial evidence to support his decision that other evidence was not consistent with or did not support the level of dysfunction noted by Dr. Meyer. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (providing that "the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight" it is given). For example, the record supports ALJ's explanation that Plaintiff's mental status examinations did not reflect positive findings or were otherwise unremarkable. (See, e.g., R. at 48-51, 408-09, 359-60, 368-69, 403-04, 436-37; 503-04, 538-39, 558, 574-80, 597-600, 635-37.) Similarly, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's symptoms of anxiety improved with medication and therapy is supported by the record evidence. (R. at 48-51, 498, 521, 570, 572-74, 580, 584, 592, 595, 603, 616, 618-19, 624, 632, 641.) It was reasonable for the ALJ to consider that Plaintiff's condition improved after taking prescribed medication. See Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 564 F. App'x 758, 763 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that improvement after taking prescribed medication supports a denial of disability benefits) (citing Hardaway v. Sec'y, 823 F.2d 922, 927 (6th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ also reasonably considered Plaintiff's testimony that she is able to provide care in the form of cooking and cleaning to her ailing parents, in addition to managing her own personal needs, when deciding what weight to assign to Dr. Meyer's opinion. See Swanson v. Berryhill, No. 6:17-183-DCR, 2018 WL 813579, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff's statements about his daily activities "undermine his assertions that he is disabled"). In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's detailed reasons for discounting portions of Dr. Meyer's opinions. Stiltner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App'x 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2007) ("The ALJ did not summarily dismiss [the doctor's] opinion. Rather, the ALJ detailed at substantial length why he found it lacking compared with the other evidence. This is all that we require when reviewing an administrative law judge's decision for compliance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)'s reasons-giving requirement.").
Finally, while Plaintiff points to contrary evidence in the record, the undersigned finds for the reasons previously stated that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Meyer's opinion and the court must defer to that finding even if there is substantial evidence supporting an opposite conclusion. Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406; cf. Schmiedebusch v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 536 F. App'x 637, 649 (6th Cir. 2013) ("The ALJ retains a `zone of choice' in deciding whether to credit conflicting evidence."). For these reasons, the undersigned finds that the ALJ did not err in his consideration of Dr. Meyer's opinion.
The ALJ considered the opinions of the state agency psychologists, Drs. Haskins and Kirwin, and assigned them "some weight," reasoning as follows:
(R. at 52.) Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's finding that there was no support in the record for "functional limitations of a separate work area, additional supervision, flexibility with shifts and breaks, and advance explanation and adjustment time for changes in work routine." (ECF No. 10 at 9.)
The ALJ's decision to reject certain limitations is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ may give the opinions of non-examining State agency doctors weight "only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case record." SSR 96-6p. As set forth above, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff's anxiety had improved with treatment, resulting in her going out with some regularity with a friend and group member. (R. at 52; see also R. at 48-51, 498, 521, 570, 572-74, 580, 584, 592, 595, 603, 616, 618-19, 624, 632, 641.) As previously discussed, it was reasonable for the ALJ to consider that Plaintiff's condition improved after taking prescribed medication. See Smith, 564 F. App'x at 763.
Plaintiff further complains that the ALJ "discredited the opinions by cursorily mentioned some favorably-selected evidence and ultimately concluding that the record showed improvement in Ms. Mayle's treatment." (ECF No. 10 at 9.) Essentially, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently. Yet, it is "[a]dministrative law judges [who] are responsible for reviewing the evidence and making administrative findings of fact and conclusions of law[.]" 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b); see also Schmiedebusch, 536 F. App'x at 649. To the extent that Plaintiff accuses the ALJ of "cherry picking" evidence, such an allegation "is seldom successful because crediting it would require a court to re-weigh record evidence." DeLong v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 748 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2014); see also White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e see little indication that the ALJ improperly cherry picked evidence; the same process can be described more neutrally as weighing the evidence.").
For all these reasons, the undersigned finds that the ALJ did not err in his consideration of the state agency psychologists' opinions. Cf. Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16-cv-1121, 2018 WL 526553, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2018) ("Because the ALJ only partially credited the state agency psychologists' assessments, the ALJ did not err to the extent he omitted a restriction on superficial interaction from the RFC finding."), recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1532527 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2018).
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's improper evaluation of the opinion evidence was more than harmless error because it resulted in an inaccurate RFC. (ECF No. 10 at 14.)
A plaintiff's RFC "is defined as the most a [plaintiff] can still do despite the physical and mental limitations resulting from her impairments." Poe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App'x 149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The determination of RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). Nevertheless, substantial evidence must support the Commissioner's RFC finding. Berry v. Astrue, No. 1:09CV000411, 2010 WL 3730983, at *8 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2010). When considering the medical evidence and calculating the RFC, "`ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings.'" Simpson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App'x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Isaacs v. Astrue, No. 1:08-CV-00828, 2009 WL 3672060, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2009) (holding that an "ALJ may not interpret raw medical data in functional terms") (internal quotations omitted).
An ALJ is required to explain how the evidence supports the limitations that he or she set forth in the claimant's RFC:
S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *6-7 (internal footnote omitted).
Plaintiff bears the burden of providing the necessary medical evidence to demonstrate her impairments cause functional limitations resulting in disability. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(c). Where the ALJ has properly considered Plaintiff's evidence and substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion, "this Court will defer to that finding even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005.)
Here, Plaintiff argues the state agency psychologists and Drs. Meyer and Dubbeling all opined Plaintiff would benefit from a separate work area and additional supervision, which were not included in the RFC. (ECF No. 10 at 14.) However, the ALJ specifically considered and found no support in the record for these limitations. (R. at 52.) For the reasons previously discussed, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment and the Court must defer to it. Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595.
Plaintiff goes on to insist that the RFC should have included additional limitations. (ECF No. 10 at 15-16.) While Plaintiff may have preferred a different RFC than the one determined by the ALJ, the ALJ thoroughly explained the bases for his determination, which enjoys substantial support in the record. Schmiedebusch, 536 F. App'x at 649; Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a `zone of choice' within which the Secretary may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm.").
In sum, from a review of the record as a whole, the Undersigned concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision denying benefits. Based on the foregoing, it is therefore
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat'l Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that "failure to object to the magistrate judge's recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant's] ability to appeal the district court's ruling"); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant waived appeal of district court's denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to magistrate judge's report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[A] general objection to a magistrate judge's report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal. . . .") (citation omitted).
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
