HUNSTEIN, Justice.
Appellant Johnathan Durden was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the stabbing death of Ricky Grice, Jr. Durden now appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in failing to grant his request to quash his indictment and in failing to give a curative instruction after alleged improper comments were made by the prosecutor during closing argument. Finding no error, we affirm.
Less than an hour after his arrival, Blubaugh decided to leave with Grice in order to buy food and to shower, as Durden's trailer had no running water or electricity. Grice waited in the driver's seat of his single-cab pickup truck while Blubaugh entered the residence to retrieve her purse. Inside the residence, Durden asked Blubaugh if she was leaving him for Grice, to which Blubaugh said no. Blubaugh testified that she took her purse and cell phone and then proceeded to Grice's truck. Durden followed, begging her not to leave the relationship. Again, Blubaugh said she was not leaving him and explained that she would return in a few hours. Durden responded by stating, "Well, if he's going to take my girl, the least he could do is shake my hand," then proceeded to the driver's side of Grice's truck. Grice rolled down his window and Durden attacked him with a knife. During the attack, Blubaugh recalled hearing Durden say, "You think you can just come up here and take my f___ing girl." Blubaugh jumped into the passenger's seat of the truck and yelled, "let's just go, let's just get away from here." As Grice attempted to turn the truck around, his arms fell, and he slumped back into his seat.
Though Grice had a rifle located behind the bench seat of his truck at the time of the attack, there was evidence that the rifle would not have been accessible to Grice from the driver's seat. Blubaugh also testified that Grice neither brandished the weapon nor threatened Durden prior to the incident.
Grice died from multiple stab wounds, including one that entered his heart and another that punctured his lung. Additionally, the State presented blood castoff evidence establishing that Grice had been seated in the driver's side of the truck, with the door shut, during the attack.
1. Though Durden has not enumerated the general grounds, we find that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Durden was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted.
2. Initially, Durden was indicted by a July-term grand jury for murder and related offenses; that indictment was quashed because it was returned during the January-term of court. The district attorney immediately recalled the January-term grand jury, which returned a true bill against Durden for the same offenses. The trial court denied Durden's subsequent motion to quash the second indictment. Durden now argues on appeal, as he did below, that the second indictment was faulty because the January-term grand jury was not re-sworn after it "reconvened" following the substitution of at least one original grand juror with an alternate. He also argues that the bailiffs were
The January 2013 Term of the Whitfield County grand jury ran from January 14, 2013 to July 5, 2013. See OCGA § 15-6-3(12)(B). Sometime after the January-term grand jury was sworn, it was discovered that at least one of the members of the January grand jury was a convicted felon and therefore unqualified to serve. These individuals were replaced with qualified alternates. No additional oath was given after the alternates were placed on the January grand jury. After Durden's first indictment was quashed, the district attorney recalled the January grand jury on the last day of the January term of court to hear Durden's case. A true bill of indictment was returned against Durden that same day.
Durden argues that the January grand jury should have been re-sworn after the body "reconvened" with the alternate grand jurors to hear and indict his case on the last day of the term of court. "A grand jury must be administered an oath, as set forth in OCGA § 15-12-67(b)(2) and, as that section clearly contemplates, charged generally regarding their duties."
Concerning reconvening a grand jury, we have previously held "that a grand jury properly summoned, sworn, and charged to serve during a particular term of the court, may recess and reconvene as it sees fit to conduct its business in the course of that term, and need not be resworn or recharged by the court during that term."
Here, though alternate jurors were substituted during the January term of court, Durden points to no evidence that the January grand jury was ever formally discharged from its duties prior to the end of its term. Thus, the January grand jury continued to act within its term of court and remained empowered to act until the last day of its term. As there is no evidence that the January grand jury was previously discharged, the members of the January grand jury did not need to be re-sworn prior to returning Durden's second indictment. This argument is without merit. See
Pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-69, grand jury bailiffs are also required to be sworn prior to tending to the grand jury. The oath is as follows:
Id. (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that the January-term bailiffs were sworn to tend to the January-term grand jury. It is further undisputed that these same bailiffs were sworn to tend to the July-term grand jury one week prior to the start of the July term of court. Although these same bailiffs were sworn with the July-term grand jury, the plain language of OCGA § 15-12-69 indicates that the bailiffs were not divested of their authority to tend to the January-term grand jury as they
Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err by denying Durden's second plea in abatement and request to quash his second indictment.
3. Durden alleges that the trial court should have given a curative instruction during the State's rebuttal closing argument because, he says, the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify. During closing argument, defense counsel stated the following:
In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued, "He tells you that his client testified before you; no, he didn't. Testimony in a courtroom is placed under oath. Each witness that took that stand raised their right hand and promised before God to tell the truth. The defendant didn't do that." Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's comments. Despite this, Durden has requested this Court review the prosecutor's statement for plain error.
As this Court recently held in
Further, this Court is unswayed by Durden's claim that the prosecutor's statement in closing argument amounts to an infringement on Durden's constitutional right to remain silent. Because Durden did not, in fact, testify at trial, the prosecutor's rejoinder was a permissible attempt to correct defense counsel's misstatement, rather than an impermissible effort to comment on Durden's failure to testify. See
All the Justices concur.